Volume 13 — Louisiana Reports

The plaintiff, Marie Delphine Justin Laroche, widow of the late Richard Clague, and natural tutrix of the minor children, Richard, Edward and Charles Clague, instituted suit in the Court of Probates against J. & L. Gamier and Thomas Barrett, Esqs., executors of the last will and testament of Richard Clague, deceased, demanding of them to be put in possession of the whole amount of the inventory of the estate of her deceased husband, after deducting the legal fees and charges…

This case commenced by order of seizure and sale. The plaintiff sold, and conveyed to the defendant, Guyol, a lot of ground, in the city of New-O.rleans, by public act, dated the 11th of May, 1832, for the sum of ten thousand eight hundred dollars, payable in four equal annual instalments from the date of sale, with mortgage retained on the premises until complete.payment of the price.

<p>APrEAL FROM THE PARISH COURT, FOR~THE PARISH AND CITY OF •NEW-ORLEANS;</p> <p>This is an action against the drawers of a bill of exchange for one thousand three hundred and ninety-three dollars. The plaintiffs are the payees and holders thereof.</p> <p>The defendants reside in the state of Arkansas. John J. Bowie, one of the drawers of said bill, was arrested in New-Orleans, at the suit of the plaintiffs, and held to bail. ■ Before any service of petition was made on him, he left the state.</p> <p>His counsel appeared and filed two exceptions; that he was not properly named in the writ of arrest, and that no copy of the petition had been served on him; and prayed that the suit be dismissed.</p> <p>These exceptions were overruled, and an answer containing a general denial put in on the merits.</p> <p>Judgment was finally rendered against all the defendants, as commercial partners in solido, for the amount of the sum claimed. The defendant, J. J. Bowie, appealed.</p> <p>relied on the cases in 2 Louisiana Reports, .170, and 4 ibid, 154, in support of his exceptions, that for want of service of the petition on the defendant, the suit must be dismissed.</p>

APrEAL FROM THE PARISH COURT, FOR THE PARISH AND CITY OF NEW-ORLEANS. This is an action against the maker and endorser of a promissory note, instituted originally in the City Court of New-Orleans. The note is endorsed in blank by the payee, and the plaintiff is the holder or endorsee.

The plaintiffs, Marie Coralie Guerin, Marie Clementine Guerin and Ovide Guerin, the two last named, being minors and properly represented, are the children of Louis Guerin and Marguerite Chauvin Delery, his late wife, and sue to recover os joint owners the slave woman Celestine, and her daughter Fann5', which they allege they acquired by inheritance from their late mother the said Marguerite.

A1TEAL FROM THE PARISH COURT,. FOR THE PARISH AND CITY OP NEW-ORLEANS. This is an action to charge the defendant with the value of a cargo and invoice of goods, shipped and consigned to him by the plaintiffs, and to recover from him the amount of a bill of exchange, which had been drawn by them on his principals, Messrs. Barrett & Brown, of Boston, to cover the goods so purchased, and which was accepted but not paid.

<p>Where a warrantor is called in by the defendant, and the sheriff’s return shows he has not been found, it‘is the duty of the party calling him, to use all diligence to have him cited; or a curator ad hoc appointed to defend him, if he resides out of the state.</p> <p>Where a war-rantor is called in by the defendant and the sheriff’s return shows he has not been found, it is the duty of the -party calling him. to use all diligence to have him cited, or a curator ad hoc appointed to defend him, if he resides out of tiie state.</p>

A1TEAL FROM TIIE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT. This is a petitory action^ by two plaintiffs, to recover from the defendant, to be taken from the sides of his tract of land, thirty-one and thirty-three superficial arpents of land, as parts of back concessions. The plaintiff, Landry, is the front proprietor of six arpents on the river Mississippi, with the depth of forty.

This suit commenced by injunction, to stop an order of seizure and sale.

This is a redhibitory action, under the act of 1834, which creates the presumption of the redhibitory vice of a runaway existing, in relation to slaves, at the time of sale, when they abscond within two months. The plaintiff alleges, he bought several slaves from the testator of the defendant, (Paul Pascal,) who were fully guaranteed against all the vices and defects prescribed by law, for eight hundred dollars each.

<p>Where two estates are adjacent to each other, the one below owes to the other, a natural servitude, to receive the waters which run naturally from it. See Marlin vs. Jell, 12 Louisiana Reports, 501.</p> <p>If the owner of the lower estate, owing the servitude, makes a levee, or other obstruction to the natural flow of the water over his land from the upper one, the owner of the latter has his action to cause the obstructions to he removed.</p>

ATPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FOR TH® PARISH OF IBERVILLE, THE JUDGE THEREOF PRESIDING. This case has already been before the court. See 11 Louisiana Reports, 587. The facts material to the cause are there fully stated. It was remanded principally on the ground that the district judge had misdirected the jury in his charge to them.

ArrEAL FROM THE COURT OF PROBATES, FOR THE PARISH AND CITY OF NEW-ORLEANS. “This is an opposition on the part of Laure Bringier, widow of N. A. Baron, jr., to the confirmation and homolo-gation of a sale made to Andrew Hodge, of certain property of the estate of the deceased, for the many grounds set forth in the opposition.

This suit commenced by attachment. The plaintiff alleges he endorsed a note as surety for the defendant, who is the maker thereof for two thousand four hundred dollars, dated in March, 1828, and payable one year thereafter, at the office of the Clinton and Port Hudson Hail Road Company, at Jackson, in this state.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE PARISH OF ST. HELENA, THE JUDGE THEREOF PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action cf slander, to recover damages for slanderous words spoken by the defendant concerning the plaintiff.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded a general denial; and reconvened in damages, for certain slanderous words alleged to have been uttered by the plaintiff against him.</p> <p>On the trial, on motion of the plaintiff’s attorney, the demand in reconvention was struck out. The cause was then submitted to a jury, who returned a verdict for the plaintiff of seventy-five dollars in damages, and from judgment rendered thereon, the defendant appealed.</p> <p>contended that so far as the judgment condemned him to pay costs it was erroneous, because there was no proof of an amicable demand, although it is specially denied in the answer. If the amicable demand be denied and not proven, the plaintiff most pay the costs of suit. 7 Martin, JY*. S., 265. 8 ibid. 117. 4 Louisiana Reports, 151.</p> <p>2. The evidence does not support the verdict of the jury, consequently the judgment should be reversed.</p>

<p>The creditor of a succession, inherited by minors, under the tutorship of the administrator, cannot institute suit for the removal of the tutor for malversation in office. No one can institute this action, without being properly authorized by the Court of Probates, as required by the article 1016, of the Code of Practice.*</p> <p>The creditor of a succession inherited by minors, under the tutorship of the administrator, cannot institute suit for the removal of the tutor for malver-sation in office. No one can institute this action without be-thomecTby' the ,Court of Pl:°" ed by the anide om-actice.</p>

This case depends entirely on the construction of the boundary clause, in the act of the legislature, passed in 1812, defining the chartered limits of the city of New-Orleans. The plaintiff shows, that he laid out a town in 1831, at the end of the Pontchartrain Rail Road, on the margin of the lake, which he called Milneburg.

This is an action by the payee against the maker of a promissory note. The defendant excepted and denied that the plaintiff was the legal owner of the note sued on; but that he was only the endorser thereon.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FOR THE TARISH OF EAST FELICIANA, THE JUDGE OF THE EIGHTH PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action by the transferree against the maker of the following promissory note:</p> <p>“ Dollars 432. Twelve months after date, I promise to pay to G. W. Munday, or bearer, the sum of four hundred and thirty-two dollars, with ten per cent, interest from the - date. Value received. “ C. W. Yarborough.”</p> <p>14th December, 1835.”</p> <p><e Witness — W. C. Whittaker.”</p> <p>Endorsed: “Pay the within note to Morgan Morgan, November 26, 1836.” G. W. Mtjnday.</p> <p>The defendant averred that the note was obtained from him through fraud of the payee, and without any valid consideration, by pretending to sell to him certain groceries which he did notown, and never were received; that the plaintiff has no interest in said note, which has been transferred to prevent this defendant from setting up his equitable defence thereto. He denies that the plaintiff is, the owner of the note.</p> <p>Upon these pleadings and issues the parties went to trial.</p> <p>There were three bills of exception taken and relied on by the defendant, which are fully stated in the opinion of the court which follows.</p> <p>The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment, from which the ' defendant appealed.</p> <p>insisted that when fraud and want of consideration, were set up as a defence against a note by the maker, it devolves on the plaintiff to show that he came fairly in possession, and for a valuable consideration. 3 Marlin, JV. S., 291, 392. 6 ibid., 566. 5 Louisiana Reports, 49.</p>

AFIEAIi FROM TIIE COURT OF PROBATES, FOR THE PARISH AND CITY OF NEW-OREEANS. In Jthis case, P. S. Biron applied to the judge of probates to be appointed curator of the vacant estate of Eugene Quezac, who died intestate in the city of New-Orleans. Brugier made opposition to this application, and claimed the preference on the ground that he was a creditor of said estate in the sum of one hundred and seventy-four dollars.

This suit commenced by injunction, to restrain the resale of a certain tract of land, which the plaintiff had purchased or was struck off to him, at the probate sale of the succession of George W. Dortch, deceased. The facts of the case are fully stated and set forth in the opinion of this court, which follows. The district judge presiding, non-suited the plaintiff, and dissolved the injunction, and he appealed.

ArPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FOR THE PARISH OF POINT COUPEE, THE JUDGE OF THE SECOND PRESIDING. The plaintiffs in this case appealed from a judgment in favor of the defendant, Poydras. There were several persons called in warranty, but the parties entered into an express agreement of record, that the case be first tried and finally determined between the original parties to the suit, before proceeding against the warrantors.

<p>ArrEAL FROM THE COURT OF PROBATES, FOR THE PARISH OF WEST BATON ROUGE.</p> <p>This is an action instituted by the plaintiff as tutor of the minor children of James Hackett, deceased, to annul a sale of the property of his succession, on the ground that it was made below the appraised value.</p> <p>He .shows, that in pursuance of the advice of a family meeting, and an order of the Court of Probates, the plantation and lands of the late James Hackett were appraised at the sum of eighteen thousand dollars, and offered for sale in two divisions or lots; and that the defendant, Dodd, pnr-chased one of said lots, for eleven thousand one hundred and forty dollars, and F. Duplantier, the other, for four thousand eight hundred and ninety-five dollars, making an aggregate of sixteen thousand and thirty-five dollars, and falling short of the appraised value. He prays that said sale be annulled, and the property resold according to law.</p> <p>The family meeting declared, “that in order to pay the debts, and for the best interests of the minors, the property should be sold, etc.”</p> <p>The land, consisting of a sugar plantation, fronting on the Mississippi river, was divided into divisions or lots, and put up at public sale, when the defendants became purchasers atless than the appraised value.</p> <p>The plaintiff insisted, that the parish judge should proceed to a resale of the property according to law, which was refused. He then instituted the present suit, to set aside the first sale, as illegal and null.</p> <p>The judge of probates decided these sales were good, and from judgment maintaining them, the plaintiff appealed.</p>

This is an action to recover damages for false imprisonment. The case was before this court in February, 1835, and remanded for a new trial. The facts of the case are stated in the former trial in this court. See 7 Louisiana Reports, 575.

This is an action by the payee against the maker of two promissory notes, made in the parish of Point Coupée, and payable at the Planters’ Bank of the state of Mississippi, at Natchez, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of one thousand four hundred and thirty-one dollars.

This is an action against the defendant, to recover the sum of four hundred dollars in damages, for failing and refusing to issue an execution, as clerk of the Parish Court of Pointe Coupée, on a judgment which the plaintiff alleges he had obtained in said court against one Devall, for two hundred and eighteen dollars, with interest and costs.

<p>execuj¿on 0f a ba;i bond, in a criminal case, need not be proved when it purports to have been signed and sealed in the presence of a witness, who certifies the transcript of appeal as cleric of the court, especially when the court has acted on it as a public record.</p> <p>On a motion to enter up judgment on a bail bond, against the principal and his sureties, it is sufficient to assign'as reasons for the judgment, that “the appearance bond of the accused was called, and he failed to appear inr compliance with his recognizance.”</p> <p>The execution of a bail bond, in a criminal case, need not be proved, when it purports to haveheen signed and sealed in the presence of a witness, and who certifies the transcript of appeal as clerk of the court, espe-eially when the court has acted on it as a public record.</p> <p>On a motion, to enter up judgment on a bail bond, against the principal and his sureties, itis sufficient to assign asreasonsforthe judgment, that “the appearance hondofthe accused was called, and he failed to appear in compliance with his recognizance*”</p>

APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FOR TIIE rARisn of roiNT coupee, the judge of the second presiding.

This is an action by the attorney of the absent heirs of Francis W. Jenkins, against the curator of the succession of George G. Jenkins, also a deceased brother, to recover the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars, for wages as a clerk and mercantile agent of the house of George G. Jenkins, from the 18th June, 1836, to the 18th September, 1837, which services are alleged to be worth two thousand dollars per annum.

This is an action by tlie heirs at law of Joseph de Leon, alias Rodriguez, against Juan Gonzales, his instituted heir and teslamentary executor, in which they allege that the last will and testament of the deceased, under which the defendant claims, is null and void, because it was not written as dictated by the testator.

<p>APPEAL FROM TIIE COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FOR THE PARISH OF POINT COUPEE, TIIE JUDGE THEREOF PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action by the widow and heirs of Thomas N. Hosea, deceased, on a promissory note for five hundred dollars, executed by the defendant, and made payable to the order of the deceased, at the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of Louisiana, in St. Francisville, in all the month of March, 1838. The plaintiffs pray judgment for the amount of the note, etc.</p> <p>The defendant excepted to the plaintiffs’ action, and denied jy[rs> jjosea was widow and in community with the late Thomas N. Hosea, the payee of the note sued on, or ^at g^g was tutrix of his children, and that they were not his heirs, and not entitled to sue in this case. He then pleaded a general denial, and prayed that the suit be dismissed. There was also a plea of failure of consideration.</p> <p>Upon these pleadings and issues the cause was submitted to a jury, on the evidence produced by the parties, who returned a verdict as follows: “Verdict in favor of plaintiffs.” Upon this, the following judgment was pro-mounced : “ By reason of the verdict of a jury first had, and the law and evidence being in favor of (he plaintiffs ; it is, therefore, ordered, etc., that they recover the sum of five hundred dollars, etc.”</p> <p>After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a new trial, the defendants appealed.</p> <p>prayed that the judgment be affirmed, with ten per cent, damages, and costs.</p> <p>urged various objections to the form of the verdict and judgment, and to the insufficiency of the evidence offered by the plaintiffs in support of their capacity to sue, and the validity of their demand.</p>

APPEAL. FROM THE COURT OF TJrtE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FOR THE PARISH OF POINTS COUPEE, THE JUDGE THEREOF PRESIDING. The plaintiff alleges, that in the year 1838, the defendants, L. Chitz, C. Porche, and P. Jeoffrian, illegally, and without authority, entered upon bis land, at the mouth of the upper canal of Fausse Rivibre, and there cut away a dike, or dam, which he had constructed across said canal, for his own use and benefit, and which was situated on his own land.

The plaintiff alleges he is owner of a front tract of land on the Mississippi, having seventeen arpents front with the usual depth; and that he entered his back lands in rear of his front tract, on the 14th of June, 1836, under the provisions of the pre-emption act of 1832, and revived by the act of 1835.

ArrEAL PROS! THE COURT OP PROBATES, POR THE PARISH OF ASCENSION. This case comes up on an opposition made by the heirs of the deceased Louis M. Reynaud, to the account and tableau of distribution, filed by the executors of Antoine Peytavin, deceased.

This is an action by a creditor to annul certain sales from his debtor to the defendants, as having been made in fraud of creditors. The plaintiff shows that he obtained a judgment against Auguste Roger, in the parish of Lafourche Interior, on the 2nd October, 1835, for one thousand three hundred and fifty dollars, with interest and costs.

This suit is composed of two consolidated cases, of Dozer vs. Squires, and Dozer vs. Donnaud,- and others, called in warranty, in which the plaintiff claims two half lots of ground, situated in the town of Thibodeauxville, and in the possession of the defendants, Squires and Donnaud.

This is an action to recover from the defendant two hundred and seventy-five dollars and eighty-four cents, for materials furnished, and for repairs made, and for work done on the defendant’s building, according to an account annexed.

This case was before the court at a former term and a judgment of non-suit entered, because of the failure of the plaintiff to produce evidence of authority to the United States agent, (Capt. T. S. Rogers,) from the war department, to convey title to the lot of ground in question. 11 Louisiana Reports, 88. On the return of the cause to the District Court, it was again tried before the court and a jury.

<p>A1TEAL FROM THE COURT OF PROBATES, FOR THE PARISH OF IBERVILLE.</p> <p>■ The plaintiff alleges, that Eliza Wilson, late of the parish of Iberville, being indebted to one John McDonough in the sum of twelve thousand and sevenly-five dollars and thirty-four cents, did by her attorney in fact, D. D. Chesnut, on the 18th day of May, 1833, make and execute her promissory note, in which she promised to pay to the order of this petitioner, on the 4th May, 1834, at the Bank of Louisiana, in New-Orleans, the said sum of money, which note he endorsed as surety, together with Lavinia Erwin, and it was delivered to the said McDonough for the debt aforesaid. That at maturity it was protested for non-payment, and Eliza Wilson, the maker, having failed to pay it, suit was instituted, and judgment for the amount thereof obtained against this petitioner, after every legal defence was made, and for which he is liable and bound to pay as endorser or security, together with interest and costs.</p> <p>The plaintiff further shows, that Eliza Wilson died during the pending of these proceedings, in the parish of Iberville, leaving a large estate, and where her succession is opened, and that Wm. E. Edwards, Esq., has been appointed dative testamentary executor, and is now the representative of said succession. ^ He further states that he frequently demanded of Mrs. Wilson in her life time, and of the executor since, to discharge said note or obligation and to relieve him from his suretyship, which they have neglected and refused to do. He therefore prays that the executor be condemned to pay and discharge said note to the said John McDonough or to him, for the use of the latter, and that the property of said succession be seized and sold to satisfy and discharge the same.</p> <p>The defendant after pleading an exception to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, and having craved oyer of the instrument of writing sued on, pleaded the general issue, and averred that the husband of Mrs. Wilson, in 1819, gave his note to one Thomas Durnford for a small loan of four thousand eight hundred dollars, which was subsequently assigned to John McDonough, and formed the only basis of the present debt, alleged to be due in the form stated. He admits that D. D. Chesnut made the note now in suit, but without the authority or knowledge of Mrs. Eliza Wilson, and specially denies that he had any power of attorney to execute said note as her attorney in fact; that said note never had any other consideration than the loan of money as above set forth, made by Durnford to N. Wilson, which was long since and before the giving of the note sued on, extinguished by prescription ; that no consideration existed for said note, or if it did, it was only for the amount of four-thousand eight hundred dollars, which was prescribed, and upon which amount usurious and compound interest was charged, until it swelled to the enormous sum of twelve thousand and seventy-five dollars and thirtj'vfour cents.</p> <p>The defendant further avers that D. D. Chesnut had no authority to execute said note, that Thompson when sued by McDonough, suffered himself to be condemned without informing Eliza Wilson or her representatives, who would have furnished the means of defence to defeat the action ; that they were never notified of the suit,-and that he as executor is not liable to indemnify Thompson. He prays that the plaintiff’s demand be rejected with costs.</p> <p>Upon these pleadings and issues, the parties went to trial.</p> <p>The record and judgment of the suit of McDonough against Thompson, as surety or endorser of the note now in suit, was offered in evidence. A bill of exception was taken to the admission of parole evidence to prove the hand writing of Jesse Munson, a subscribing witness to the power of attorney executed by Mrs. Eliza Wilson to D. D. Chesnut, and under which he acted in signing the note sued on.</p> <p>After hearing all the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the judge of probates gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.</p>

This case was before the court at the February term, 1837, and remanded for a new trial. Vide 10, Louisiana Reports, 524. On the return of the cause to the District Court, both parties attempted to amend their pleadings by leave of court, which were objected to by the adverse party.

This is an action to recover two sums of money, one of one thousand eight hundred dollars, and the other, three thousand dollars, with interest, which remain due on the price of a tract of land, or plantation and slaves, sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, by public act, bearing date 8th of March, 1836.

In this case the curator of F. A. Browder’s estate, presented two accounts and tableaus of distribution, which were at his instance and prayer, with a slight alteration to which he consented, homologated and confirmed.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, THE JUDGE THEREOF PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is a petitory action, in which Francis and Zenon Rivas, seek to recover two undivided thirds of a plantation or tract of land, having twelve or thirteen arpents front on the Mississippi, with the usual depth, and claimed by the defendant. x</p> <p>The plaintiffs allege that said land was inherited by their father from his ancestor, and was his separate property, and that at his death he left only three heirs, (the petitioners and Yirginie Rivas,) all minors, and that without their consent and in contravention of the forms of law required in such cases, the tract of land in question, has been illegally sold and taken possession of by the defendant. They pray for judgment, declaring them to be the lawful owners of two-thirds thereof, and for damages.</p> <p>1. The defendant pleaded a general denial.</p> <p>2. He avers that he is the lawful owner of the land sued for, having acquired the same at a sale made by the syndic of the estate of Marie Rivas, an insolvent debtor. That said sale was made in pursuance of a competent judicial order to that effect, and that respondent paid the price at which it was adjudicated, to the syndic. They aver that the title so vested in them, can only be annulled or contested in a regular action of nullity, to which the heirs and creditors of Marie Rivas should be parties.</p> <p>3. He avers that the father of petitioners left his estate heavily encumbered with debts ; that after his decease his surviving widow caused the whole of the property belonging to the community to be adjudicated to her, and that among the community property so adjudicated, was the tract of land now claimed. That subsequently, finding herself unable to pay the community debts, or her own, she made a surrender of her property for the benefit of her creditors; and that the land claimed was sold, and the proceeds of the sale appropriated principally to the payment of the debts contracted by Francis Rivas, the father of plaintiffs.</p> <p>4. That the property surrendered by Marie Rivas, the mother of plaintiffs, sold for more than sufficient to pay all her debts, and plaintiffs, as her heirs, have received from the syndic their portion of the overplus, and given him an acquittance therefor, and thereby ratified all the proceedings in the surrender, and confirmed the title of defendant, they being at the time of full age.</p> <p>5. That when the tableau of distribution was filed, the plaintiffs were of full age, and appeared in court and made opposition on various grounds to the tableau of distribution, but did not set up title to the land now claimed, but on the contrary admitted it to have been the common property of J r r 7 their parents, and claimed as privileged creditors to be paid a large sum out of the proceeds of said sale.</p> <p>6. He avers that after the surrender of Marie Rivas, she acquired some property, and that on her decease, the plaintiffs, who were then majors, took possession of her property and divided it between themselves and their sister, Virginie Rivas, without pursuing the forms of law, and that, thereby, they have rendered themselves liable as heirs, pure and simple, of their mother, and are estopped from asserting their present claim.</p> <p>7. He demands that the heirs of Marie Rivas, and her creditors, be cited in warranty, &c. ■</p> <p>Upon these pleadings and issues, the cause was tried.</p> <p>It appeared in evidence that Francis Rivas, the ancestor of the plaintiffs, received this land partly by inheritance and partly by purchase from his co-heirs after his marriage; that the price he was to allow for it, (four thousand dollars,) formed part of the succession tobe divided between the heirs.</p> <p>The plaintiffs’ ancestor died in possession of this property, which was put in his inventory as part of his estate, the 3d August, 1829. His widow, Marie Rivas, in pursuance of the advice of a family meeting, and an order of the Probate Court thereon, had all the property in the inventory of her deceased husband, adjudicated to her at its appraised value, the 23d November, 1829. She remained in possession under this adjudication until the 7th July, 1831, when she made a surrender of all her property to her creditors, including the tract of land in question, who appointed John Buhler, Esq., sheriff of the parish of East Baton Rouge, syndic. This property, with other effects, was sold by the syndic after the necessary formalities, and the land purchased by the defendant Bernard, for the sum and price of nine thousand one hundred dollars. The syndic filed his tableau of distribution, in January, 1835, and the plaintiffs, being then both of age, made opposition, claiming to be creditors for a larger amount than was recognized by the syndic. These oppositions were dismissed, the parties failing to appear and prosecute them, and on the 3d of July, 1835, the tableau of distribution was homologated. The opponents made an unsuccessful attempt to have their opposition reinstated, but no appeal was ever taken by them. They received from the syndic the sums allowed them on the tableau.</p> <p>The defendant’s counsel relied on these acts of the plan tiffs, as a full and complete ratification of the sale and adjudication of this property to their mother.</p> <p>It appears in evidence that the syndic of Madame Rivas’s creditors, filed his tableau of distribution the 14th January, 1835, in which he puts down the proceeds of the sale of her personal property at six hundred and fifty-eight dollars; slaves, at six thousand six hundred and nine dollars; land to Neilsou, seven hundred and fifty dollars; do. to Arnous, one thousand dollars; do. to J. Bernard, (defendant,) nine thousand one hundred dollars; a lot in Baton Rouge, to Monteguf, at three hundred dollars; in all, eighteen thousand four hundred and seventeen dollars. Among other creditors, he placed thereon, “ Francis, Zenon and Virginie Rivas, heirs of Marie Rivas,” (as creditors,) for four thousand seven hundred and sixteen dollars and sixty-three cents.</p> <p>On the 21st January, these heirs (Francis and Zenon Rivas, being of full age,) filed their opposition to the tableau, in which they allege they are the lawful heirs of Francis Rivas, deceased, whose property, according to the inventory of his estate, amounted to twenty-two thousand six hundred and forty-nine dollars ; and that, during the existence of the community, he received from his father’s estate the sum of eleven thousand five hundred and seventy-nine dollars, and the acquests and gains were only three thousand and eighty dollars ; one half of which belonged to these opponents as his heirs. That tliesaid Marie Allain, (widow Rivas,) remained in possession of the undivided property of her and her late husband, until she was unlawfully divested of it, by surrender to Buhler, as syndic, &c. That their said mother took possession of their share in their father’s estate and never accounted for it, in consequence of which, they allege, they are the privileged creditors of their mother for the share inherited from their father, to wit: the sum of eleven thousand five hundred and seventy-nine dollars; and for two thousand dollars brought to the community by their mother, (Madame Rivas,) as her separate property; and further, they claim one half of the balance as common property, being the sole heirs of their father.</p> <p>The opponents then pleaded exceptions to various parts of the proceedings of the creditors and syndic, receiving and selling the property so surrendered by their mother, and set up several vices and errors in the formalities of the proceedings : finally, they allege that the syndic improperly and Avrongfully placed them on the tableau, as heirs of Madame Rivas, when they never had assumed that quality, and that instead of being placed on the tableau as creditors for four thousand seven hundred and sixteen dollars and sixty-three cents, they ought to have been entered as privileged creditors of their father’s estate, in the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred and nineteen dollars, and not as heirs of their mother’s insolvent estate. They reserve all their rights, and in opposing the homologation of the tableau, pray that it be so amended as to conform to and allow them their claims as set up by them.</p> <p>When this opposition was called up for trial, Zenon Rivas was dead, and no one appearing for them, the opposition was dismissed.</p> <p>He states he paid F. Rivas the full amount due to him, out of the proceeds of his mother’s estate, as placed on the tableau. He proved the signature of F. Rivas to a paper offered in evidence, to show he had made himself responsible for the payment of one of the debts placed on the tableau. Objected to, because F. Rivas was a minor at the time. Admitted, the objection going to the effect and not to the competency. Witness said he had no money of F. Rivas, except what was allowed him on the tableau of distribution. Rivas called on him for the money.</p> <p>Witness further states that Z. Rivas paid him, as syndic, the last note due by Arnous, for the price of property purchased by him at the sale of Mrs. Rivas’s estate. Witness was not indebted to Z. Rivas in any other manner, than as stated on the tableau. Witness proved signature of F. Rivas to a paper, offered to prove his acceptance of the amount appearing to be due him on the tableau, and to show his acquiescence in the proceedings, &c. Objected to, because the paper was written while F. Rivas was a minor. Admitted, the objection going to the effect of the evidence only.</p> <p>The defendant offered in evidence the record of the suit of Marie Rivas vs. Her Creditors, to show how much of the proceeds of the sale of the property surrendered was appropriated to the payment of the community debts, and it appearing the vouchers were not endorsed, as having been filed by the clerk, parole evidence of J. Buhler, syndic, was offered to make their proof: objected to and admitted, and a bill of exceptions taken.</p> <p>The plaintiffs then moved to strike out all the evidence of Buhler, because it appeared that at the time of the death of Rivas, the father, the plaintiffs were minors, and that Buhler illegally and wrongfully took possession and administered their estate and is liable to them. The motion was overruled and the plaintiffs’ counsel excepted.</p> <p>From the foregoing evidence, the district judge was of opinion the plaintiffs were bound, by the proceedings had in the surrender, sale and distribution of the proceeds of the property surrendered, and that they could not be permitted to attack these proceedings collaterally. That not having appealed from them, or instituted an action of nullity to set them aside, they are precluded from a recovery in the present suit.</p> <p>The district judge was also of opinion the evidence showed that the plaintiffs had rendered themselves liable, as heirs pure and simple of their mother, by taking possession and appropriating to their own use the property of which she died possessed. Judgment was, therefore, rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs appealed.</p> <p>I. The inventory establishes that this property formed part of the estate of plaintiffs’ grand-father. He died intestate, leaving four children. Hence the father inherited an undivided fourth. He entered into an agreement with his co-heirs, by which he was to acquire the remaining three-fourths, at the price of three thousand dollars, payable in four equal annual instalments, &c.</p> <p>Before the last instalment of the price fell due, to wit, on the 30th of December, 1817, the parties had a conventional liquidation and partition of the estate. Each heir was entitled to eleven thousand five hundred and seventy-nine dollars forty-one and three-fourth cents ; and as part of the share of plaintiffs’ father, we find this property allotted to him at the price of four thousand dollars. From this it is evident, that the plaintiffs’ father inherited one-fourth of this property, and paid for the remaining three-fourths out of the proceeds of' his share of the inheritance. This constitutes it separate estate under our laws.</p> <p>II. The adjudication to Madame Rivas was absolutely null, and did not pass the land. 1</p> <p>1st. Because it was separate property. The minors did not hold it in common with her, and none but property so holden can be adjudicated to the father or mother of minors. Louisiana Code, article 338. But had it been holden in common, the adjudication is void, because the same article requires that there shall be an “ estimation by experts” of the property, after the family meeting have advised the adjudication ; and here the property was taken at the original appraisement.</p> <p>2d. As a sale it was void. The adjudication was a sale, and nothing else. It contains all the elements and properties of a sale. There is the thing parted with, and acquired, its price and the consent of one party, and an essay towards those legal formalities, which (fully and exactly complied with) supply the consent of the others. If a sale then, why was it void Í because the tutrix purchased of her pupils, which the law forbids. Louisiana Code, 327. But it was void for want of other formalities.</p> <p>III. The insolvent proceedings as to the land were void, and did not pass it to the purchaser.</p> <p>1. Because Marie Rivas could not make a cession of property which did not belong to her.</p> <p>2. The plaintiffs, being minors at the time of the cession and sale, and the land being exclusively theirs, no alienation thereof could be legal without the ministration of the Probate Court; the District Court being wholly without jurisdiction.</p> <p>3. The plaintiffs were not placed on the bilan of Marie Rivas, nor in any wise represented in the concurso, and hence are not bound thereby. Bainbridge vs. Clay, 3 Martin, JV. /S'., 262. Thomas et]al. vs. Breedlove et al., 6 Louisiana Reports, 575. As to citation of creditors, see 2 Moreau’s Digest, 426, section 8. Louisiana Code, 3054. The syndics and creditors were bound to have the minors legally represented, under the penalty of intermeddling. Louisiana Code, 3283. 11 Louisiana Reports, 4. Ibid., 409.</p> <p>4. The property was not sold agreeable to law. There was no procés verbal of the sale. The deed being exparte as to us, the recitals thereof can have no effect against us; and we are not otherwise apprised by the proof of there having been a public sale, but by a recital to that effect in the deed, afterwards made. None but a public auctioneer could have sold the property. There being no evidence to establish that this was a public sale, made in the manner required by law, it must be considered as a private sale. Such a sale could not be made of the property embraced in an insolvent’s cession. See Act of 1826, 2 Moreau’s Dig., 437, sec. 3. Again, these irregularities of the syndic, constituted him a tutor, in his own wrong; and as tutor, he is expressly forbid to make a private sale of his ward’s property; such a sale is not a relative but an absolute nullity. Fletcher et al. vs. Cavelier, 4 Louisiana Reports, 269. The- plaintiffs not being divested of title by these proceedings, the next inquiry is, how far their rights were affected by the homologation of . the syndic’s tableau of distribution.</p> <p>IY. The judgment homologating the tableau of distribution is not res judicata, as to us.</p> <p>It is true the plaintiffs filed their opposition to this tableau, but it is not true that the merits thereof were ever discussed, considered, or decided upon. The counsel has strangely confounded the facts, by not giving them their proper order of precedence, as they are found upon the record. The judgment declares, that opponent’s counsel being dead, and they being called, and not present to prosecute their opposition, that the same be dismissed, and it then proceeds to homolo-gate the tableau. Now, it is clear from this, that the same document comprises two judgments, entirely distinct and several in their natures : 1st. A judgment of dismissal. 2d. A judgment of homologation ; and by force of that dismissal, the plaintiffs ceased to be parties to the tableau before the judgment homologating it was rendered. Hence we say that judgment is not res judicata, because,</p> <p>1st. It was a judgment of non-suit. A judgment of dismissal is nothing more than a judgment of non-suit. The terms are strictly synonymous when applied to coercive non-suits by the court, contra-distinguished from voluntary non-suits, by a parly, and none of these are res judicata, and the party may bring his action anew on paying costs, etc. Code of Practice, articles 491, 492, 536 ; 1 Martin, JY. S., 165; 6 ibid., 331; 7 ibid., 365; 2 Louisiana Reports, 429.</p> <p>2nd. We were not parties to judgment of homologation, nor placed upon the bilan. A. judgment can never have the effect of res judicata against persons not parties to it. Even where a person has claims in different capacities against an insolvent estate, and is regularly cited as to one, and votes for syndic, the judgment of homologation is no bar to his other claim, provided he receives nothing under the tableau. 6 Louisiana Reports,-576. When a party’s claim is dismissed, he is no longer a party to the suit. 3 Louisiana Reports, 514; 4 ibid., 324.</p> <p>3rd. The demand is not the same, nor between the same parties, in the same quality. It has been strenuously'urged, that this judgment could only be assailed by appeal, or action of nullity. This has been conclusively replied to already, in showing we were not parties to it, that it is not for the same cause, etc. We have another answer fully as complete. It is a settled principle of our jurisprudence, that wherever an action of nullity would lie, to annul a judgment, or a contract, etc., the same party may oppose the enforcement of either, by way of exception. Hence, the exception of nullity, opposed to such judgment or contract, etc., operates to the same extent and with' the like result, as would the action of nullity, brought for their dissolution. Code of Practice, article 20 ; Louisiana Code, articles 1875, 1876, 2042 ; 1 Martin, N. (S'., 468 ; 3 ibid., 695 ; 2 Louisiana Reports, 39; 3 ibid., 246.</p> <p>If, then, this judgment forms no bar to our recovery, the plaintiffs must recover, unless they have ratified the sale, and we maintain,</p> <p>V. There has been no ratification :—</p> <p>It is alleged, 1st. That the plaintiffs’ opposition to the tableau, and claim of proceeds of sale, ratified it.</p> <p>We answer, that the language of the opposition is that of the counsel who filed it, and he not being attorney in fact, it cannot bind the parties as a judicial confession. Louisiana Code, article 2270.</p> <p>2nd. If receiveable at all, it cannot be divided, against us; and it denounced, as radical and absolute nullities, the whole proceedings against us.</p> <p>3rd. The dismissal of the opposition placed all its admissions and averments dehors judicial cognizance.</p> <p>It is alleged, 2nd., That the plaintiffs, by taking possession of their mother’s estate at her death, without the authority of justice, made them her heirs, pure and simple, and bound them to warrant all her acts.</p> <p>We answer, the whole of her estimated property was seventy-eight dollars; that is, twenty-six dollars to each heir, and comes within the principle of de minimis non curat lex; an amount not equal to the funeral expenses, which the law permits, without construing it into an acceptance of the succession. See Louisiana Code, article 995; 3 Louisiana Reports, 549.</p> <p>It is alleged, 3dly, and lastly, That the plaintiffs have ratified the sale of the land, by receiving the price thereof.</p> <p>The father of plaintiffs, during his marriage, inherited property to the value of eleven thousand dollars. This includes the land in controversy, valued at that day at four thousand dollars. At his death, his heirs became privileged creditors upon his estate to the amount of the inheritance.</p> <p>The aggregate of the syndic’s sale amounted to eighteen thousand dollars, of which the land in controversy brought nine thousand dollars. The community debts, as exhibited upon the bilan of Marie Rivas, amounted to six thousand dollars. It results, that the heirs were entitled to three thousand dollars of the proceeds of the sale, independent wholly of the price of the land, nine thousand dollars.</p> <p>The only amount shown by the record to have been received by Zenon Rivas, was one thousand three hundred dollars, and this was some two years before the tableau was filed. The only written evidence, as to the amount Francis Rivas has received, shows two hundred and fifty dollars-There is no evidence whatever that either of them received any thing after the homologation of the tableau ; nor do the receipts in any wise connect or identify the acknowledgment of payment therein expressed, with the price of this particular property.</p> <p>It having been made manifest that the heirs were not divested of title, by the adjudication to Marie Rivas, nor by her cessio bonorum, nor the sale of the syndic, it follows, that Bernard is without title, unless those receipts, (which do not mention the land,) coupled with the oral declarations of the syndic, that he has paid other moneys to F. Rivas, can confer a title ! That syndic, too, having brought upon himself the penalties of an intermeddler, a tutor in his own wrong, thereby became incompetent, from interest.,,to prop up even that frail miniment of title ! No case with us has gone to this length ; it is altogether without precedent.</p> <p>The cases cited from 10 Martin, 734; 6 Louisiana Reports, 601 ; 7 ibid., 34; 5 ibid., 520; 9 ibid., 291, 293; are all clearly distinguishable. Most of them were ratifications by authentic acts, and the others by explicit recognitions.</p> <p>What constitutes an act of confirmation, or a voluntary execution of an obligation, etc., is explicitly set forth in our code, to this extent — that the former is valid only when it contains within it the substance of the obligation confirmed ; and the latter, when it shall be executed in due form. Louisiana Code, articles 2251-2; also, articles 2255, 2214, 2215.</p> <p>The adjudications elsewhere are fully accordant. They establish that no act of ratification can be opposed to a party, which was not clearly designed as such by the party making it; nor then, unless it appears that he was fully apprised of his rights, and especially of his right.to be relieved from the act claimed to be ratified. See Newland’s Equity Contracts, first American edition, from page 496 to 502 ; ibid., 435 to 444; 2 Vernon, 121; 1 Wilson, 320; 3 Pierre Williams, 292, and notes; 3 Brown’s Chancery Cases, 117; 2 Vescy, jr., 199 ; 2 Schoales and Lefroy, 48 ; 1 Ball and Beatty, 330 ; 11 Sergeant and Rawle, 305 ; 1 Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, 303, chapter 7, section 307 ; ibid., 338, chapter 7, section 345.</p> <p>contended, that the original title to the land in controversy was derived by purchase of F. Rivas, (he ancestor of the plaintiffs, from his co-heirs, for the sum of four thousand dollars. This acquisition was made during the marriage, and three-fourths of it at least was community property; the other fourth being his share, in the inheritance with his co-heirs of then-deceased ancestor.</p> <p>2. On the death of F. Rivas, the adjudication of this property to his surviving widow, at the estimative value and in pursuance of the advice of a family meeting, vested in her a good and valid title. But if there were any irregularities in the proceedings, they could only be taken advantage of, or attacked by a direct action of nullity. 7 Martin, N. S., 180. 7.Louisiana Reports, 17. 10 Ibid, 264.</p> <p>3. It also appears from the evidence, that this, with other property, was surrendered by Madame Rivas to pay the debts of the community, which the plaintiff’s ancestor, her late husband,- had contracted as the head of the community, and was bound to pay. It is shown too, that the plaintiffs, as heirs of their father and mother, (for she died soon after the surrender,) appeared in their capacity of heirs, and claimed to be privileged creditors on the tableau presented by the syndic. They cannot now recover the property ; on the contrary, they are bound to warrant the title to the purchaser. 6 Louisiana Reports, 601.</p> <p>4. The plaintiffs having received after they became of age, the balance of the price of this very property, allowed to them on the tableau of distribution, have ratified the sale of the syndic, and cannot now be allowed to attack the sale and title. The decisions of this court and authorities, are express on this point. In the case of Grounx et al.f.p. c. vs. Mai’s 'Executors, this court held, “ that where the price of minors’ property has been received by their tutor and placed to their credit on the tableau of distribution of the tutor’s estate, which is homologated by a judgment unappealed from, the minors are precluded from setting up title to the property itself, &o.” See 7 Louisiana Reports, 17 and 34, 2 Louisiana Reports, 155. 6 Ibid. 601. 8 Toullier, Nos. 508-9-10.</p> <p>5. The ratification of the syndic’s sale in this case was made by the plaintiffs after they obtained full age, by appearing and contesting the tableau of distribution, in claiming to be creditors for larger sums than were allowed them. ’ They did not contest the validity of the sale of the property to the defendant; the scramble was for the price in the hands of the syndic. When their oppositions were overruled, they acquiesced without appealing, and received the respective portions allowed them from the syndic. There cannot be a stronger case of ratification than this. On the subject of ratification, see the case of McDonald vs. Catlett, 11 Louisiana Reports, 503-4. Baham vs. Baham, ibid. 510 ; and Foutelet et al. vs. Murrell, 9 Louisiana Reports, 291, 299.</p>

The plaintiff, Madame Michelle Gamier, residing in the kingdom of France, separated in property and bed and board from her husband, Alexander Bonneau, alleges that she is the niece and one of the heirs and residuary legatees of the late Julien Poydras.

' APPEAL FH.OJI THE COURT OF PROBATES, FOR THE PARISH AND CITY OF NEW-ORLEANS. This case was before the court at its February term, 1837, on an application for a mandamus commanding the judge of probates to allow an appeal from an interlocutory order, requiring the defendant, as curator of Durnford, to render an account. 10 Louisiana Reports, 497.

APrEAL PROM THE COURT OP THE PIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDINQ. This was an action on a verbal lease, to recover the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, for one year’s rent, due and to become due.

<p>The act for the relief of insolvent debtors in actual custody, requires as a pre-requisite to obtain the relief it affords, if the applicant is a merchant or trader, that he deposit in court his books and accounts, along tvith his schedule.</p> <p>So, where the debtor was a dealer in corn and hay, and had a small grocery store attached to his business, but kept no books or memorandums, except a small book in which he entered his purchases of corn, and he deposited none in court: Held, that although the law does not expressly rCqU;re a merchant or trader to keep books, yet, to be entitled toils benefits, he should have and deposit them in court, for the inspection of his creditors.</p> <p>So, where the debtor was a dealer in com “smalt’grocery store attached to las business, but no books or “®“ptiaadmail in y1”0.1' lie entered his purchases of posHeTno^e^n a°°rt:ireid, that does no t express-chant^oT trader y°t to be entitled to its benefits, he should have and deposit them in specUm-To-Phis creditors,</p>

ArPEAI. THOM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING. The facts and law of this case are comprised in the following opinion and judgment rendered by the district judge presiding “ This is an action of redhibition, arising out of the sale of a slave by defendant to plaintiff.- The alleged redhibitory vice is that of the habit of running away. The sale of the slave took place on the 4th November, 1835.

This is an action by the plaintiff, residing in the state of Mississippi, to recover a lot of ground in the city of New-Orleans, in the possession, and claimed by the heirs and legal representatives of Oliver Aikin, deceased. The plaintiff shows title to lot No. 5, in square No. 58, fronting on Magazine and Robin streets, and alleges that he has always had an agent in Louisiana, to pay all his taxes and other dues on his property in this state.

This is an action on several promissory notes, amounting to six hundred dollars, signed by Pyne & Huntington. The defendants were arrested on an affidavit of the plaintiff’s agent, and took a rule on the plaintiff to show cause why the order of arrest should not be set aside on the insufficiency of the affidavit.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action to recover the possession of a promissory note of two thousand four hundred dollars, drawn by F. Frey, and endorsed by Schmidt & Longer, alleged to be in the hands of the defendant, and wrongfully claimed and detained by him. The plaintiff alleges, that the note is owned by the minor children of the late Samuel Spotts, of whom he is the tutor, and that he is entitled to demand the possession or its proceeds, for which he prays judgment against the defendant accordingly.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded a general denial, and averred, that true it was he had the note in his possession, but was the lawful proprietor, having received it in the regular course of trade, in good faith, and for a valuable consideration.</p> <p>Upon these pleadings and issues the cause was tried before the court and a jury.</p> <p>Wm. Christy, Esq., the notary public, with whom the note in controversy was deposited by the plaintiff, testified, that in May, 1835, shortly after the note was executed, he ascertained that it was missing from his office, together with one other. He immediately advertised them in two of the newspapers. He soon discovered that W. Finney, his leading clerk, took the note and pledged it to the defendant, who lent him the sum of one thousand two hundred dollars, which sum was to have been returned by Finney, and the note taken up in a few days. These facts in relation to the pledge, witness had from the defendant himself, who called on him about two days after the note was advertised.</p> <p>Witness produced a letter to him from Finney, dated at Mobile, the 15th of May, 1835, acknowledging that he had taken this note, which was for two thousand four hundred dollars, payable the 15th of January, 1836, and pledged it to the defendant for one thousand two hundred dollars, with the intention of redeeming it, but that his misfortunes prevented him.</p> <p>All this testimony was objected to by the defendant’s counsel, but was received by the court, and a bill of exceptions taken.</p> <p>The advertisement of the notes was put in the papers by the notary, the 27th of May, 1835. The plaintiff made full proof of the loss of the note, and that it was duly advertised. The defendant admitted he had received it, but that he had discounted or purchased it in due course of business for the sum of one thousand two hundred dollars.</p> <p>There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed.</p>

ATrEAL FROM THE COURT 01? THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING. The plaintiff, Henriette Catharine Rapp, separated from bed and board from her husband, J. B. Guerin, sues to recover from the firm of Peyroux, Rivarde & Co., the sum of two thousand two hundred and twenty-four dollars, the amount of a note which she alleges her husband put into their hands for collection, the 7th June, 1833, when she and her husband were on the eve of starting for France.

This case comes before the court on an application for a mandamus to the judge of probates for the parish and city of New-Orleans, commanding him to order the execution and registry of the will of Robert Wardlaw Ramsay, deceased, late a resident of Great Britain, which was made and duly authenticated and admitted to probate in that country. Ambrose Lanfear, resident in New-Orleans, appeared and made affidavit that he was the attorney in fact of Messrs.

The facts and pleadings in this case, are fully stated in the following opinion and judgment, of the district judge who presided at the trial : “ This is a suit for non-compliance with a stock contract.

<p>No physical act, in taking possession, is necessary under a sale by notarial act. The intention of the purchaser, which the law presumes, coupled with the power which the act of sale gives, vests the possession in him. The right is taken for the fact, and the buyer is seized of the thing cor-porally by the execution of the title.</p> <p>There is but one kind of possession known to the law, which commences by the corporal apprehension of the thing, or the signing of the title which transfers it; and continues, whether or not the possessor actually occupies and detains the thing, until he is disturbed in fact or in law.</p> <p>The Louisiana Code contains definitions, and points of doctrine, as well as positive legislation; and whenever there is any inconsistency in • its provisions, the court will disregard the doctrine, and consider the definitions modified by the clear meaning of the positive enactments. ,</p> <p>So, all possessors, who have had possession quietly and without interruption, by virtue of one of the titles prescribed in the 47th article of the Code of Practice, for more than one year, previous to being disturbed, can maintain a possessory action ; and the possession of less than one year is sufficient, in case of eviction by force or fraud.</p> <p>No physical act in taking possession, is necessary under a sale bv notarial act. The intention of the purchaser, which the law presumes, coupled with the power which the act of sale gives, vests the possession in him. Thcrig7i2 is taken for the fact, and the buyer is seized of the thing cor-porally by the execution of the title.</p> <p>one'kinlofpos-t0 session known to commences by prehension31 ^of the thing, or the signing ot the title which eontinues,4 wh¿ ther or not the possessor acLually occupies and detains the thing, nntiihe is orliUaw-in faet</p> <p>The Louisiana Code contains definitions and points of doctrine, as well as positive legislation ; and whenever there is any inconsistency in its provisions, the court will disregard the doctrine, and consider the definitions modified by the clear meaning of the positive enactments.</p> <p>So, all possessors, who have had possession quietly andwith-outinterruption, by virtue of one of the titles, prescribed in the 47th article of the Code of Practice, for more than one year previous to being disturbed, can maintain a possessory action ; and the possession ofless than one year is sufficient, incase of eviction by force or fraud.</p>

This action commenced by the executory process, against mortgaged properly in the possession of a third person. The facts and pleadings of the case, are fully stated in the following opinion and judgment of the district judge : “ The heirs of Roche allege and prove, that Chretien gave his note, dated 29th March, 1825, to the widow Roche, payable one year afterdate, for one thousand six hundred dollars.

Hennen, on behalf of the heirs of Walker, who intervened in this case, insisted, that the court overlooked the provisions contained in the article 3298 of the Louisiana Code, in rendering judgment, and solicited a re-hearing.

This case was before the Supreme Court in February, 1838, and remanded for a new trial. See 11 Louisiana Reports, 551. The facts of the case and the written contract between the parties, are fully stated and set forth in the former report, and need not be again stated.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action on an account for a balance of one thousand five hundred and fifty dollars, which the plaintiff alleges is due to him for services rendered the defendant, as manager of a saw mill.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded a general denial. The case comes before this court on a bill of exceptions. On the trial, and before the testimony of the defendant was closed, the defendant, by his counsel, asked leave of the court to amend and file a plea of compensation of six hundred and thirty-three dollars, against the first item in the plaintiff’s demand, being the note of the latter for that sum, but the court refused to grant the leave, and to permit the plea of compensation to be filed. The defendant took his bill of exceptions.</p> <p>Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the principal part pf his demand, and the-defendant appealed,</p> <p>prayed for the afficmance of the judgment.</p> <p>insisted that compensation could be pleaded at any stage of the proceedings, previous to final judgment. Code of Practice, 367. 11 Louisiana Reports, 213. 2 Martin, N. S., 135. 3 Ibid. 665. 5 Ibid. 135.</p>

APrEAL FROM THE PARISH COURT, FOR THE PARISH AND CITY OF NEW-ORLEANS. This is an action in which the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to make him a title to a certain lot of ground in the city of New-Orleans, in pursuance of a memorandum of sale.

APPEAL PROM TÍIE COURT OP THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING. This is an action to recover a raft of timber, which the plaintiff alleges the defendant took forcible possession of in the state of Arkansas, and brought to the city of Lafayette for sale. He alleges that he is the true owner, and prays judgment that it be decreed to belong to him, and in the mean time that it be sequestered.

This is an action to recover from the defendant one thousand three hundred and eighty-two dollars and fifty cents, being the one-half of the net profits of a cargo of flour, sold on the joint account of plaintiffs and defendant, in pursuance of a written contract between them.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE PARISH COURT, FOR THE PARISH AND CITY OF NEW-ORLEANS.</p> <p>This is a redhibitory action, in which the plaintiff seeks to rescind the sale of two slaves made to her by the defendant, and to have her note for the price, amounting to nine hundred dollars returned, and for damages.</p> <p>She alleges, the slaves were afflicted with a pulmonary disease, at the time of sale, which was known to the seller, but which she fraudulently concealed, and of which the slaves died shortly after their delivery, following the sale.</p> <p>The plaintiff further alleged, she had been sued on the note in question, by Miramond, O’Duhigg & Co., to whom the defendant had transferred it. She prays for judgment,, restoring to her the note she gave as the price of said slaves, together with all the interest and cost recovered from her, in the suit of Miramond, O’Duhigg & Co., and for two hundred dollars in damages.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded a general denial to ■ the material allegations in the petition.</p> <p>On the trial, many witnesses were examined; and the record of the suit of Miramond, O’Duhigg & Co., against the plaintiff in this case, on her note given for the price of the slaves in question, was by her counsel offered in evidence, to which the defendant’s counsel made opposition, on the ground that the defendant was no party to that suit. The opposition was sustained, and the plaintiff took her bill of exceptions.</p> <p>The cause was submitted to a jury, on the evidence adduced by the parties, who returned‘a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed from the judgment rendered thereon.'</p>

ArPEAL PROM THE PARISH COURT POR THE PARISH AND CITY OP NEW-ORLEANS. This is an action for damages alleged to be occasioned by the defendant in demolishing the walls and chimneys of the plaintiff’s house, and building a privy over the line between them.

This is an action against the acceptors of a bill of exchange. The defendants admit their acceptance, but aver that the bill was accepted for the accommodation of the- drawer, L. Tanner; the defendants not having at the time, nor since, funds of the drawer in their hands ; that the plaintiff well knew their acceptance was an accommodation, and that being sureties of the drawer, the holder is bound to discuss the property of the drawer before proceeding against them.

This is an action on a promissory note under protest. The defendant excepted to the petition, on the ground that it did not set forth the place of residence of the plaintiff. The counsel for the plaintiff, on motion, and giving the court to understand that the exception was frivolous on its face, had it dismissed. Judgment by default was confirmed, and a new trial prayed for, on the ground that the exception was dismissed without being called up for trial.

<p>When there is no amicable demand proved, and the want of it is specially-pleaded, the judgment will not be affirmed with damages, although the appeal is frivolous.</p> <p>So, where the defendant appeared and pleaded the want of an amicable demand, but had no valid defence, he was required to pay all the costs in the inferior court, after his first appearance there.</p>

On the 9th February, 1838, Joseph Claiborne and Henry S. Mather, filed their petition and schedule, and prayed for the benefit of the insolvent laws of this state. The petitioners allege that they were three-fourths owners of the steam-boat Marmora, together with one J. Lefiicher, who owned the other'fourth.

This is an attachment suit by a resident of the state of Mississippi, against the Mississippi and Alabama Rail Road Company ; a corporation established by law, and located at Brandon, in said state. The plaintifF alleges, that the defendants are indebted to him in the sum of ten thousand dollars, for this amount of their bank notes, which he holds, and which they refuse to pay in the lawful money of the United States.

Suit was first instituted before the City Court of New-Orleans, in which the plaintiff had judgment, and the defendant appealed to the Parish Court for the parish of New-Orleans. On the trial in the first instance, the defendant insisted on his exception, that the plaintiff had brought another suit on this same note, which is still pending, and the costs unpaid, in consequence of which he was precluded from prosecuting the present one.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING.</p> <p>The plaintiff sues to compel the defendant to comply with the terms of an auction sale and adjudication of certain lots of ground in the faubourg Livaudais, and which were bid off to him as the last and highest bidder.</p> <p>It is shown by the evidence that the plaintiff, the wife of E. Lesassier, was owner of certain lots of ground in the fau-bourg Livaudais, and being desirous of selling a portion of them, on the 6th March, 1837, advertised for sale four lots, describing them minutely, and, also, referring to a plan of them, which was to be exhibited on the day of sale; and likewise fixed the day on which they were to be sold at public auction.</p> <p>At the time and place of sale, the defendant, Bach, who it appears was well acquainted with the adjacent ground, attended and bid at the sale. The auctioneer, it seems, had received written instructions from the husband of the plaintiff, by which the lots were limited at the price of two tbouand dollars each. But these instructions were not communicated to the bystanders or bidders. The defendant bid off three lots, one at two thousand and fifty dollars, the other two at two thousand dollars each. He has since refused to take them or comply with the sale, because there was no actual bidders besides himself, and that agents or puffers, were employed to bid against him.</p> <p>The auctioneer who "made the sale, deposed that he advanced on the bids made by others, until he run them up to the limitation, in pursuance of his written instructions. The defendant was the last and highest bidder for the lots in question.</p> <p>On this evidence and state of the case, the district judge was of opinion the plaintiff ought not to take any thing by her suit. Judgment was given for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.</p>

This is an appeal taken from a judgment of the City Court, dissolving an injunction, which the plaintiff, N. Nichols, the father, had obtained to enjoin an execution which R. Nichols, his son, had issued against him, and was proceeding to seize and sell his property.

This is an action instituted in the Court of-Probates, for the city and parish of New-Orleans, by Jean Claude Gravil-lon, of the city of New-York, attorney in fact of the syndics of the creditors, and of the curator of the vacant estate of a person calling himself Etienne Richard, whose real name is Ennemond Richard Lioud, a native of France, lately residing and doing business at Annonay, in the kingdom of France, but who came to New-Orleans, by the way of New-York, in the…

This is an action to recover from the defendant, as a stockholder or co-proprietor of the steam ship Cuba, the amount of the following note given by the commissioners appointed by the company to raise money and act as its agents. “ New-Orleans, October 26th, 1837.

In this case an appeal was taken from an order of the judge a quo, setting aside an order of arrest. This is an action to recover the sum of seven hundred and forty-three dollars, with interest due to the plaintiffs, who, together with the defendants, reside in the state of Alabama.

This is an attachment suit, and the case turns solely on the validity of the attachment. On the 28th April, 1838, Chauncey Powers, a member of the firm of Pope, Powers & Smith, declared on oath, that James Hunter is justly indebted to said firm, in the sum of two thousand three hundred and fifty dollars, besides interest, damages, &c.; that said sum is now due, and that James Hunter resides out of the state of Louisiana.

This is an action to recover the balance due on a building contract. The plaintiff is an architect, and entered into a written contract with the defendant, to build a block of brick stores and dwelling houses, in the city of New-Orleans. He alleges, the buildings are completed, and that there is a balance 'clue him of eight thousand seven hundred and twenty-four dollars, according to an account annexed, for which he prays judgment.

This suit commenced by an order of seizure and sale. Nicolet, in his lifetime, had sold a lot of ground to the defendant Moreau, and retained the vendor’s mortgage. One of the notes becoming due and remaining unpaid, the ° Till, executor procured an order of seizure and sale, and the lot in question was adjudicated to one Tremoulet as the highest bidder.

<p>No appeal lies from an order of court dismissing a supplemental petition.</p>

This is an action instituted by the plaintiff, for the use of D. B. Hempstead, on a judgment of the Supreme Court of the state of New-York, against the present defendant. Judgment was rendered in the District Court for the sum of one thousand and ten dollars and twenty-six cents and costs, on the 16th April, 1838, but not signed until the 14th May following. . _ On the 7th May, the defendant took a rule on the plaintiff to show cause why a new trial should not be granted.

This is an action by the Second Municipality, to recover the sum of one thousand five hundred and forty dollars and forty-five cents, for. taxes due for paving certain property, owned and leased by the late Dr. Heermann to one Parks, for twenty years, and by him assigned to the defendants, R. and J. Curell, in 1827.

This case arose in the court below, on an opposition filed by the plaintiff, to the report of commissioners appointed and acting under the act of 1832, to widen and extend Notre Dame-street.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action against the maker and endorser of two promissory notes, given as part of the price of a lot of ground, comprised in the vacant space or square between Customhouse and Bienville streets, and in front of Old-Levee-street, in the city of New-Orleans. When these notes became due, they were protested for non-payment, and the present plaintiffs, the Mayor, Aldermen and inhabitants of the city of New-Orleans, instituted suit to recover the amount thereof, for the benefit of the sinking fund, in pursuance of an act of the legislature, passed the 8th March, 1836, dividing the city into three municipalities.</p> <p>The defendants admitted their signatures, and pleaded various matters in defence; but Hopkins, the maker of the notes, averred that he was already the owner of a lot on Old Levee-street, fronting the river Mississippi, according to the original titles, and that all the space in front of his lot, (and which has been sold,) was designated on the original plan of the city as public property, and marked as a quai; in consideration of which, he avers, he is entitled to enjoy all the rights, advantages and privileges of such a situation.</p> <p>He alleges that the sale of this front space in lots, is illegal ; that by it he has been deprived of the privilege of a front proprietor, and that it belonged to the public as a quai, so long as the city should claim it for this purpose. He further avers, that the corporation had no right to consent to the sale of said space of land ; that it had no title, other than the right to keep the same open as a quai, and to regulate the use of it for the benefit of the public. He prays that said notes be cancelled, and that they, together with others he gave, be returned to him, and that he have judgment for damages occasioned him, in being deprived and cut off from his privileges as a front proprietor. Upon this issue the case was tried by the court.</p> <p>The evidence shows that the space of ground, lying between Old Levee-street and the public road or street, running along the Levee, at the upper and lower extremities of the city proper, and which was originally designated on the plan as a quai, had become enlarged by alluvion, or batture, in front, and it was deemed necessary to sell off a portion of it into lots. At this time, (1834,) the space in question was in contestation between the United States and the Corporation of New-Orleans. While suit was still pending, and before the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, giving this property to the Corporation, an agreement was entered into between the parties litigant, that the ground in contest be laid out into lots, and sold at public auction, and the proceeds of sale held subject to the final judgment of the court.</p> <p>Judgment was rendered in the Supreme Court of the United States, at the January term, 1836, in favor of the Corporation of New-Or!eans. On the 11th of March, 1836, the legislature passed a law sanctioning this sale, and providing that the net proceeds be, and form apart of the sinking fund of the Corporation, according to the provisions of the 15th section of the act, approved the Sth March, 1836, dividing the city into municipalities.</p> <p>On the whole evidence adduced, the district judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed.</p> <p>urged the affirmance of the judgment. The defendants had no ground of defence, as there was no eviction or disturbance in regard to the possession or title to the property.</p> <p>2. The appellants cannot set up any want of authority to sell the premises, as they have taken possession and improved the property, and have, by their acts, ratified all the proceedings in relation to the sale.</p>

APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP THE PIRSr JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING. These cases depend on the same facts, and are decided on the same principles, involved in the case of the Mayor et al. vs. Hopkins et al., ante 326. The defendants are appellants from two judgments, depriving them of their defence as front proprietors, and requiring them to pay certain notes.

APrEAL PROM THE COURT OP THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING. This is a petitory action, in which the plaintiff alleges that, the defendant, who is an adjoining proprietor, has encroached on his land, and taken two arpents more than he is entitled to, according to their respective titles.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OP THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action for two years arrear of interest, due by the defendant on the price of a sugar plantation. See the case in 9 Louisiana Reports, 336.</p> <p>On the return of the cause to the District Court, the defendant filed his answer, averring, that this case cannot be tried until the final determination of a suit in the United States District Court, between the same parties, for the two previous instalments of interest due on the same debt; that in that defence he has pleaded want of title in the vendor, disturbance by suits and danger of eviction, prayed for a rescission of the sale, &c. Some other matters were set up in defence, but there was no testimony produced on the (rial on the part of the defendant.</p> <p>The district judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs for the several sums claimed by them, with legal interest thereon, and the defendant appealed.</p>

This case comes up on an appeal from a judgment discharging a rule, which the plaintiffs took on Brown, Brothers & Co. and their counsel in this city, to show cause why certain promissory notes, owned by the defendant, J 1 J * tvt Southmayd, and pledged by his house in. New-York, to Messrs. Brown, Brothers & Co., should not be sold to satisfy the judgment of the plaintiffs.

This is an action by the holder of a draft, drawn by the chief engineer, on the Atchafalaya Rail Road and Banking Company, for the sum of five hundred dollars, payable at sight. The defendants pleaded a general denial.

This is an action instituted by the First Municipality, in 1837, for the rescission of the sale of certain lots within its limits, made by the corporation of New-Orleans, in 1833, at public auction, and which were adjudicated to the defendant.

<p>Steam-boats carrying passengers for hire, should be furnished with whatever is requisite or usual, for the safety of those on board.</p> <p>So, where a steam-boat was destitute of a yawl, and of ropes to throw to the assistance of a person falling overboard : Held, that the owner is liable for the value of a slave of one of the passengers, who fell overboard and was drowned; the officers and crew using; no exertions to save him.</p> <p>Steam-boats carrying passengers for hire, should be furnished with whatever is requisite or usual for the safety of those on board.</p> <p>So, where a steam-boat was destitute of a yawl, and of ropes to throw to the assistance of a person falling overboard ; Meld, that the owner was liable for the value of a slave of one of the passengers, who fell overboard and was drowned, the officers and crew using no exertion to save him.</p>

This is an action on a protested bill of exchange, drawn by the defendant, in New-Orleans, on Hoopes & Bogart, in Mississippi.

The plaintiff having made a surrender of his'property for the benefit of his creditors, who appointed syndics, Elisha Crocker presented a note of $787, the payment of which he alleged was secured by a special mortgage on one of the slaves surrendered by the insolvent. He prayed to be recognized as a mortgage creditor on this slave for the amount of his note, and paid by preference out of the proceeds of sale of said slave.

THis is an action instituted by the heirs and legal representatives of the late Amie Labarre, deceased, against the defendant, to compel him to comply with the terms of the probate sale of a slave which was adjudicated to him at the price of one thousand and fifty dollars, by paying one half in cash and the other half by giving his promissory note.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP THE PIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action against the endorsers of a bill of exchange, which was protested for non-payment at maturity.</p> <p>The defendants severed in their answers. The defendant, Patterson, pleaded a general denial, and averred that the plaintiff was not the true holder of the bill; that he knew it was endorsed for the accommodation of the drawer alone; and, lastly, that the real holder or owner, had given the defendants time, which had not expired.</p> <p>Morton pleaded the general denial, and denied specially that the plaintiff was the true owner of the bill.</p> <p>The following is the exact tenor of the bill on which this suit is instituted :■—</p> <p>“ New-Orleans, 24th February, 1837.</p> <p>“ Exchange for $10,000.</p> <p>“ Seventy days after date of this first of exchange (second, and third, &c.), pay to the order of Morton & Patterson, at the Phoenix Bank, New-York, ten thousand dollars, value received, and place the same to account, as advised by</p> <p>“ Louis I. Fourniquet,</p> <p>“ Messrs. Robertson & Branda, Norfolk, Virginia.”</p> <p>Endorsed—</p> <p>“ Pay to the order of John Crosby.</p> <p>“ Morton & Patterson.”</p> <p>“ Pay to the order of R. G. Dixon, Cashier, &c.</p> <p>“ John Crosby.”</p> <p>“-Pay to the order of J. Delafield, Esq.,- Cashier.</p> <p>“ R. G. Dixon, Cashier.”</p> <p>This bill was sent on to the Phoenix Bank for collection, and the notary of the bank states, in his protest and testimony, that, on the 8th May, 1837, at the request of the | bank, he presented said bill to the paying teller of the Phoenix Bank, where it was made payable, and demanded of him payment thereof. He answered, that “ it could not be paid ;” wherefore it was protested, &c.</p> <p>There' is no evidence that the bill was ever presented to the drawees, Messrs. Robertson & Branda, in Norfolk, for acceptance.</p> <p>The evidence clearly makes out that the plaintiff is the bond, fide holder of the bill; and it further appears, that the defendants were members of a commercial firm at the date of the bill, and for some short time thereafter. Their signatures are admitted in the pleadings.</p> <p>The District Court gave judgment in solido against the defendants for the amount of the bill, and ten per cent, damages thereon, with legal interest on the whole amount, from protest until payment. The defendants appealed.</p>

Appeal Prom The court op the first judicial district, judge BUCHANAN PRESIDING. This case was before the court in May, 1837, and remanded to prove the signatures of the endorsers on the note. 11 Louisiana Reports, 94. The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the court, which follows; and in the former report.

This case comes up on the following bill of exceptions: On the trial, a witness for the plaintiff was called and examined in chief. He was delivered over to the counsel of the defendant, who propounded a question and desired the clerk to take down the answer in writing. The judge interposed, and decided that the testimony could not be taken in writing, as neither party had desired it at the commencement of the examination.

APrEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING. This is an action on three several promissory notes, signed by the defendant, payable to himself, and endorsed by him and the plaintiff, amounting to $800 and costs of protest, for which the plaintiff prays judgment.

<p>Where an endorser of a bill has not received notice of protest, but after-wards acknowledges he is bound, and promises to pay, with a full knowledge of the irregularity and want of notice, he will be held liable.</p>

This is an action on a promissory note given for the price of a slave, adjudicated to the defendant Stringer, at the probate sale of the succession of W. W. Wright, deceased. The executor made it publicly known that the slave was sold to pay the debts of the succession, and without warranty.

APPEAR FROM THE PARISH COURT, FOR THE PARISH AND C1T1 OF NEW-ORLEANS.' This is an action to recover the sum of six hundred dollars, the value of a slave, which the plaintiff alleges the defendant illegally took on board the steam-boat Lady Washington, which he commanded, and carried him out of the state, by which he was entirely lost, as he has never returned.

This suit commenced by attachment. The plaintiffs attached one hundred and thirty-two bales of cotton, the 31st May, 1837, as the property of the defendant, who, it was alleged, resided in the state of Mississippi. The debt sued on was evidenced by a promissory note signed by the defendant, for four thousand seven hundred and thirty-three dollars and seventy-six cents, payable the first day of April, 1837, at the Commercial Bank of Rodney, in the state of Mississippi.

<p>In dissolving an injunction, not more than 20 per cent, damages can be allowed, unless damages to a greater amount be proved. It is not sufficient to add fifty dollars to the damages, as counsel fees, which the party will have to pay.</p> <p>In .dissolving an injunction, not more than damage^Ln^e ™lesa greater amount notf sufficient1 to as counsel, fees, wm'haveto'pay^</p>

This is an action of jactitation, or slander of title, and injunction to restrain the defendant from selling the land or piece of ground described in the petition, of which the plaintiffs allege they are the true owners. They call upon the defendant to come forward and state by what title he claims; and that he be forever enjoined from setting up claim or title to the same; and that the plaintiffs be declared the legal and true owners.

Roselius and Quemper, for the defendant and appellant, solicited a re-hearing in this case. 1. This action is essentially a petitory one, and the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his title. Held: in the case of Holmes et al vs. Patterson, that the contract was not a sale, because the value received was not proved. The defect was in the substance of the contract, not in its form.

This is an injunction case. The plaintiff in injunction having purchased three arpents of land from the defendant, in February, 1837, for forty-five thousand dollars, one-third of which was paid in cash, leaving thirty-six thousand to be paid by instalments. When twenty-four thousand dollars became due and remained unpaid, the defendant obtained an order of seizure and sale for the whole debt.

This is an action on an account current, between the plaintiffs and defendants, for a balance due, according to a statement on the account annexed to the petition. The account of plaintiffs appears to be made up to the 30th June, 1836, by which they charge the defendants with the amount of their draft in favor of Geo. C. Morton, of Baltimore, and accepted by plaintiffs, for two thousand dollars, payable the 12th and 15th August following.

This is a petitory action, in which the plaintiff seeks to recover an estate, or tract of land, called the Arlington estate, in the parish of East Baton Rouge, together with the slaves, cattle and horses, stock and farming utensils, and the growing crop thereon, which were in the possession of the defendant, and which the plaintiff allegts are illegally and unjustly withheld from him.

This is an action against the curator of the estate of John F. Manning, deceased, in which the plaintiff claims the sum of four hundred and thirty dollars, for keeping and taking care of the steam-boat Romeo, belonging to the estate of the deceased, at the special instance and request of the curator. The account is annexed, and states, that he had charge of the boat from the 6th July to the 30th September, 1837, making in all eighty-six days, at five dollars per day.

<p>Partners in joint stock companies, have no action against the company as such, except for the settlement of accounts and partition, after the association is dissolved.</p> <p>If the company wrongfully confiscates or withholds the stock of a partner, he has an action to be reinstated in his rights, but his stock will iemain subject to the debts and losses of the company, until its dissolution.</p> <p>„ Partners in joint stock com-action”’ hagainst the company as such, except for the settlement of partition, after the association is</p> <p>If the compa-confiscates5^'™-7toék°of”apart-ner, he has an Instated in his rights, but his stock will remain subject to the debts and losses of the fodissStition.111</p>

This is an action of slander, in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, on a certain day and in several places, publicly uttered against him many slanderous words and epithets, which he sets forth in the petition, as injurious to his reputation, and to his damage five thousand dollars.

This is an action against the father, on the promissory note of the son, for blacksmith’s work done for the benefit of the father’s livery stable. There was a general denial and want of amicable demand pleaded. The plaintiff’s witness slates that he called on the father and son for payment; that the father, after several evasive answers, said he supposed he was responsible, and would go the next morning and see the plaintiff, and settle the note with him.

APPEAL I'll DM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING. This is ail action by the payee and holder of a bill of exchange, drawn by C. Robinson and J. M*Murdo, under the firm of Robinson & Co. at ten days sight, on Messrs. Lancaster, Denby & Co. of Richmond, Virginia, dated the 28th of March, 1837, for the sum of six hundred and forty-one dollars twenty-two cents. The suit was discontinued as to M'Murdo, and Robinson pleaded a general denial.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE PARISH COURT, FOR THE PARISH AND CITP OF NEW-ORLEANS.</p> <p>The plaintiffs allege, that the commercial firm of Whitte-more, Blair & Co., of New-Orleans, composed of the said Whittemore and Daniel Blair, residing in New-Orleans, and of A. F. Rightor, who resides at Donaldsonville, in the parish of Ascension, are indebted to them in the sum of forty-three thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine dollars, with ten per cent, interest thereon, for the balance of an account, which is annexed to the petition, it being for advances in cash, and endorsements on notes and bills drawn by said firm. They pray judgment in solido against the defendants.</p> <p>The defendant Rightor pleaded his domicil; that he was a resident of the parish of Ascension, and could not be sued, in New-Orleans: he also denies that he is a partner of Whittemore & Blair, or ever was, and that no judgment can be rendered against him as such. On the merits, he pleaded the general issue.</p> <p>The firm pleaded to the merits, and averred that they were not indebted in the sum claimed ; that they were entitled to many credits which have not been allowed them, and which they plead in compensation, &c.</p> <p>The plaintiffs established their claim by proof, and showed that the defendants were partners, and had judgment. The defendants appealed.</p> <p>insisted on the affirmance of the judgment.</p> <p>assigned for error, among other matters, that the exception of domicil was a declinatory plea, and was never overruled. It was manifestly erroneous to try the cause on its merits before this exception was first disposed of. It should have been placed on the exception docket, and tried summarily, and not on the ordinary one, and tried with the cause on its merits. This plea could only be decided on, by trying whether Rightor was a partner or not. The Parish Court of New-Orleans was incompetent to try this question, because its jurisdiction is confined to causes of action arising in the parish or first judicial district. Rightor lived out of the district.</p>

The defendant, J. W. Collins, curator of the estate of John Soey, deceased, filed his account and tableau of distribution in the Court of Probates. The plaintiff, John M‘Mullin, tutor of the minors Soey, made opposition to the account on several grounds, and required the curator to file his vouchers, and prove every item in it not admitted. The cause was fixed for trial, and the defendant notified thereof.

This is an action on an attachment bond. The' defendants pleaded a general denial, and set np several matters in defence, most of which went to the irregularity of the attachment in the first instance. Judgment was rendered on the bond for three hundred and four dollars,.with legal interest and costs. The defendant, Follin, alone appealed. prayed for the affirmance of the judgment, with damages and costs.

This is an action against the makers of a promissory note, and the defence is a general denial. There was judgment, and the defendants appealed.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action on a promissory note. The case has been before this court, and was remanded to allow the defendant to prove any payments or offsets he might have against it in the hands of the transferors. See 9 Louisiana Reports, 479.</p> <p>On the return of the case, no further evidence being offered, judgment was rendered for the entire amount of the note sued on, and the defendant again appealed.</p>

This is an action on a promissory note against the maker and endorsers, and judgment in solido against all of the defendants is prayed for. The defence, after pleading some exceptions, which were r 7 overruled, was a general denial. The plaintiffs proved their demand, and had judgment, with five per cent, interest thereon, and the defendants appealed.

This is a petitory action, in which the plaintiffs allege that they are the sole heirs of their late mother, Louise Boune Lalanne, f. w. c., and inherited from her a house and lot, situated in the faubourg Marigny, and now in the possession and claimed by the defendant, as owner.

Afmi FROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING. This is an action by the principal against his agent, to recover three thousand four hundred and three dollars, for losses on ninety-nine hogsheads of tobacco, purchased by the latter on account of the former, without authority, and shipped to New-Yorlc, where it was sold at a loss.

<p>Where a slave was taken from Louisiana, with the consent of the owner, to France, although afterwards sent back here, she was thereby entitled to her freedom, from the fact of having been taken to a country where slavery is not tolerated, and where the slave becomes free by landing oh the French soil.</p> <p>The Supreme Court will not consider one decision alone as finally settling the jurisprudence on any given point or question of law, which is not settled by positive legislation.</p> <p>When owners go out of the state with their slaves, and afterwards emancipate them, they must do so according to the laws of the place where the emancipation takes place.</p> <p>waf taken from Louisiana, with the owner to though' after-wards sent back here, she was thereby entitled from^he^fact^f having been taken to a country where slavery and°where'attbe free15by landing on the French *0!l'</p> <p>The Supreme Court will not consider one decision alone as finally settling the jurisprudence on any question of law, which is not settled by positive legislation.</p> <p>When owners go out of the state with their slaves, and af-terwards emancipate them, they must do so according to the laws of the place where the emancipation takes place.</p>

ArPEAL FROM THE COURT OR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRCT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING. This is an action to compel the defendants, who were joint purchasers at an auction sale, to comply with the terms and pay the price. .The defendants resisted under several pretexts which are stated in the opinion of this court. The plaintiff had judgment in solido, against them for the price, in case of failure- to comply with the terms of sale, 1 1 1 J &c. They appealed.

A1TKAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT. This is an action on a policy of insurance, in which the plaintiff claims eight thousand seven hundred.and eight dollars, the value of certain goods insured by the defendants, on board the steamer Privateer, at and from New-Orleans, for Coates’ Bluff, on Red River, with the privilege to re-ship in keel-boats from thence to Fort Towson.

This case comes up on an appeal from the decision of the district judge on a rule, taken on the plaintiff, to show cause why the defendant should not be discharged from arrest and bail. It was shown that the defendant commanded the steamer Cuba, trading between New-Orleans and Havana, and was about to depart on a trip, or voyage, when he was arrested and held to bail at the suit of the plaintiff.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP THE PIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action by the acceptors against the drawer of a bill of exchange, alleged to have been accepted and paid for the benefit and accommodation of the defendant: the plaintiffs claim a balance due on the bill of one thousand two hundred and sixty-five dollars; and, on several shipments of tobacco to London, the further sum of nine thousand eight hundred dollars, for which they pray judgment.</p> <p>Writs of attachment issued, and, among other property, one undivided half of the ship Rob Roy was seized.</p> <p>The defendant resided in Virginia.</p> <p>Walter De Lacy, also residing in Norfolk, Virginia, intervened, and alleged that the one half of the ship Rob Roy, attached as the property of the defendant, was, on the 26th May, 1837, at Norfolk, assigned and transferred to him, as trustee, in trust to pay certain creditors, who yet remain wholly unpaid, and that he had possession under the transfer previous to the attachment, and that he is entitled to hold and dispose of the same for the benefit of the trust creditors.</p> <p>The plaintiffs joined issue on the demand in intervention, and alleged that the assignment was fraudulent as to them and prayed that the deed of trust be declared null and void, and that they have judgment contradictorily with said inter-venor for their claim, &c.</p> <p>The laws of Virginia were admitted in evidence, and the deed of assignment was shown to be executed in Norfolk, in the state of Virginia, between parties residing there. The several claims of the parties were admitted, and the whole contestation arose on the validity and effect of the assignment.</p> <p>The district judge was of opinion, that, by the laws of Virginia, (the parties residing there) the assignment was valid. Judgment was rendered in favor of the intervenor, and the plaintiffs appealed.</p> <p>1. The intervenor, De Lacy, has not alleged or proved a compliance with the condition expressed in the assignment, which requires that he or his agent shall forthwith proceed to take into his possession the interest of the defendant in the ship, so soon as practicable after her arrival in the waters of the United States.</p> <p>2. The right to perfect the assignment against the creditors wdthout actual delivery, because of the ship being at sea, is waived by providing specially for the delivery, as one of the conditions of th.e assignment.</p> <p>3. By fixing the time, place and manner of transferring possession of the ship, the defendant has subjected the assignment, so far as regards its effects, to the law of the state into which the ship should first come; and, by outlaw, the assignment is void.</p> <p>4. The assignment cannot prevail against the creditors until the delivery has taken place, as provided for; but the attachment of the plantiffs was levied by taking possession of the ship on the fifth day after her arrival at the Balize, and prior to any attempt by the intervenor to obtain the possession.</p> <p>5. The deed of trust is fraudulent by the statute of Virginia, because the ship was not in the county of Norfolk when the deed was recorded. 1 Revised Code, p. 362, 372; Tate’s Digest, p. 95, 4, sec. 4 ; Ibid, p. 101, 18, sec. 11 ; 2 Tucker’s Commentaries, p. 331.</p> <p>6. The assignment defrauds the plaintiffs, because the defendant was then in insolvent circumstances, and he has not by that deed assigned all his property. United States vs. Howland, 4 Wheaton’s Reports, 108; United States vs. Mott, 1 Paine’s Reports, 186; United States vs. Clark, Ibid, 629; Leavings & Mead vs. Brinkerhoff, 5 Johnson’s Chancery Reports, ■ 335; Brashear vs. West, 7 Peters’ Reports, 614; 2 Tucker’s Commentaries, p. 435.</p> <p>7. The assignment hinders and delays the plaintiffs, by the clause requiring the creditors to grant a full discharge of their debts, under penalty of being debarred from sharing in the proceeds. Tate’s Digest, p. 104, 1, sec. 2; Hamilton vs-Russell, 1 Cranch’s Reports, 316 ; Fitzhugh vs. Anderson, 2 Henning & Mumford’s Reports, 302.</p> <p>8. The plaintiffs, as non-residents, are entitled to equal privileges in our courts with resident plaintiffs. To set aside the assignment made in Virginia in favor of a Louisiana creditor, and sustain it against a New-York creditor attaching in our courts, would be unconstitutional as well as unjust. Constitution of the United States, art. 4, sec. 2', Story’s Conflict of Laws, p. 479, seen 571; and see the authorities -there cited.</p>

<p>In a case of redhibition depending upon the testimony of witnesses, which stands uncontradicted, and the judge « quo gave full faith to it, this court cannot afford relief to the appellant.</p>

This is an action to recover sixteen bales of cotton in the possession • of the defendant, which the plaintiffs allege belong to them, as the true owners, and which has been illegally and wrongfully taken from them. They further show, that said cotton is worth three hundred and twenty dollars, and pray that it be sequestered, and that they have judgment for the cotton or its value, together with damages.

This case turns upon an exception taken to the institution of suit, on the ground that it was premature. The exception is founded on a submission by the parties of the matters now in controversy to arbitrators, who, in case of disagreement, were authorized to choose an umpire.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE PARISH COURT, FOR THE PARISH AND CITY OF NEW-ORLEANS.</p> <p>This suit commenced by attachment.. The plaintiffs filed their petition the 5th July, 1838, claiming judgment for the sum of two thousand dollars, and interest. They ask, that Lyons, Harris & Co., and others, be ordered to answer on oath the annexed interrogatories, and condemned, as garnishees in solido, to pay the amount of the plaintiff’s demand.</p> <p>Interrogatory. — “Had you, at the time of service of this interrogatory upon you, or have you had ai. any time since, in your possession, or under your control, any moneys, cotton, &c., or property belonging to the defendant 1 If yea, please specify and detail the same fully and particularly, with the value thereof, and whether the same amounts to the sum of two thousand dollars, with interest, &c.”</p> <p>The sheriff returned, that he had duly served the attachment on the garnishees, and attached in their hands properly of every kind belonging to the defendant, to an amount sufficient to satisfy the writ, &c.</p> <p>On the 11th July, Lyons, one of the firm of Lyons, Harris & Co., on the part of the firm, answered, “ Yes, one hundred and four bales of cottofi.”</p> <p>The other garnishees gave detailed and full answers.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded a general denial, and the plaintiff had judgment against him for the sum claimed.</p> <p>In January, 1839, the plaintiff look a rule on the garnishees, Lyons, Harris & Co., to show cause why they should not be condemned in solido to pay to the plaintiff the amount of their judgment against the defendants: to which they replied, that the cotton attached in their hands in this suit had been previously attached at the suit of S. W. Oakey & Co., by whose request and assent it had been sold, and the proceeds, amounting to five thousand one .hundred and eighty-seven dollars, was in their hands, subject lo such attachments as might be adjudged entitled to it.</p> <p>On hearing the parties, the parish judge decided, that, as the property in the hands of the garnishees had been pre- ' viously attached in another suit pending in the district court, the rule must be discharged; reserving to the plaintiffs their right of proceeding in said court, contradictorily with the attaching creditors.</p> <p>The plaintiffs appealed.</p> <p>1. The plaintiffs interrogated the garnishees on facts and articles: “ Have you property in y.onr possession, or under your control, belonging to the bank, and, if so, is it worth two thousand dollars, interest, &c. V’ They answer, “Yes; one hundred and four bales of cotton.” When ruled to show cause why they should not be condemned to pay the two .thousand dollars, they admit the receipt of five thousand one hundred and eighty-seven dollars and sixty-one cents for the cotton. In substance, they plead, in avoidance of the legal effect of their answer on oath, that the proceeds of the cotton are not under their control or in their possession absolutely, but that they possess and control them at the pleasure of the District Court,.which had. attached them. In their answer under oath, they clearly had the right to state what raaner of possession and control they had, to what restrictions they were subjected, with what privileges the ownership of the cotton by the. bank was burdened.</p> <p>%. The right of the plaintiffs against the garnishees was only inchoate when the answer under oath was filed. It was perfected by the judgment against the'bank. When the plaintiffs chose to exercise it, it was too late for the garnishees to divest them of it.</p> <p>3. The 'garnishees were bound by their, answer made under oath. They cannot add to or change the legal effect of that answer by any subsequent act of theirs. Their answer to the rule is, in effect, an amendment of then-original answer, setting up a defence not mentioned iu the original answer. 5 Louisiana Reports, 86 ; 8 Ibid, 160.</p> <p>4. The garnishees well knew, when they answered the interrogatories, if there was a previous attachment levied. Why did they not inform the plaintiffs of itl Why suffer ^e plaintiffs to prosecute their suit to judgment before alleging a defence, which renders nugatory their answer under oath 1 Can they now take advantage of their own wrong ?</p>

This is an action to rescind the sale of certain town lots in Greenville, a small villa laid out on the banks of the Mississippi, a few miles above New-Orleans in 1836.

This suit commenced by attachment. The plaintiff claimed the sum of four hundred and twenty-nine dollars for his wages as carpenter on board the steam-boat Mississippian, and had her attached. The defendant pleaded a general denial, and the prescription of one year.

•APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGIÍ ÍSUGHANAN PRESIDING. The plaintiff obtained an injunction to prevent the defendant from enforcing a judgment against him, alleging that be had refused to pay the price of a piece of ground for which this judgment was rendered, because he was interrupted in his possession, and in danger of eviction.

<p>The affidavit necessary to obtain an attachment for a debt not due, must be special, according to the act of 1826, and the creditor or his agent must sweaiythat the “ debtor is about to remove his property out of the state, before the debt becomes due.”</p>

It was proved that Berthoud, the plaintiff, wrote a letter from New-York, to the master of the ship Moro Castle, to have her insured. On being shown this letter, Mr. L. H. Gale, to whom the ship was consigned, had her insured for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed.

This is an action on three several promissory notes subscribed by the defendant and made payable to the order of Messrs. Edward Clarke & Co., dated at New-York, September 20th, 1836.

ATTEAI. 3Í0M THE PARISH COURT, SOR THE PARISH AND CITY OE NEW'ORLEANS. This is an action to recover the sum of twenty thousand seven hundred dollars, in lawful money of the United States, for this amount of bank notes issued by the Commercial and Rail Road Bank of Vicksburg, in the state of Mississippi. The plaintiff alleges, that these notes had been presented at the bank, and payment in gold or silver demanded, which was’ refused by the bank.

<p>Factors or commission merchants cannot claim a lien or .privilege on goods, moneys or property for a general balance of account against the owner, over an attaching creditor.</p> <p>The only privilege a factor or commission merchant has is expressly given by article 3,214 of the Louisiana Code, and is limited to specific ad-vanees made on goods consigned, after they have come into his possession, or he has received a bill of lading or letter of advice that they have been despatched to him.</p> <p>Factors orcom-chants cannot Qe“eIlen ” goods, moneys or property tor a general ba-ag^nsrdie own-^¡“'’“reditor" °</p> <p>.The onigpri-0r Commission expressly s'1'’™ t>y article S2i4 Code, and is ^1*613advances niad? on, s°?ds consigned, after they have come Kas received a bin ot lading or letter of advice been despatched t0 hira></p>

This is an action commenced by attachment, in which the plaintiffs allege the defendants are indebted to them in the sum of six hundred and forty dollars, with four dollars for cost of protest, and interest at the rate of six per centum, it being the amount of a promissory note, which was subscribed by the defendants, of which the petitioners allege they are the holders and owners. The defendants reside in Wetumpka, Alabama. The note was not annexed to the petition.

This is an action against the maker and endorser of a promissory note. On making judgment by default final, it Was confirmed against the maker alone. He appealed, and assigned various grounds as error apparent on the face of the record and proceedings.

This is an action against the endorser of a promissory note, discounted at the branch of the Atchafalaya Bank, established at Monroe, in the parish of Ouachita. The defendant resides in the state of Mississippi, and this suit was instituted by attachment in the District Court at New-Orleans, the 2d March, 1838.

A1TEAL FROM THE COURT OK THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING. This case comes up on an injunction to stop proceedings on an order of seizure and sale. The defendants, as the transferees by authentic act of John Green, obtained an order of seizure and sale for the payment of a note signed- by the plaintiffs in injunction for two thousand dollars, and were proceeding to advertise and sell the property mortgaged to secure payment, when they were, enjoined.

This is an action on a policy of insurance, effected by the plaintiffs on the steam boat Port Adams for six months, from the 25th day of November, 1836, at 6 per cent, premium, on one-third of the value of the boat, which was fixed at thirty thousand dollars.

APPEAL PROM THE PARISH COÚRT, POR THE PARISH AND dITT OP NfiW-ORLEANS. This is an action by the bank against the endorser of a promissory note.

This is an action instituted on the following check or bill of exchange: “ Commercial Sank of Jfew-Orleans, May 6,1837. “Pay to the order of C. A. Jacobs, on the 24th May, 1837, (without grace) five thousand six hundred and twenty-five dollars.” (Original acceptance waived.) “ EdwaRd Duplessis, Cashier. “ To D. Thompson, Esq., Cashier Sank of America, Jfew-York.” Endorsed: “ Pay to Messrs.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CITY COURT OE NEW-ORLEANS, JUDGE DUNCAN PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an action on two promissory notes executed by the defendant, as the purchaser of certain lots, in part payment of the price.</p> <p>The defendant admitted his signature, but averred that said lots were sold in reference to a plan, as fronting on a passage which the plaintiff had no right to make. He prays that the sale be rescinded, and notes cancelled and given up, and that the sum of six hundred and ninety-three dollars and interest thereon, which he has paid, be refunded, and for which he prays judgment in reconvention.</p> <p>The plan by which the lots were sold, and, also, the act of sale, were produced in evidence. The plan is referred to, and made' a part of the sale, and has the passage marked and represented on it. But there is no authority shown from the corporation to make this a public passage or alley. The city judge, however, gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.</p>

This is an action instituted by the testamentary heirs of the late James Johnston, who died in the city of New-Orleans the 3d July, 1818, against the late N. Cox, then surviving executor. The suit was commenced in December, 1834, to compel the executor to render an account, and pay and deliver over all the moneys and property of every description belonging to the estate of the deceased.

This is an action on a contract of insurance alleged to have been made between the plaintiff’s agent, L. H. Gale, to whom bis ship, the Moro Castle, was consigned, and the defendants. The whole case turns on the question, whether the contract of insurance was complete between the parties at the time of the happening of lhe loss.

The plaintiff alleges, that Henry Lockett, one of the defendants, being ah alderman, and member of the council, was illegally employed by said council to assist the corporation attorney, in defence of a suit against the Second Municipality, for which it allowed him a fee of twenty-live hundred dollars ; that the resolution allowing this fee is illegal, null and void ; as, also, another resolution of said council, taking away the authority of the mayor to sign notes and…

This is a suit for damages, for violation of a contract. It turns principally, upon matters of fact. The council for defendants has urged, however, that they were never put in default according to law ; that plaintiff should have tendered to defendants such a bond as he deemed proper under the contract.

This is an action, instituted in March, 1837, on a policy of insurance, and in March, 1839, the plaintiff obtained judgment for seven thousand three hundred and fifty Hollars. February, 1838, Townsend, by public or notarial act, made an assignment of this claim to certain of his creditors, , ° , , ... . on particular specified conditions, which was notified to the defendants.

In March, 1833, C. Adams, senior, made a surrender of all his property to his creditors, in which twenty-three negroes, now in the possession of the defendant, were included.

APPEAL PROM THE COMMERCIAL COURT POR THE CITY OP NEW-ORLEAN8, JUDGE WATTS PRESIDING. The Hon. Henry Bry, was appointed president of the board of public works by the governor and senate, to take effect the 18th April, 1839 ; and at the time designated in his commission, applied to the Hon. C. Woodrooif, his predecessor, for the archives of the office, and to be admitted to the full exercise and control of all the duties and functions thereof.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, JUDGE BUCHANAN PRESIDING.</p> <p>This is an opposition to executory process. The defendant in the opposition, Joshua Baldwin, syndic of the creditors of Thomas C. Swain and brothers, took out an order of seizure and sale on one of three promissory notes secured by mortgage on the property seized; drawn by C. & A. Armstrong, the present plaintiffs. The Armstrongs executed this note, together with two others “drawn to the order of and endorsed by J. R. Pully, ” dated the 12th January, 1837, and payable in twelve, eighteen and twenty-four months. These notes were given in payment of the price of two city lots which they purchased from one Henry C. Myers. In the act of sale, Myers sells and transfers sixty shares of stock in the Citizens’ Bank to the purchasers, subscribed and held on said lots, and binds himself to make such other transfer whenever thereto required, as may be necessary and required by the rules and regulations of the bank. No other transfer was ever made ; there is no evidence that Myers was ever called on to make it. Myers was allowed to keep possession of the property under a lease to the Armstrongs. On the 8th of August following, Myers executed an act of pledge before a notary, in which he pledged and pawned said notes to Joshua Baldwin, syndic of the creditors of Thomas C. Swain and brothers, and in case they “ were not punctually paid at maturity, he, the said Myers, transfers to the said Baldwin, syndic, &c. all his rights under the above act of mortgage, particularly subrogating the said Baldwin to all his rights of proceeding by executory process to enforce payment of said notes by seizure and sale of the mortgaged premises. ”</p> <p>The plaintiffs allege, that they never had notice of this r . ° . , pledge to Baldwin, and are entitled to all equities and offsets against Myers, and that they have a claim of five hundred dollars for rent due by him, which they ask to be credited on the note, together with twelve hundred dollars, for the profit which the stock in the Citizens’ Bank will readily sell for if transferred. They allege several other matters in defence, such as irregularities in the executory proceedings, &c., and pray for an injunction to restrain the sale and prohihit all further proceedings, until Myers transfers the sixty shares of stock, and their credits are allowed on the note sued on.</p> <p>On the trial of the opposition and injunction, the district judge was of opinion that the ownership of the notes in question was still in Myers, the pledgor, qualified by the pledge it was true, but in no manner extinguished. The suit should have been brought in the name of Myers. Judgment was rendered, perpetuating the injunction, and the defendant appealed.</p>

This is an action instituted by attachment on fifteen promissory notes, issued by the defendants at their banking house in the town of Brandon, in the state of Mississippi, commonly called bank notes, amounting to eleven thousand dollars; and property, money and effects attached, in the hands of Harris, Lyons & Co., E. Yorke, and J. Miuturn, in New-Orleans, to a very large amount, who were summoned as garnishees.

This is a possessory action, instituted by an injunction to prevent the sale of a tract of land, laid out into lots adjoining the city of New-Orleans, by the agent of Madame Pontalba, which is claimed by the plaintiffs, and of-which they-allege they were possessed as owners. The defendant averred she was in the legal possession of said tract of land, as owner, under a good and authentic title, and she prays that the injunction be dissolved, with heavy damages allowed her.

In the case of Gray vs. Cochran, the defendant prayed and obtained a suspensive appeal, on giving bond with one Joseph Grant, as security in the sum of four thousand five hundred dollars, conditioned according to law. The plaintiff took a rule on the defendant and appellant, to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed, on account of the insufficiency of the security offered, which was made absolute on hearing the parties.

<p>Where the insured settled with the underwriters for a partial loss and gave up their policy, without notifying them of a claim pending in the admiralty court for salvage, which, if successful, would increase the loss: Held, that the insured cannot recover of the insurers for any further loss they may sustain on account of salvage decreed to the salvors.</p> <p>Had the insured notified the insurers at the time of the settlement, of this outstanding claim, a different case would have presented itself.</p> <p>Had the insured notified the insurers at the time of the settlement of this outstanding claim, a different case ■would have presented itself.</p>

appeal Prom the court op the first judicial district, judge BUCHANAN PRESIDING.

This is an action for damages, and to compel the defendant, as marshal of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, to deliver up and make a legal title to a plantation and slaves, which he adjudicated to the plaintiff1 under a judgment and execution of the United States District Court, on the 24th May, 1834.

Appeal prom the court of trobates, por the parish and city of new-orleanS. This is an action instituted in the Court of Probates against the executors of the estate of the late Henry Babcock, to recover the balance of an account amounting to one thousand six hundred and seventy dollars, on an adventure of goods, ordered by Babcock while in Havana, in 1834, to a mercantile house, in which he was concerned, in New-York.