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13 Ill. 296

Brown v. Keirns

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided December 15, 1851

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1851-12-15

This was an action commenced by Keirns against Brown, before a justice of the peace, in Fulton county. Keirns took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Fulton county.

Relies on Smith v. Whitaker ex rel. Jonas

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1851-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently April 1934

3 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Treat, C. J.

¶1The court should have dismissed the appeal. The bond was in the penalty of $54.62, and* it recited a judgment for $27.62. The penalty was, therefore, less than twice the amount of the judgment appealed from. We understand the statute as requiring an appeal-bond to be in the penalty of at least double the amount of the judgment. Rev. St. ch. 59, § 59. The deficit in this case may seem trifling, but the bond is nevertheless not a statutory obligation. 1 If a departure from the statute could be tolerated in the present case, it would have to be allowed in cases of more substantial defect, and the result would be to vest clerks and justices with a mere discretion as to what should be the penalty of an appeal-bond. It was decided in Smith v. Whittaker, 11 Ill. 417, that a penalty in a larger sum than twice the amount of the judgment will not vitiate an appeal-bond; and it was intimated, in that case, that a penalty in more than double the judgment may properly be required where it is necessary for the full indemnity of the appellee. The report of that case should have stated that the bond in question was more than twice the amount of the judgment appealed from; and what was there said must be understood with reference to such a bond. But there is no authority for holding that an appeal-bond is a less penalty than double the judgment, can be regarded as a compliance with the statute. On the contrary, this court has often expressed the opinion, that the appellee has a right to insist that the bond shall strictly conform to the statute. Young v. Mason, 3 Gilm. 55; Sharp v. Bedell, 5 Id. 88. The rule cannot operate harshly upon an appellant, for he is permitted to avoid the effect of a motion to dismiss his appeal for the insufficiency of the bond, by the execution of a new bond. If he will not thus perfect the appeal when the objection is made, he must suffer the consequences resulting from his negligence.

¶2The judgment is reversed.

¶3Judgment reversed.

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