Volume 13 — Delaware Reports

<p>Assumpsit for money had and received.</p> <p>The plaintiff was the widow of Luke E. Ellegood, deceased.</p> <p>Clara E. Jones was married to Ellegood 7th June, 1869. I bought the first furniture we had, except an old cook stove. Moved to Lewes in the fall of 1878. We .were burnt out there, the furniture was all mine and was totally burnt. I owned a tract of land in the county, and my husband traded it off for a mare, which became my property. I demanded it after his death of Mr. Cannon, his administrator, who refused to deliver it to me, and sold it afterwards as administrator. She also made a written demand on him, as administrator, for her exemption as widow under the statute, and afterwards made a verbal demand of the appraisers for the same.</p> <p>Rachel A. Barker, mother of preceding witness. Mr. Jones made Mrs. Ellegood, the plaintiff, a present of a horse and carriage, which she let her husband, L. R. Ellegood, have, and for which he agreed to pay her one hundred and fifty dollars.</p> <p>Wm. D. Barker, testified: When Mr. Ellegood brought the mare home from Mr. Cannon, I heard him tell his wife that he had traded the land off for a mare and carriage for her.</p> <p>Ida Barker corroborated the testimony of the next preceding witness.</p> <p>Wm. Fosque was at the administrator’s sale and heard Mrs. Ellegood demand the mare as her property.</p> <p>John T. Long was the auctioneer. Proves the same.</p> <p>Wm. C. Parkhurst testified that Mrs. Jones made a demand on me as an appraiser of her husband’s goods and chattels for her exemption under the statute.</p> <p>Rufus Warren proves a written • demand of the plaintiff on Mr. Cannon, the administrator for the same.</p> <p>Samuel Layton was one of the appraisers. On the day of the appraisement Mrs. Ellegood made a verbal demand on me for her exemption under the statute.</p> <p>John C. Hazzard testified: I had a judgment note for $45 against Robert Rickards (ad.) who sold a piece of land to</p> <p>, and he and I went with Luke Ellegood into his house when he said something to his wife to the effect that I was Mr. Hazzard, who had called to get the' money due on the land, and she went up stairs and came down and placed the amount due me in my hands.</p> <p>Robert Rickards testified : I sold the land for $75. I was paid $5 and the balance was paid to Mr. Hazzard on a bill I owed him.</p> <p>Charles M. Cullen proves that he paid in 1879 the sum of $337 to the plaintiff, Mr. Ellegood, due to her for insurance on furniture destroyed by fire.</p> <p>Mr. Cannon, the administrator, testified: The estate is insolvent, but I did not know it at the time of the sale.</p> <p>Plaintiff closes here.</p> <p>Geo. W. Hatfield swore: Made Ellegood’s coffin. Bill was $55 Mrs. Ellegood came around and paid me $50 on it. She came back afterwards and said she had learnt that an administration had been granted on her husband’s estate, and wanted me to give the money back to her, which I declined to do.</p> <p>Prothonotary drew the deed to Clara R. Ellegood from Robert Rickards at her husband’s request, L. R. Ellegood, he first told me to draw the deed to him, but when I asked him if he wanted it drawn to him, he declined “hello, no, draw it to Clara.”</p> <p>Wm. J. Parldiurst saw Mr. Cannon and L. R. Ellegood exchange horses when the latter got the mare in question from him.</p>

<p>Assumpsit on a special contract in writing for building a machine to mix fertilizers to be run by the defendants’ engines, and to do the work in mixing and emptying the same. The defendant to pay not over two hundred dollars for it, and if the plaintiff could make it for less, he was to do so.</p> <p>The evidence for the plaintiff was to the effect that the machine cost over two hundred dollars and was accepted by the defendant.</p> <p>The evidence for the defendant was in direct contradiction. That the machine leaked from the first and never did the work for which it was intended and the contract called for.</p>

Trespass on the Case for damages sustained by the plaintiff, by the breaking down of a bridge on a public road in West Dover Hundred, under a wagon and team of two horses, laden with a half to three-quarters of a cord of seasoned wood, in September, 1884, and by which one of the horses, as well as himself, was seriously injured.

<p>Appeal from a Justice of the Peace in and for New Castle County. Decided on demurrer to the declaration.</p> <p>Plaintiff filed the following narr. -</p> <p>1. For that the said defendant on the fourth day of September and on divers other days and times before the commencement of this suit, with force and arms, to wit, at New Castle county aforesaid, seized, took and carried away certain goods and chattels of the plaintiff, to wit, thirty-three baskets each containing about five-eighths of a bushel of peaches of great value, to wit, of the value of fifty dollars, and converted and disposed of the same to his own use.</p> <p>2. For that the said defendant on the day and year aforesaid with force and arms, to wit, at New Castle county aforesaid, seized and took certain other goods and chattels of the said plaintiff, to wit, thirty-three other baskets each containing about five-eighths of a bushel of peaches, and overturned, bruised, damaged and destroyed the same, and also drove a certain wagon through, upon and over the said' goods and' chattels, so that the wheels of said wagon crushed, broke, damaged and destroyed the said goods and chattels of the said plaintiff, of great value, etc.</p> <p>To said declaration the defendant demurred and assigned the following reasons.</p> <p>First—For that in and by the said declaration, in the second count thereof, the said plaintiff hath declared and complained against the said defendant in a Plea of Trespass, for the alleged forcible taking over-turning, bruising, damaging and destroying certain goods and chattels by the wheels of a wagon, which it is alleged the defendant drove, being for indirect or consequential injury and damage. And also, for that there are in the same count pretended causes of action, different in their natures, comprehended and included in the same count, to wit: a pretended cause of action founded on a supposed direct and immediate injury to said goods and chattels, and a pretended cause of action grounded on indirect and consequential injuries to said goods and chattels; which are incompatible with each other, and ought not to be joined in the same count: for that indirect and consequential injuries are not within the jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace where the case originated; and also, that the said declaration and said counts are in other respects uncertain informal and insufficient.</p>

Replevin for a soda water apparatus. The plaintiffs had sold to W. C. R. Colquhoun a soda water fountain for $500, under an agreement that it should be the property of the vendors until it should be fully paid for. The terms of the sale were an allowance of $100 for an old fountain,.cash to that amount and six notes for $50 each for the balance. Three of these notes had been paid, the remaining three were still due.

<p>Action of debt for rent on a lease dated June 12, 1885 of a mill and premises for three yéars at three hundred dollars per annum. Amount sued for being two hundred dollars. The lease was proved and put in evidence.</p>

<p>Scire Facias on Mechanic’s Lien.</p> <p>The plaintiffs, McCartney, Kenny & Co., had contracted with defendants, Lewis P. Buck & Co., for the material for upholstering the Academy of Music. The goods and materials were charged to L. P. Buck & Co. Plaintiffs claim they were furnished on the credit of the building. All goods furnished were in the building prior to its completion, and amounted to $2,605.27, of which $1,100 had been paid. The original terms of the contract were, $1,300 cash and note for $500, in advance. Some of the goods were delivered by plaintiffs, and afterwards replevied ; and when Buck went to look' for some plush at their store, plaintiffs demanded some money, as they had to pay cash for the material; they were paid $1,100. Plaintiffs in a letter had offered to accept defendants’ note for $1,300, on three months’ time. Verdict for plaintiff in opposition to the charge of the Court.</p>

<p>Action for libel. Demurrer.</p> <p>To the plaintiff’s declaration the defendants filed'the following pleas:</p> <p>1. Not guilty.</p> <p>2. Action on because the defendants say that the matters charged as libelous in said declaration are true, and that the same were published properly for public information, and with. no malicious or mischievous motives, within the meaning of the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Delaware in that behalf passed at Dover, March 4, 1857; and this the defendants are ready to verify, etc.</p> <p>3. Action on because the defendants say" that the matters charged as libelous in said declaration were furnished for publication to said defendants by John T. Wood, husband of said plaintiff, and that the same were published properly for public information and with no malicious or mischievous motives, within the meaning of the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Delaware in that behalf passed at Dover, March 4, 1857, and this the defendants are ready to verify, etc.</p> <p>The plaintiff filed the following demurrer and replication.</p> <p>And the said plaintiff by Tilghman Johnston and Walter H. Hayes her attorneys as to the plea of not guilty by the said defendants, first above pleaded, saith replication and issue.</p> <p>And the said plaintiff, by her said attorneys, as to the plea of the defendants, secondly above pleaded, saith that the said plea is not sufficient in law and the plaintiff shows to the Court here the following causes of demurrer to the said plea, to wit, that the said plea does not contain or show any particular ground or matter of justification, nor any particular matter of defence to the said plaintiff's cause of action; and that said plea is in other respects uncertain, informal and insufficient, etc.</p> <p>And the said plaintiff, by her said attorneys, as to the plea, thirdly, above pleaded by said defendants, saith that said plea is insufficient in law; and the said plaintiff shows to the Court here the following grounds of demurrer to wit, that the said plea in averring that the matter, charged, in the declaration in this cause, as libelous, was furnished to said defendants by John T. Wood [who is alleged in said plea to be the husband of said plaintiff], for publication, raises an irrelevant issue in this action, in that it alleges as a matter of defence, that the defendants published said libel on the information of the said John T. Wood, whereas the offence charged in the declaration in this cause, is the publication of said libel by the said defendants; that said plea is double and alleges two distinct matters of fact, to wit, [1] that said matter charged as libelous, in said declaration, was published on the information of one John T. Wood, [2] that the said matter charged as libelous in said declaration, was published properly for public information without malice; that said plea alleges that said matters, charged as libelous, in said declaration, were published properly for public information, and with no malicious or mischievous motives, within the meaning of the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Delaware, passed at Dover, March 4,1857, and does not allege that said matters were true, also that said plea is in other respects uncertain, insufficient and informal, etc.</p>

<p>Action of Replevin by George F. Ott against the firm of Specht & Spahn for conditional sale of machinery for a brewery. "Verdict for plaintiff.</p>

Cross Appeals from a decree of the Chancellor sitting in and for Kent County, rendered in an action brought to restrain the opening of a public street across complainant’s land, making perpetual a preliminary injunction as to the sections of the proposed road across a portion of the land and dissolving it as to the section across another portion. Reversed, in part.

On reservation from the Superior Court of Kent County, of a question as to the validity of Chap. 623, Vol. 17, Laws of Delaware. Act sustained. The action was assumpsit upon a book account brought in Kent County. Defendant resided and was served in Sussex County. He made no appearance or defense and on the last day of the term plaintiff’s counsel, under the rules, moved for judgment with full costs, notwithstanding Chapter 623, Vol. 17, Laws of Delaware.

Case stated to be heard before all the judges. William Herbert, State Treasurer of Delaware, sued the Baltimore & Philadelphia Railroad Company to obtain an interpretation of an act of the Leg., passed March 1, 1881, (Volume 16, Laws, 528,) in relation to the amount of taxes to be paid by defendant. CASE STATED.

<p>Capias ad. Respondendum on general demurrer to the fifth plea, there being no affidavit filed.</p>

<p>Action for damages for injury to property, caused by the overflow of a city sewer.</p> <p>The questions presented are stated by the Court.</p>

Action on the case for false imprisonment. This was an action against the defendant, as a justice of the county, before whom a suit for a nuisance had been brought by Peter W. Rust against Legates, the plaintiff in this action, under the Act of Assembly entitled “ An Act to amend chapter 128 of the Revised Code,” passed at Dover, March 8, 1875, Laws of Del., Vol. 15, 315, for trespassing upon his land, which was instituted by a warrant issued by the justice to a constable…

Summons case. Motion in the Superior Court of Kent County, for judgment for plaintiffs on affidavit filed, notwithstanding a counter affidavit. Judgment granted.

Action for damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff, while working in defendant’s mill, by getting his hand caught in a shoddy-machine. The jury disagreed. John W. Foster, the plaintiff, said he went to work in Pusey’s mill June 16, 1886, was assigned to the shoddy machine, his duty being to place shoddy on the feed table of the picker. This machine frequently became clogged and was in that condition the day his hand was injured.

<p>Action on the case to recover damages for a personal injury.</p>

Assumpsit by Anthony Reybold against the Delaware City, Salem & Philadelphia Steamboat Navigation Company for money had and received, and work and labor done, under an agreement by the directors of the defendant company allowing him to prosecute the collection of a claim of the company against the United States at his own expense, and retain the proceeds. The jury found a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Case stated from the Superior Court of New Castle County. The Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company was a corporation existing under and by virtue of legislation in the States of Delaware and Pennsylvania. The act to incorporate the Wilmington and Brandywine Railroad Company was passed by the Legislature of Delaware, March 5,1861, (12 Del.

Affirmed. The administratrix of William Walker, deceased, filed a bill against the Farmers’ Bank of the State of Delaware to have a deed absolute in form declared a mortgage, and for an accounting. Decree was rendered for defendant, the Chancellor delivering the following opinion :

<p>Trespass on the case for value of goods lost.</p> <p>The suit is to recover the value of goods shipped through the defendant company, as follows: May 10, 1886, 150 full sets of false teeth, valued at $168, to New York, for reshipment to Sigmund Pappenheim, Berlin, Prussia; October 6, 1886, a shipment valued at $474.88, to New York, for reshipment to Paul Buss, Berlin ; November 8, 1886, a shipment valued ,at $158, to J. L. Brewster, St. Louis, Mo. The goods were lost in shipment, and claim is made for their value, $810.88.</p> <p>Michael Mooney, a clerk for the Dental Company, testified to making the shipments and receiving receipts from the company.</p> <p>John L. Brewster, sworn; Was then travelling salesman for same company. Received in St. Louis no goods alleged and charged in the third shipment. Inquired once for them at the St. Louis Dental Co., but not at the office there of Adams Express Co.</p> <p>Mooney, again. I packed the goods and shipped them by the Adams. Express Co., to John L. Brewster to the care of the St Louis Dental Co.</p> <p>Deposition of the bookkeeper of the firm of L. donsareau & Co., in New York, to which were consigned the first and second shipments as alleged and charged by plaintiff company was then read in evidence, to the effect that the books of said firm show no such shipments to the firm.</p> <p>Deposition of Frederick Kempff and another, to the effect that they were members and officers of the St. Louis Dental Co., and that the books of it show that no such shipment was ever delivered at its office, and the latter deposed that jt never did come to it—he was order clerk of the company.</p> <p>Jacob F. Frantz.- Is a stockholder and the president of the plaintiff company. Proves Hail’s signature.</p> <p>Stansbury J. Willey is treasurer of same; prove the signature of Hall to be genuine. The goods shipped never came back to the plaintiff company.</p> <p>Mr. Bird offered as evidence the record of the indictment and conviction of Silas Murray for the larceny of sundry goods from the plaintiff. Attorney-General Biggs testified to prosecuting the case, and that Murray was convicted of stealing platinum.</p> <p>Samuel F. Betts had been agent for the Adams Express Company for twenty-seven years. The manifests were exhibited and the witness declared that no packages were shipped by the Express Company on May 10. October 5 a box weighing seven pounds was shipped for the Wilmington Dental Manufacturing Company. There was no record of any shipment on November 8. When the loss was reported the Express Company endeavored to ferret out the matter and employed a detective, but the packages were never ' recovered.</p> <p>Edward J. Dougherty, a Pinkerton detective, testified to making an investigation of the loss at the instance of the Express Company. Examined the books at the Dental Company’s office and thought that some of the figures had been changed.</p> <p>George H. Hall, driver for Adams Express Company, had frequently called at the office of the Dental Company for packages. When they were not ready, Michael Mooney, a clerk in the office, would often say he would send the goods to the office by Silas Murray. Had often seen Murray bring packages to the express office. Witness could not swear that the signature on the book on May 10 was his own. Had been tested several times in regard to recognizing his own signature and had failed.</p> <p>William H. Tunis, route agent for the Adams Express Company, was with Detective Dougherty when he made the investigation of the alleged loss of the packages. In the office of the company Michael Mooney explained the change of a figure one to a two in the entry book by saying that when the entry was made only one box was ready, but a short time afterward another box was sent and the figure changed. Had seen Silas Murray at both offices of the Adams Express Company with packages and boxes. Tested Hall’s ability to recognize his own signature and found that he could not.</p> <p>Harry Betts, clerk for the Adams Express Company. Had been in the office for about twenty years. Have seen Silas Murray bring goods to the express office.</p> <p>The defence rested here and Mr. Higgins recalled Stansbury J. Willey and explained the transactions of October 5.</p> <p>Michael Mooney was recalled. The alteration in the figure was made because one package was intended to go by mail, and Mr. Willey took it to the post office. The postal authorities would not take it on account of the weight. The package was then brought back and sent by express and the two packages placed together.</p>

Ejectment by Spencer Hitch, John H. Hitch, Mary Collison, and Arcadia Postles, against Wellington Patten. The following will of Spencer Hitch, Sr., was admitted to probate, February 21, A. D. 1797 : Sussex County, State of Delaware.

This suit was brought to determine, by interpleader, between George W. Todd and Jethro T. McCullough which of them is entitled to 105 shares of the capital stock of the Diamond State Iron Company, the complainant, standing upon the books of the company as the property of the defendant McCullough, and to certain dividends thereon (and interest upon a part of the dividends) that have accrued since January, 1881.

Action on the case to recover damages for injuries received by the plaintiff'from being knocked down at Second and French streets by a horse driven by the defendant. Thomas Denny testified that he was in company with Robinson on January 28, 1888, when the accident happened. The pavements were so slippery that they were compelled to take the street.

Action on the case for damages for personal injuries sustained from falling into a hole in the pavement on French street. When the third juror, George Abele, was called, Mr. Bird objected on the ground that Abele was a citizen of Wilmington, and as such incompetent to sit on the jury as he was, being a taxpayer interested in the suit. Mr. Lore argued on the other side of the question. The Court sustained the objection. Councilman Baugh was rejected on the same ground.

<p>Appeal from a Justice of the Peace.</p> <p>The suit was brought by Foster to secure the payment of $100, which he claims is due him for services rendered as special officer while he was dog catcher under Mayor Rhoads.</p> <p>Foster testified at length to the dates on which he served as special officer and declared that the mayor had requested him to do so.</p> <p>Councilman William H. Quinn testified that Foster had purchased a suit of police clothing at his place, saying that he wanted it for his own protection in his duties as dog catcher.</p> <p>Ex-Mayor Calvin B. Rhoads testified that Foster had been appointed dog catcher by him, and had been sworn in as a special officer for his own protection. He never put in a claim for extra services until after he had resigned as dog catcher. He had been allowed to do police duty at his own request until the regular officers objected, when he was stopped.</p> <p>John J. Dougherty, ex-chief of police, testified that he was chief of police from June 30, 1885, until May, 1888. He could not mention any particular occasion on which he had detailed Foster as an officer. Foster had acted in that capacity, however, and he compared favorably with other officers.</p> <p>Ex-Police Sergeant Harry C. Taylor testified: Witness remembered the accident to Charles Shields. That night he was called into the office and Mayor Rhoads said Foster is going up to to .take Shields’ place. Told Rhoads that he did not want him, but Rhoads replied: “He has been asking to go up there, let him go.” Witness never recognized Foster as a police officer. If he failed to report,' witness did not ask for him. Witness would not believe Foster on oath. Cross-examined by Mr. Vandegrift, witness said that Foster wore a uniform.</p> <p>Francis S, Sawdon, Chairman of the Police Committee of City Council, testified that his committee had never been called upon to confirm the appointment of Foster as a special officer. Cross-examined : Witness said he' never knew Foster as anything but a dog catcher. Foster asked the committee to pay for his clothes, but it refused.</p> <p>Augustus F. Messick, clerk of City Council, was called to prove bills which Foster had been paid for services as dog catcher. Mr. Vandegrift objected to such evidence, and the Court sustained the objection.</p> <p>Ex-Special Officer Harry Schoor testified that he never knew Foster as anything but dog catcher. Witness remembered the accident to Hamilton, who was turnkey. Witness had charge of the police station in the absence of the chief during that time. Had heard Foster ask to go to New Castle, giving as a reason that he had business there, and the city might as well pay his fare. Wit-Witness supposed he would have to believe Foster if he was on oath.</p> <p>Mr. Vandegrift recalled Francis T. Sawdon, who, in answer to questions from Mr. Vandegrift, said he had heard Mayor Rhoads say before the Police Committee that Foster made a good officer, but the witness did not know whether he meant dog catcher or policeman. Foster had asked for money for police clothing, but it was refused. On cross-examination by Mr. Turner witness said that Mayor Rhoads never said Foster was a speciaPofficer.</p> <p>C. Brooks Foster was called and testified that he had done police duty and had been recognized as an officer by the sergeants.</p>

Attachment Fieri Facias. Sheriff returns :—Laid in' the hands of Robert R. Cochran,. March 30, 1888.

Assumpsit for services and commissions on a contract for the sale of certain real estate belonging to the defendant, which he authorized plaintiff to sell for $12,000, to have for his commission all he could obtain for it above that price. The property was in the hands of several real estate agents for sale.

<p> Abatement—Witness—Accident at Railroad Grossing—Diligence. </p> <p>The right to sustain a personal action for damages to a person did not survive to his. representatives at common law, but exists in this state by force of the statute.</p> <p>As a general thing, the testimony of witnesses who swear positively to a fact is entitled to more weight than those who swear negatively in regard to it.</p> <p>The terms “ordinary care and diligence,” which railroad companies are bound to exercise, when applied to the management of railroad engines and cars in motion, must be understood to import all the care and circumspection, prudence, and discretion, which the peculiar circumstances of the place or caution reasonably required of such company or their servants ; and this will be increased or diminished according as the ordinary liability to danger to others is increased or diminished in the movement or operation of them.</p> <p>The law imposes upon every person the duty of using ordinary care for his own protection and security against accident; and the care and diligence which he is-bound to exercise must be in proportion to the,danger to be avoided, which is such care, prudence, and diligence as a reasonably prudent man, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, would exercise to preserve himself from being injured.</p>

<p> Master■ and Servant—Injury to Servant—Negligence—Damages. </p> <p>An employer impliedly engages to make the service of the employed a reasonably safe one. When acting through agents, he undertakes that his agent shall be a capable person for the position he holds. He shall provide a safe place for the employe to work at or upon, and no order with respect to change of position of the subject of the work shall be executed without due warning to the employe.</p> <p>If the employe has timely warning, and does not act upon it, he takes the risk of danger upon himself. When the plaintiff is guilty of the slightest contributory negligence, and the injury is not wholly the fault of the defendant, he cannot recover.</p> <p>In order to hold the employer responsible for the act or omission of his agents, where rights of others are concerned, such act or omission must be satisfactorily proved, and also it must appear that the plaintiff was not guilty of any contributory negligence.</p> <p>The measure of damages includes compensation for all expenses for medical attendance, a reasonable allowance for nursing and drugs, for his loss of time and wages, and for his pain and mental suffering resulting from the accident, and if he has received permanent injuries which will diminish his ability to make a living, he will be entitled to recover all the pecuniary loss which he is likely to sustain by reason thereof, and for his future suffering.</p>

Affirmed. The following facts were proved and admitted. (1) On the 13th of September, 1873, John H. Bewley executed his judgment bond to T. Foxwell for the real debt of $1000, with Samuel Hutchison as surety. (2) In Augus, 1873, Bewley gave his bond to John Numbers for $1,000, with Samuel Robert as surety. (3) On the 10th of October, 1877, Bewley gave bond to William Sharp for $700, with Daniel Palmatary as surety.

<p>This was a casé stated upon a scire facias at the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants, on a judgment in the Superior Court in and for Sussex County, and was as follows:</p> <p>And now this 17th day of October, A. D., 1882, it is hereby agreed by and between the parties to the above suit, that the following case be stated for the opinion of the Court in the nature of a special verdict.</p> <p>On the ninth day of February, A. D., 1875, Levin B. Brown recovered by confession, in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County, a judgment against John K, Brown and Hugh Brown, the said judgment being No. 154, to October Appearances, 1874, and the real debt therein being the sum of one thousand dollars, payable on the first day of January, A. D., 1866, with interest from the twenty seventh day of December, A. D., 1864.</p> <p>The following credits are indorsed on the record of said judgment to wit: May, 1867, by $70; December 27, 1868, by $110; January 1, 1873, Cr., by $300; September 10, 1873, by $67.38.</p> <p>On the-day of--A. D., 1875, a fi. fa. vice comes was issued on said judgment, being No. 354, to October Term, 1875.</p> <p>On the-day of--A. D., 1875, the said Hugh Brown departed this life.</p> <p>On the first day of November, A. D., 1876, the said judgment debt, interest and costs, was duly assigned, transferred and set over by the said Levin B. Brown to George Hallowell.</p> <p>On the 28th day of October, A. D., 1878, the said George Hallowell caused to be issued on said judgment a writ commonly called a Fieri Facias, being No. 7 to April Term, 1879, and in favor of George Hallowell, assignee of Levin B. Brown v. John K. Brown, who both survived Hugh Brown, deceased, the said Hugh Brown having departed this life on or about the-day---A. D., 1875.</p> <p>The following return was made upon said writ of Fieri Facias to wit: Levied on goods and sold, and nothing to apply to this execution suit. B. W. Truitt, L. Shff.</p> <p>On the-- day of- A. D., 1879, a thirty day rule was issued on said judgment, being No. 238 to October Term, 1879, on which the following return was duly made, to wit: “Inquiry held Juñe 10, 1879, and lands condemned,” saith B. W. Truitt, L. Shff.</p> <p>On the-day of---A. D., 1879, a writ commonly called a writ of Venditioni Exponas to sell lands, being No. 331 to October Term, 1879, was issued at the suit of the parties last aforesaid, against the parties last aforesaid on said judgment.</p> <p>" To the said writ of Venditioni Exponas the following return was made, to wit: Lands advertised and sold July 19, 1879, at the hotel of H. C. Pennington, in Seaford to the Nanticoke Building and Loan Association, for the sum of $1100.00, and applied as follows, to wit: The sum of $291.42 to a judgment of Wm. H. Ross and Jacob Williams v. John K. Brown, as garnishee, as per answer October 11, 1866, being the amount in full thereon, which settles the same; the sum of $142.32 to judgment No. 149 to April Term 1867, at suit of Jacob Williams v. John K. Brown, which settles the same; the sum of $152.61 to judgment No. 136 to October Term, 1871, at suit of George W. Windsor v. John K. Brown,, which settles the same; the sum of $241.35 to judgment No. 19, to April Term, 1872; at suit of James Rawlins v. John IÍ. Brown, which settles the same, and the sum of $272.30 to this execution in part payment and exhausts the said fund. Saith B. W. Truitt, Shff.,</p> <p>On the 17th day of March, A. D., 1875, letters of administration on the estate of said Hugh Brown, deceased, were in due form of law granted to Eliza Brown and Severn A. Brown. On the 18th day of February, A. D., 1882, they passed their fifth account on the estate of said deceased, in and by which they are decreed to have in hand an unappropriated balance of seventy-seven dollars and eighty-five cents.</p> <p>On the 23rd day of March, A. D., 1875, a judgment by confession was recovered in the said Superior Court (being No. 228 to October Appearances, 1874), at the suit of the said Hugh Brown v. Hugh C. Brown, for the sum of fourteen hundred and forty-eight dollars and sixty cents, (1,448.60) real debt with interest from the 7th' of November, A. D., 1874, and payable as follows, to wit:. $150 with interest on the whole, January 1st, A. D., 1876 and the balance in $150 payments with interest on the whole annually until paid.</p> <p>The following entry has been made upon the record of said judgment, to wit: “ 1882 April 10th, Cr. this judgment by cash paid on the 11th day of January, 1875, to Hugh Brown in his life time $400, S. A. Brown, Adm. of Hugh Brown, deceased.”</p> <p>On the 2nd day of March, A. D., 1882, a writ commonly called a writ of Scire Facias, was issued out of said Superior Court at the suit of George Hallowell, assignee of Levin B. Brown v. John K. Brown, who hath survived Hugh Brown, deceased, and the heirs and terre tenants of the lands of said Hugh Brown, deceased, said suit being No. 28, April Term, 1882, and in and by which said writ the sheriff was commanded to make known to the said John K. Brown, who hath survived Hugh Brown, deceased, that he be and appear in said Superior Court on a day therein named to show cause “ why the said George Hallowell, assignee of Levin B. Brown, ought not to have his execution against him of the debt and damages as aforesaid according to the form, force and effect of the said recovery,” and in and by which said writ the said sheriff was further commanded to make known “ to the heirs and terre tenants of the lands and tenement which were of the aforesaid Hugh Brown, deceased, on the ninth day of February A. D. 1875, (on which day the judgment aforesaid was rendered), or at any time said * * ” that they and each of them be and appear before the said Court on a day therein named to show cause “ why the debt and damages aforesaid of the land and tenements aforesaid ought not to be made, and to the said George Hallowell, assignee of Levin B. Brown as aforesaid rendered according to the form, force and effect of the recovery aforesaid.”</p> <p>To the said writ of Scire Facias, Samuel J. Martin, sheriff of Sussex county, to whom it was directed made the following return, to wit: “ Made known by John Den and Richard Fen, personally to Sallie D. Sharp, Henry W. Brown, Levin B. Brown, Susan A, Brown, Hugh C. Brown, and John K. Brown, March 7, 1882, so answers Samuel J. Martin, sheriff.</p> <p>If the Court be of the opinion that the said Scire Facias is properly issued, then judgment to be entered for the plaintiff, but, if not, then judgment to be entered for the defendant. The costs to follow the judgment, and either party reserving the right to sue out a writ of error thereon.</p>

Action of trespass vi et armis. Mrs. Thomas was the occupant of a certain property, which was owned by her husband’s father, and upon which there was a mortgage given by him. It was sold under this mortgage by the sheriff to one Scotten. Mrs. Thomas, on December 23, 1887, still holding possession, leased the property to one Carter. In March, 1888, Carter subleased the second story to one Black.

Trespass on the case for injury caused by flooding the cellar of plaintiff’s store* at corner of Delaware avenue and Jackson: street.

Action on the case for damages sustained by plaintiff due to the negligence of defendant. A. E. Sanborn, being called by the plaintiff, was examined as follows: Mr. Bradford:—I desire to ask Mr. Sanborn some questions on voir dire and waive the oath. Mr. Bird:—I would rather have it put. Mr. Sanborn stated that he had conscientious scruples to swearing, and he was then affirmed. By Mr. Bradford. Q,. Have you been assisting Mr. Bird in preparing this case for trial ?

Action on the case as a withdrawing member of the defendant loan association for amount due plaintiff. In April, 1884, McKenney joined the Diamond Loan Association, taking five shares of stock. He paid on these shares $5 a month from that date up to and including November, 1887, making 44 payments, amounting in all to $220.

This was an action against a master for damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of his servant while using the team of the master on the public highway.