¶1I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that it has “not added words to [Penal Code] section 1192.7[, subdivision] (c)(18), nor . . . rewritten that provision.” (Maj. opn., ante, this page.) Such bold disclaimer notwithstanding, that is precisely what the majority has done. In adding language to Penal Code
¶2A. The Intent of the Legislature Is Manifested in the Words It Employs
¶3The majority and I begin on the same road: The most significant goal of statutory interpretation is ascertaining and carrying out the intent of the *786Legislature. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) However, the majority and I head in different directions when it comes to choosing the manner in which such intent should be ascertained. In my view, legislative intent should be discerned from the words actually used—and the words not used—by the Legislature in enacting statutes. The majority’s approach seems to be to seek out some meaning lurking behind the words used—and not used—by the Legislature. In seeking out such “hidden meaning,” the majority follows a disturbing trend of relying on extrinsic aids which do not illuminate the intent of the collective legislative body.
¶4Article IV, section 8, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution provides: “The Legislature may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill . . . .” Thus, under the California Constitution, legislative will and intent may only be expressed through statutes—statutes which are, in turn, composed of language—words which reflect intent. If the Legislature is constitutionally precluded from expressing its intent except through the words employed in the statutes it enacts, it seems reasonable that the courts should examine those words to determine legislative intent. That limitation is even more significant because the Legislature is a collective body made up of 120 persons, each of whose minds may harbor an “intention” which is different from that of any other legislator.
¶5“Despite the anthropomorphic overtones of the word ‘intention,’ the Legislature is not a person. What goes on in the minds of individual legislators when enacting a statute cannot fix its meaning. Rather, the Legislature is a collective entity and its ‘intentions’ are primarily known by its legislative acts. . . . The statutes themselves embody the collective ‘intention’ of the Legislature. ‘[W]henever a law is adopted, all that is really agreed upon is the words.’ [Citation.]” (In-Home Supportive Services v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 720, 739 [199 Cal.Rptr. 697], fn. omitted, original italics.)
¶6B. The Words Employed by the Legislature Make It Clear That Burglary of a Vessel Is Not Covered by Section 1192.7(c)(18)
¶7Section 1192.7(c)(18) establishes “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or inhabited portion of any other building” as a “ ‘serious felony.’ ” The definition of first degree burglary in section 460 is broader—it includes not only the burglaries enumerated in section 1197.2(c)(18) but also burglary of an inhabited vessel or floating home. Put simply, the Legislature’s intent, as manifested in plain language—the words of the two statutes—is that certain burglaries which are of the first degree do not qualify as serious felonies.
¶8*787In my view, the reason the majority reaches its questionable conclusion— that “an individual who has suffered a conviction for burglary of an inhabited vessel has sustained a conviction of a ‘serious felony’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 779)—is because the majority conducts its analysis backwards. Instead of looking first at the plain language of the statutes, the majority begins its analysis by purportedly examining the “history” of the 1986 amendment of section 1192.7(c)(18). Had the majority begun by looking at the two statutes separately, it would have found each clear and unambiguous. If the majority had looked at the statutes together, the majority would have found no collective ambiguity or conflict between them, nor would the majority have found any uncertainty or ambiguity in the specific application of the statutes in the case at bench. Accordingly, there would have been no need for the majority to search for indicia of legislative intent. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) In sum, had the majority looked first at the words of the two statutes, the majority would have reached the conclusion that burglary of an inhabited vessel, although of the first degree, is not a “serious felony.”
¶9C. The Majority’s Analysis Is Flawed
¶10As a result of starting down the wrong path and analyzing “history” first, the majority reaches several conclusions about the 1986 amendment of section 1192.7(c)(18). First, the majority concludes that the Legislature “amended section 1192.7(c) (18) for the purpose of making it clear that section 1192.7(c)(18) would include any first degree burglary encompassed by the then existing language of section 460.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 774.) The majority then concludes that “[n]o intent appears to narrow the application of the ‘burglary of a residence’ serious felony enhancement.” {Ibid.) The majority finally concludes that “those burglaries that were intended to be treated as serious felonies by virtue of the 1986 amendment of section 1192.7(c)(18) should continue to constitute serious felonies for the purpose of that provision.” (Ibid.) The second and third conclusions are of no consequence to the majority’s analysis or mine. The first is crucial to my analysis and ultimately highlights the error in the majority’s analysis: the 1986 amendment made it clear that section 1192.7(c)(18) would include any first degree burglary covered by the “then existing language of section 460.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 774, italics added.) Put another way, nothing in the language of the amendment—or in the “history” considered by the majority—suggests that the Legislature intended that future expansions of, or additions to, the acts constituting first degree burglary would automatically constitute a “serious felony” under section 1192.7(c)(18). Had the Legislature so intended, it could easily have designated “burglary in the first degree” or “first degree burglary as defined in section 460” as a “serious felony.”
¶11*788When the Legislature amended section 460 in 1989 and 1991, the legislators believed that they were expanding the acts which constituted first degree burglary. In 1989, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest
¶12The majority avoids the obvious conflict between its conclusion and the legislators’ actions in amending section 460 in 1989 and 1991 and their understanding of the effect of their actions, as evidenced by the Legislative Counsel’s Digest, by finding that the legislators (and by implication the Legislative Counsel) “misunder[stood] ” the true state of the law—that burglary of a vessel which is “inhabited and designed for habitation” and/or a “floating home” was already of the first degree, at least as far back as 1986. The majority concludes that the Legislature was wrong for three reasons: (1) prior California cases have broadly interpreted the term “dwelling house” for purposes of section 460; (2) the legislative objective of the statutory language recognizes the increased danger and gravity of residential burglary; and (3) out-of-state cases have construed similar language to include burglary of an inhabited vessel. Regrettably, none of the factors relied upon by the majority supports its conclusion.
¶13*7891. California law, the terminology of sections 459 and 460, and rationality support the conclusion that inhabited vessels and floating homes are not encompassed in the term “inhabited dwelling house.”
¶14The majority tacitly concedes that prior to 1986 no California authority supported the proposition that burglary of an inhabited vessel constitutes “ ‘burglary of an inhabited dwelling house.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 775.) The majority then notes that several cases have given a broad definition to the term “inhabited” and, based on that broad definition, concludes that a vessel which is inhabited (“ ‘currently used for dwelling purposes whether occupied or not’ ”) is included within the term “inhabited dwelling house.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 777.)
¶15What the majority does not note is that no reported decision between 1986 and the date of the Legislature’s amendment of section 460 in 1989 concluded that burglary of an inhabited vessel constitutes “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house.” The majority also fails to note that none of the cases it cites considered, even referentially, burglaries of vessels. Most importantly, however, the majority fails to give appropriate weight to the only two reported California decisions which have considered burglaries of boats—People v. Holt (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 42 [198 P.2d 58] and People v. Moreland (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 11 [146 Cal.Rptr. 118]—both of which conclude that such burglaries are of the second degree, albeit by implication in the former and dictum in the latter.
¶16In People v. Holt, the Court of Appeal considered whether or not sufficient evidence, apart from the statement of an accomplice, corroborated appellant’s conviction of second degree burglary of a cabin cruiser. The Court of Appeal found such corroboration in appellant’s statement to the police in which he admitted rowing around the Newport docks with the accomplice while the accomplice entered several boats. (People v. Holt, supra,88 Cal.App.2d at pp. 43-44.) In 1948, only burglaries of an “inhabited dwelling house or building committed in the night time” or burglaries committed by armed individuals or by individuals who assaulted “any person” were of the first degree. (Stats. 1923, ch. 362, § 1, p. 747.) In Holt, there was no factual dispute about (a) the boat being “inhabited” under the broad scope given that term by the majority (Holt and his accomplice took canned goods from the boat; and the owner left the boat in the early evening and did not return until 10:30 p.m., indicating that he cooked aboard it and likely planned to sleep aboard it); (b) the burglaiy having been committed at night (the accomplice testified that they started rowing “toward night” and continued rowing “after dark,” and the owner was only gone in the evening); and (c) the burglary not involving an assault or a weapon (no testimony is *790reported relating to either issue). The only logical conclusion to be drawn from the facts of Holtand Holt’s conviction of second degree burglary is that an inhabited vessel is not the same thing as an “inhabited dwelling house.” If they were, Holt’s conviction would have been for first degree burglary.
¶17The majority addresses and dismisses People v. Moreland, supra,81 Cal.App.3d 11, but fails to consider its real significance to the case at bench. In Moreland, the Court of Appeal considered whether Moreland’s discharge of a firearm at a motor home came within the provisions of (then) section 246 which prohibited the firing of weapons at, “ ‘an inhabited dwelling house or occupied building.’ ” (81 Cal.App.3d at p. 14.) The Morelandcourt carefully and thoroughly considered numerous definitions of “house” and “building” and concluded that a motor home did not come within any reasonable meaning of either term. In so concluding, the court observed: “Would the ordinary citizen believe that [a motor home] is a house or a building, any more than he would believe a 24-foot cabin cruiser or sail boat, or a railroad car, or an airplane is a house or building, even if equipped with bunks and a kitchen?” (Id. at p. 19, italics added.) The Morelandcourt is correct. No ordinary citizen—and for that matter, no sophisticated legislator—would think that a vessel or a boat fell within the definition of “house.”
¶18One other factor which militates in favor of the view that first degree burglary has not historically included invasions of vessels (inhabited or otherwise) is found in the language of section 459 which includes vessels in its lengthy list of subjects which may be the object of burglary. Certainly, had the Legislature intended before 1989 to classify the invasion of an inhabited vessel as burglary of the first degree (in section 460), it would have done so.
¶19The conclusion I draw from the only relevant cáse law, Holtand More-land, and the inclusion of “vessel” within section 459 and its exclusion from section 460 (prior to 1989) is that burglaries of vessels, whether inhabited or not, were of the second degree until 1989.
¶202. Recognizing the policy underlying the 1986 amendment of section 1192.7(c)(18) does not authorize its amendment by this, or any other, court.
¶21The second factor influencing the majority’s decision that burglaries of inhabited vessels have been of the first degree since at least 1986 is based on the policy underlying the 1986 amendment of section 1192.7(c)(18)—that “residential” burglaries are more dangerous than nonresidential burglaries. *791Assuming that the majority is at least partially correct in that assertion,
¶223. The out-of-state decisions cited by the majority do not support its conclusion.
¶23The last factors cited by the majority in support of its conclusion that burglaries of inhabited vessels have been of the first degree in California since at least 1986 are two foreign decisions: State v. Vredenberg (Minn. 1978) 264 N.W.2d 406 and Shoemaker v. State (Alaska Ct.App. 1986) 716 P.2d 391. As a starting point, it is worth noting that the majority cites no authority whatsoever for the proposition that it is appropriate to consider the decisions of foreign jurisdictions which have interpreted their state’s penal laws to interpret California’s penal laws. Moreover, the two cases support the opposite conclusion from the one for which the majority has cited them.
¶24In State v. Vredenberg, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that cabins of houseboats constituted “buildings” under Minnesota law. The court began its analysis by noting that “building” was then defined by a “streamline[d]” Minnesota law to include “ ‘a dwelling or other structure suitable for affording shelter for human beings . . . .’” (State v. Vredenberg, supra,264 N.W.2d at p. 406.) The court then noted that the definition of “building” before the law was streamlined specifically included “vessels” and that the intent of the drafters of the change was not to omit certain structures from the protection of the statute. (Ibid.) Simply put, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, where Minnesota’s Criminal Code once specifically defined buildings to include vessels and where no intent had been evidenced to narrow that definition, vessels remained buildings under Minnesota law. (Id., at p. 407.) Here, we are interpreting a statute in which neither “dwelling house” nor “building” has ever been defined by the Legislature. Moreover, as alluded to in part C.I., ante, if the Legislature had viewed “vessel” as synonymous with “building,” it would not have included both “building” and “vessel” within the types of structures identified in section 459.
¶25*792In Shoemaker v. State, the court of appeals also dealt with criminal codes which provided clear definitions of the terms employed therein. Under Alaska law, a first degree burglary was defined as that of a “building” which was used as a “dwelling.” A “building” specifically included “ ‘in addition to its usual meaning . . . any propelled [vessel] . . . adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business . . . .’ ” (Shoemaker v. State, supra, 716 P.2d at p. 392.) The only issue raised by the defendant in Shoemakerwhich is arguably relevant to the case at bench was whether or not a fishing boat which was designed to sleep two crew members but which was left unoccupied while the owner tried to sell it constituted a “building” under Alaska law. How logically can an interpretation by a court of another state of the meaning of its laws, which carefully define buildings to include vessels, serve as a basis for interpreting California statutes, which explicitly differentiate between “vessels” and “buildings?”
¶26D. The Majority’s Approach Ignores (1) Relevant Principles of Statutory Interpretation, (2) Relevant Indicia of Legislative Intent, and (3) the Legislature’s Prohibition Against Adding Words to Statutes
¶27By ignoring the language of sections 459, 460 and 1192.7(c)(18) and attempting to infer some unexpressed legislative intent from extrinsic aids, such as committee analyses, the majority ignores the rule that analysis begins with the plain language of the statutes under consideration. (Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra,45 Cal.3d at p. 735.)
¶28By assuming that the 1989 and 1991 additions of the terms “vessel . . . which is inhabited and designed for habitation” and “floating home . . . ” to section 460 are of no effect, the majority violates the rule that statutory constructions which render some words mere surplusage should be avoided. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1010 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154].)
¶29By ignoring the fact that “vessel” is included in the pre-1989 language of section 459—but not section 460—the majority ignores the rule that, where the drafters of a statute have employed a term in one place and omitted it in another, “it should not be inferred where it has been excluded.” (People v. Woodhead, supra,43 Cal.3d at p. 1010.)
¶30The majority also gives short shrift to the fact that the Legislature (a) amended the robbery statute (§ 212.5, subd. (a)) in 1990 to include inhabited vessels and (b) amended section 667.5, subdivision (c)(9) (enhancement for prior prison term) to include such robberies. The Legislature’s specific choice to address enhancements for crimes committed in or on vessels and *793floating homes in one context and not another reflects legislative intent to act in the first context (enhancements for all first degree robberies) and not in the second (enhancements for specific—but not all—burglaries.) Again, it is inappropriate for the majority to ignore such evidence of legislative intent.
¶31The majority also accords little significance to the Legislature’s failure to amend section 1192.7(c)(18) in the years following the 1989 amendment of section 460, when it twice amended section 1192.7 for other purposes. Moreover, the majority ignores the Legislature’s 1993 amendment of section 1170.95, subdivision (h), to bring floating homes within the definition of burglaries subject to determinate sentencing laws for certain residential crimes and its concomitant failure to address enhancements relating to such crimes. Such repeated failures to act to change the law, when the subject is before the Legislature, should not be deemed a “ ‘draftsman’s oversight’ ” but, instead, reflect an intent to leave the law as is in areas which are not amended. (People v. McClanahan (1992) 3 Cal.4th 860, 865 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 719, 838 P.2d 241].)
¶32In sum, the Legislature has shown that it is aware of numerous parallel provisions relating to residential burglaries and residential robberies and that it knows how to make changes in some of those provisions and not in others. (T&O Mobile Homes, Inc. v. United California Bank (1985) 40 Cal.3d 441, 455 [220 Cal.Rptr. 627, 709 P.2d 430].) It is inappropriate to infer, as the majority implicitly does, that the Legislature intended that each and every burglary which is added to those enumerated in section 460 should automatically be deemed a “serious felony” under section 1192.7(c)(18). If the Legislature had such an intention in 1986, or at any time since the last amendment of subdivision (c)(18), it would have been very easy to express it by saying “burglary of the first degree” or “first degree burglary as defined in section 460,” instead of listing only specific burglaries.
¶33The last two rules of construction violated by the majority are arguably the most significant. First, even if one were to assume that the statutes at issue here are ambiguous or that their meaning is “uncertain” in the context in which we are considering them—a point with which I obviously take issue—long-settled California law requires that any ambiguity must be construed most favorably to the accused. (People v. Woodhead, supra,43 Cal.3d at p. 1011.) The majority stretches to create additional criminal liability in violation of this basic principle.
¶34Finally, despite protestations to the contrary, the majority has violated the Legislature’s cardinal rule regarding interpretation of its own statutes: “In the construction of a statute . . . the office of the judge is simply to ascertain *794and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858, italics added.)
¶35No matter how many times one reads section 1192.7(c)(18), never will the words “vessel . . . which is inhabited and designed for habitation” or “floating home” appear.
¶36E. The Majority Errs in Considering Staff Analyses in Analyzing Legislative Intent
¶37Although the majority does not rely heavily upon them in reaching its conclusions about the interpretation of sections 459, 460 and 1192.7(c)(18), I believe that the majority errs in taking judicial notice of certain extrinsic aids—“analyses” of the bill by (a) the Assembly Committee on Public Safety and (b) the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The majority’s consideration of those materials compounds the error made by the majority in beginning its analysis by looking at the “history” of the statutes rather than first examining their language.
¶381. Legislative staff analyses and, under existing law, committee reports are to be considered only where the meaning of a statute is “uncertain.”
¶39In choosing to consider the two noted staff analyses,
¶402. Legislative staff analyses and committee reports are unreliable indicia of legislative intent.
¶41For decades, California courts have considered extrinsic aids, such as committee reports (cf. In re Rottanak K. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 267, fn. *7958 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 543].), staff analyses (cf. Hutnick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 465), third reading analyses (cf. People v. Tabb (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1308-1309 [279 Cal.Rptr. 480]), and other documents generated in the process of lawmaking. Most of those cases have examined those extrinsic aids without considering whether or not they are truly useful in determining the intent of the Legislature. Hutnick is the only case of which I am aware in which this court has indicated why committee reports
¶42In most instances, California legislators who vote on a bill see only its text and the Legislative Counsel’s Digest of it.
¶43While I acknowledge that in Hutnick, Justice Kaufman at least gave some reason why committee reports merit consideration by courts in determining legislative intent, the same may not be said for any of the six California cases and the two United States Supreme Court cases cited by him in *796footnote 7. Many cases, including Hutnick, which have relied on committee reports or staff analyses cite two cases for the conclusion that such materials may serve as indicia of legislative intent—Maben v. Superior Court (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 708, 713 [63 Cal.Rptr. 439] and Southern Pac. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 271, 278-279 [120 P.2d 880] (Southern Pac.). The two cases merit scrutiny. Maben does contain the following language: “It has long been the rule that ‘Statements in legislative committee reports concerning the statutory objects and purposes, which are in accord with a reasonable interpretation of the statute, will be followed by the courts. And it will be presumed that the Legislature adopted the proposed legislation with the intent and meaning expressed in committee reports.’ (45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 168, p. 670.)” (Maben v. Superior Court, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at p. 713.) There are two significant points to be made about the proposition of law advanced in Maben. First, it is dictum; the court actually addressed the propriety of considering the Legislative Counsel’s Digest—not a committee report. Second, although the authority cited for that proposition— California Jurisprudence Second—does contain the language quoted by the Maben court, California Jurisprudence’s editors cite Southern Pac. as the only case supporting it.
¶44Southern Pac. is interesting for several reasons. First, there is no author for the opinion; this court adopted the opinion of the Court of Appeal verbatim. Second, the Southern Pac. court was analyzing a federal statute and considered a report of a United States Senate committee pertaining to the bill in question. Third, the court relied on two authorities in stating that a report which is in accord with a “ ‘reasonable interpretation’ ” of the statute could be considered in interpreting—one federal case and “ ‘59 CJ. 1021.’ ” (Southern Pac., supra,19 Cal.2d at pp. 278-279.) Corpus Juris, in turn, cites numerous federal cases—but no California case—in support of the noted proposition.
¶45*797In my view, the materials in question should be tested by the criteria suggested by Walter Kendall Hurst in The Use of Extrinsic Aids in Determining Legislative Intent in California: The Need for Standardized Criteria (1980) 12 Pacific L.J. 189 et seq. Hurst proposes that courts should examine proffered extrinsic aids from four perspectives in assessing their value in determining legislative intent: credibility (reliability), contemporaneity (when the aid was prepared), proximity (closeness of the origin of the aid to the legislative process), and context (historical circumstances surrounding passage of the legislation and the purposes for which the aid was promulgated). (Id. at pp. 192-195.)
¶46The reliability of committee analyses is suspect, as the expertise and level of knowledge of the author are unknown; moreover, in most instances, the names and qualifications of the authors are not available to those—the courts—which must assess the credibility of their analyses. In addition, in most cases, there is no evidence that the analyses have been presented to, or were even available to, the members of the Legislature who voted on the measure. Staff analyses also fail the “context" test in many instances, as they are frequently cursory in nature; indeed, “analyses” are sometimes only filled-in blanks on standardized forms. In sum, staff analyses are generally not valuable tools for assessing legislative intent. I see no reason to deviate from that general rule in the case at bench.
¶473. The majority errs in taking judicial notice of staff analyses.
¶48The majority has taken judicial notice of the two staff analyses without adherence to the requisites established by the Evidence Code. First, neither the People nor the defendant asked this court to take judicial notice of these specific analyses. Presumably, the majority is taking judicial notice of them on its own motion. Yet, it has not followed the dictates of Evidence Code sections 459, subdivision (c), and 455, subdivision (a). Simply put, the majority has not given either side the opportunity “to present to the court information relevant to (1) the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter and (2) the tenor of the matter to be noticed.” (Evid. Code, § 455 subd. (a).)
¶49More significantly, however, I cannot see how any court can take judicial notice of staff analyses under the Evidence Code. Evidence Code section 450 precludes courts from taking judicial notice of any matter unless authorized or required by law. I am hard pressed to see how committee reports or staff analyses qualify as matters of which judicial notice may be taken. They are certainly not matters subject to mandatory judicial notice under Evidence Code section 451. Nor do they appear to be matters for permissive judicial *798notice under Evidence Code section 452. Are they then “[o]fficial acts” of the Legislature under section 452, subdivision (c)? I cannot see how a staff analysis can qualify as an “act” of the Legislature (or, to use the language of subdivision (c), the “legislative . . . departments . . .”); and I am certain that such an analysis should not be deemed “official.”
¶50F. Conclusion
¶51It matters not whether one looks only at the language of section 1192.7(c)(18) or also at the “history” of the changes in section 1192.7 and/or sections 459 and 460. Section 1192.7(c)(18) does not and never has contained the words “inhabited vessel” or “floating home.” Because the prosecution in the case at bench failed to establish that defendant’s prior first degree burglary conviction was other than of an inhabited vessel or a floating home, insufficient evidence supports the finding of that conviction for enhancement purposes. I would affirm the Court of Appeal.
¶52Mosk, J., concurred.
¶53Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 25,1996. Chin, J., did not participate therein. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
¶54Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the Acting Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
¶55Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
¶56While I take issue in part E. of this dissent with the majority’s indiscriminate reliance upon legislative committee staff analyses, I believe that the Legislative Counsel’s Digest does qualify for judicial notice and may be appropriately considered in discussing legislative intent. See further discussion in footnote 6, post.
¶57While I agree with the fact that, in amending section 1192.7(c)(18) in 1986, the Legislature intended to make it clear that all burglaries which were of the first degree, as then defined by section 460, would be deemed “serious” felonies, if the Legislature’s objective had actually been to treat all “residential” burglaries as serious felonies, as argued by the majority, it would simply have left section 1192.7(c)(18) alone.
¶58The majority takes judicial notice of three other staff analyses relating to the 1989 amendment of section 460. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 780, fn. 9.) I do not discuss those analyses because the majority does not quote from them and seems not to rely on them in any fashion. However, I believe the majority errs in taking judicial notice of them, as well.
¶59The Hutnickcourt discussed the propriety of considering committee reports; however, what the Hutnickcourt actually considered was an analysis by a committee staff member. (Hutnick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 465.)
¶60The Legislative Counsel’s Digest is frequently a valuable tool in assessing legislative intent. The Office of the Legislative Counsel was created by the Legislature in 1913. (Gov. Code, § 10200; Stats. 1913, ch. 322, § 1, p. 626.) The Legislative Counsel is responsible for preparing legislation (Gov. Code, § 10231), and its digest (a synopsis which often describes current law and the purpose and effect of the proposed legislation) precedes the text of each bill voted upon by the Legislature. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest, therefore satisfies all criteria discussed in this part and parts E.2. and E.3. of this dissent.
¶61For example, if a committee report were appended to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest or otherwise referenced in the digest.
¶62Reliance on federal authorities for the proposition that California legislative committee reports are valuable indicia of legislative intent is inappropriate. The federal system of considering bills and passing laws is vastly different from California’s. What is valid for the federal system may not be (and in my view is not) valid for California. (For example, in the federal system, a bill is frequently sent to the floor of the House of Representatives or Senate with a committee report recommending its passage and explaining its purpose and effect. Such a report may well be a valuable tool for interpreting the statute, as it is available to every member of the House and Senate.)
¶63I am aware of no California case in which the propriety of considering staff analyses has ever been given careful consideration.