129 Vt.
Volume 129 — Vermont Reports
112 opinions
- 129 Vt. 1Village of Morrisville Water & Light Department v. Town of Hyde Park (1970)
- 129 Vt. 8Allen v. Burlington Housing Authority (1970)
- 129 Vt. 16Gallant v. Gallant (1970)
- 129 Vt. 23Pettengill v. New Hampshire Insurance Company (1970)
- 129 Vt. 33Wilbur v. University of Vermont (1970)
- 129 Vt. 46Bogie v. Town of Barnet (1970)
- 129 Vt. 57Vermont v. Cattanach (1970)
<bold>1. Motor Vehicles — License to Operate — Suspension</bold> If the commissioner exercises the authority to suspend an operator's license within the limits of the motor vehicle law and correctly performs the procedural acts required to notify the licensee, the suspension becomes effective three days after his order and demand for suspension are certified or registered with the postal service, and his inability to communicate such information, through no fault of the motor vehicle department, will not thwart a prosecution for the offense of driving under the suspension he has imposed. 23 V.S.A. §§ 204, 674(a). <bold>2. Criminal Law — Intent</bold> It is within the power of the state to prohibit its licensees from doing an act irrespective of knowledge or ignorance on his part of the facts which make his conduct criminal.
- 129 Vt. 61Matte v. City of Winooski (1970)
- 129 Vt. 66Wright v. Nasal (1970)
<bold>1. Negligence — Last Clear Chance — Pleading</bold> The essential acts or omissions to constitute a case within the last clear chance rule must be averred in traversable form. <bold>2. Negligence — Last Clear Chance — Pleading</bold> Where the allegations charged the defendant with a breach of duty in the operation of his motor vehicle by driving at an excessive speed, failing to proceed with caution, and failing to keep a proper lookout, and the breach of duty was alleged without reference to any acts or omissions which would constitute a charge of liability against the defendant under the last clear chance doctrine then the last clear chance rule was not an issue in the case and a refusal of a requested charge on the point was proper.
- 129 Vt. 70State v. Pease (1970)
- 129 Vt. 77Allen v. Small (1970)
- 129 Vt. 81In re Milne (1970)
- 129 Vt. 84Simpson v. Bona (1970)
- 129 Vt. 87State v. Bessette (1970)
- 129 Vt. 91Masterson v. Rutland Hospital, Inc. (1970)
<bold>1. Workmen's Compensation — Accident</bold> The word "accident" as used in the workmen's compensation statutes means an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed. 21 V.S.A. §§ 601(11)(A), 618. <bold>2. Workmen's Compensation — Compensation for Injury — Diseases</bold> Special exception provided in the case of firemen disabled by heart disease, made it clear that the Legislature did not intend to save other diseases from the exclusion of the workmen's compensation statute. <cross_reference>21 V.S.A. § 601</cross_reference>. <bold>3. Workmen's Compensation — Compensation for Injury — Diseases</bold> The plain language and statutory design of the workmen's compensation law restricts compensation for disease to those illnesses which result from accidental injury, save only in cases of firefighters striken by heart ailment while in line of duty, and does not include pulmonary tuberculosis contracted at a hospital. <cross_reference>21 V.S.A. § 1019</cross_reference>.
- 129 Vt. 94Fox v. Lakin (1970)
- 129 Vt. 95Corytsas v. Kyriacou (1970)
- 129 Vt. 98Furgat v. Brooks (1970)
- 129 Vt. 102Petition of Reed (1970)
- 129 Vt. 107In re Estate of Allen (1970)
- 129 Vt. 112State v. Parton (1970)
- 129 Vt. 114Ford v. Franklin (1971)
- 129 Vt. 123In re Walker (1971)
- 129 Vt. 124State v. Bruley (1970)
- 129 Vt. 132Woodmansee v. Franklin County Court (1971)
- 129 Vt. 133In Re Mossey (1971)
- 129 Vt. 139State v. Polidor (1970)
- 129 Vt. 141State v. Lyon (1971)
- 129 Vt. 143State v. Daniels (1971)
- 129 Vt. 145Blake v. Betit (1971)
- 129 Vt. 152Drinkwine v. State (1970)
- 129 Vt. 155United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Giroux (1971)
- 129 Vt. 162In Re Estate of Davis (1971)
- 129 Vt. 168Vermont Board of Health v. Town of Waterbury (1970)
- 129 Vt. 175State v. Stewart (1971)
- 129 Vt. 182Stewart v. Smith (1971)
- 129 Vt. 185In Re Delinquency Proceedings Concerning a Certain Juvenile (1970)
- 129 Vt. 191State v. Jackman (1971)
- 129 Vt. 195State v. MacHunsky (1971)
- 129 Vt. 200Ball v. Hall (1971)
- 129 Vt. 212State v. DISTRICT COURT OF VT. UNIT NO. 1, RUTLAND CIR. (1971)
- 129 Vt. 216ATLAS FINANCIAL CORPORATION v. Oliver (1971)
- 129 Vt. 220State v. White (1971)
- 129 Vt. 227ABC Realty Corporation v. Bissonette (1971)
- 129 Vt. 230In Re Brown Estate (1971)
- 129 Vt. 234In Re Proceedings Concerning a Neglected Child (1971)
- 129 Vt. 241State v. Oakes (1971)
- 129 Vt. 260State v. Hotte (1971)
- 129 Vt. 264Stearns v. Stearns (1971)
- 129 Vt. 270Willette v. Vermont Department of Social Welfare (1971)
- 129 Vt. 278Bean v. Sears, Roebuck & Company (1971)
- 129 Vt. 284Woodmansee v. Smith (1971)
- 129 Vt. 288State Highway Board v. Jackson (1971)
- 129 Vt. 298Mack v. Jones (1971)
- 129 Vt. 302In Re Bryant (1971)
- 129 Vt. 308Milne v. Capital City Gas Co. (1971)
- 129 Vt. 309Chaput v. Smith (1971)
- 129 Vt. 315Dartmouth Savings Bank v. Estate of Schoen Ex Rel. Ainsworth (1971)
- 129 Vt. 322Dostal's, Inc. v. Wright, Commr. (1971)
<bold>1. Taxation — Generally</bold> As the setting of a primary standard by the legislature is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of regulatory authority by an administrative body or officer then a delegation of authority from the legislature to the commissioner of taxes can validly take place only when associated with fixed limits on its exercise. <bold>2. Taxation — Generally</bold> The purposes outlined by the tax statutes simplifying the manner and form of rendering returns, including the reduction of accounting burdens and facilitation of collection, are subordinate considerations,<page_number>Page 323</page_number> yielding to the principal purpose of raising revenue for the state unless the legislature clearly indicates a contrary intention. <bold>3. Taxation — Corporate Returns — Consolidation</bold> The failure of the legislature to authorize consolidated corporate returns for tax saving purposes must be taken to be deliberate, in the light of its positive authorization of joint husband-wife returns and thus the regulation of the commissioner which allowed for consolidated corporate returns only if such would not result in a significant reduction of Vermont corporate income tax liability was valid. 32 V.S.A. §§ 5820, 5811(18), 5832, 5823(3), 5827(a) and 5829(e).
- 129 Vt. 326Place v. Place (1971)
- 129 Vt. 330State v. Emrick (1971)
- 129 Vt. 333Walker Process Equipment Co. v. Cooley Building Corp. (1971)
- 129 Vt. 341Shelburne Museum, Inc. v. Town of Shelburne (1971)
- 129 Vt. 346Trivento v. Smith (1971)
- 129 Vt. 348In re Jordan (1971)
- 129 Vt. 351Town of Mendon v. Ezzo (1971)
- 129 Vt. 362Pooler v. Derby (1971)
- 129 Vt. 368Larmay v. VanEtten (1971)
<bold>1. Motor Vehicles — Use of Highway — Rules of the Road</bold> Under the rules of the road governing the conduct and operation of vehicles upon a public highway the operator of a motor vehicle is under the duty to have his car under reasonable control. <bold>2. Motor Vehicles — Injuries from Operation — Violation of Safety</bold> <bold>Statutes</bold> The rules of the road are safety statutes and proof of their violation, on the part of one charged with negligence, makes out a <italic>prima facie</italic> case of negligence against the offending operator; but this presumption of negligence is open to rebuttal. <bold>3. Evidence — Presumptions</bold> A true legal presumption is in the nature of evidence and is to be weighed as such, it shifts to the party against whom it operates the burden of evidence and a <italic>prima facie</italic> case would become an established case if nothing further appeared. <bold>4. Evidence — Presumptions</bold> A presumption points out to the party on whom it lies the duty of going forward with evidence on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the office of the presumption is performed. <bold>5. Evidence — Presumptions</bold> A permissible inference must rest upon a logical deduction from established facts in order to provide a conclusion which the triers of fact may or may not find along with the other evidence in a case. <bold>6. Evidence — Presumptions</bold> A "presumption" is a deduction which the law requires a trier to make; an "inference" is a deduction which the trier may or may not make according to his own conclusions. <bold>7. Motor Vehicles — Injury from Operation — Violation of Safety</bold> <bold>Statutes</bold> Trial court properly granted plaintiff's motion for directed verdict in motor vehicle accident case where the plaintiff, having established a violation of the safety statutes, made out a <italic>prima facie</italic> case of negligence against which no rebuttal evidence was produced fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact was not as presumed.<page_number>Page 369</page_number> <bold>8. Appeal and Error — Review of Verdict</bold> The right to set aside a verdict is based ultimately on the proposition that an injustice would result from permitting the verdict to stand. <bold>9. Appeal and Error — Review of Verdict</bold> Verdicts are not to be lightly disregarded, for it is the proper province of the jury to settle questions of fact. <bold>10. Trial — Verdict — General Verdicts</bold> General verdicts should be construed to give them effect, if that can reasonably be done, thus the court, ordinarily, will not interfere with the jury's province to determine the amount of damages where the evidence as to damages is conflicting. <bold>11. Appeal and Error — Amount of Damages — Change on Appeal</bold> Reviewing court will not interfere with verdict for damages unless it appears that the jury's determination is so small or large that it plainly indicates the award was the product of prejudice or other misguidance which undermines its validity as a verdict.
- 129 Vt. 375Milne v. Shell Oil Co. (1971)
- 129 Vt. 379Montgomery v. Branon (1971)
- 129 Vt. 389Huntley v. Dubois (1971)
- 129 Vt. 393In Re Bashaw (1971)
- 129 Vt. 395Town of Milton v. Bert's Mobile Home Park, Inc. (1971)
- 129 Vt. 400Krupinsky v. Birsky (1971)
- 129 Vt. 405Brattleboro Chalet Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Thomas (1971)
- 129 Vt. 413Mott v. Vinton (1971)
- 129 Vt. 428In Re Knight (1971)
- 129 Vt. 431Town of Milton Ex Rel. Yusitis v. Brault (1971)
- 129 Vt. 432Randall v. Randall (1971)
- 129 Vt. 436State v. Lane (1971)
- 129 Vt. 441Dodge v. Town of Worcester (1971)
- 129 Vt. 446Haklits v. Oldenburg (1971)
- 129 Vt. 449State v. Lebo (1971)
- 129 Vt. 452Diamond National Corporation v. Szerbik (1971)
- 129 Vt. 460State v. Morrill (1971)
- 129 Vt. 466Dutch Hill Inn, Inc. v. Patten (1971)
- 129 Vt. 472State v. Beyor (1971)
- 129 Vt. 475State v. Emrick (1971)
- 129 Vt. 484In Re Miner's Estate (1971)
- 129 Vt. 490Hunn v. Koerber (1971)
- 129 Vt. 495Town of Milton Ex Rel. Yusitis v. LeClaire (1971)
- 129 Vt. 500Isabelle v. Proctor Hospital (1971)
- 129 Vt. 505Fayette v. Ford Motor Credit Company (1971)
- 129 Vt. 517Segalla v. Segalla (1971)
- 129 Vt. 534Application of Hemco, Inc. (1971)
- 129 Vt. 538Stevens v. CROSS ABBOTT COMPANY (1971)
- 129 Vt. 546Petitions of Davenport (1971)
- 129 Vt. 564State v. Mayer (1971)
- 129 Vt. 573CLASE v. Fair (1971)
- 129 Vt. 575Leech v. Munn (1971)
- 129 Vt. 578Shequin v. Smith (1971)
- 129 Vt. 583Wetmore v. Wetmore (1971)
- 129 Vt. 586Mikell v. Town of Williston (1971)
- 129 Vt. 591State v. Guppy (1971)
- 129 Vt. 598Cano v. Cano (1971)
- 129 Vt. 605State v. Fernie (1971)
- 129 Vt. 607University of Vermont v. Town of Essex (1971)
- 129 Vt. 615Beck v. Dutra (1971)
- 129 Vt. 619Williams v. Carter (1971)
- 129 Vt. 624In re Cadieux (1971)
- 129 Vt. 628LaMantia v. King (1971)
- 129 Vt. 635Bradley v. Marshall (1971)