13 Md. App. 220 - State v. Lawless’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

86 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 86 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Traditionally, three approaches have been used to arrive at a determination of prejudice. One approach is that it is incumbent upon the accused to make a showing of actual prejudice or at least a strong possibility of prejudice resulting to him or to his defense from the delay. Another approach is that prejudice will be conclusively presumed and necessarily follows from long delay. The middle position, and that used in this State, is that a certain quantitative and qualitative degree of delay gives rise to a rebutta-ble presumption of prejudice and will shift the burden of going forward with the evidence from the accused to the State. Before that critical point is reached, there rests upon the accused, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion] .... Once that critical point has been reached, however, the presumption of prejudice arises and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the State. That critical point on the delay scale where the presumption arises and where the burden shifts has been denominated the point of “substantial” delay.... [A] delay becomes “substantial” [depending on] the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 132 Md. App. 396 - In Re Thomas J. · 223 Md. App. 519 - Randall v. State

2. ““There is nothing in the present case to suggest that either the attitude or the course of conduct of the State was ‘purposeful or oppressive.’ The State was certainly not motivated by ‘bad faith’; nor was any action or inaction by the State ‘a deliberate choice for a supposed advantage.’ In terms of assessing ‘fault,’ the behavior of the State clearly would not fall under the interdict of ‘purposefulness’ or ‘oppressiveness.’ It is rather in the middle ranges of the ‘reason’ spectrum that analysis becomes less certain. Here the ‘fault,’ if any, on the part of the State is one of omission, rather than of commission. Here we are concerned not with an affirmative delay-causing decision, either for good cause or for bad cause, but rather with pure inaction. Even within the ‘inaction’ band, there are gradations. On the one hand, there is deliberate and knowing inaction in the face of clear and repeated demands for action. This is the brand of conduct contemplated by our addition of the adjectives ‘capricious,’ ‘arbitrary’ and ‘unreasonable’ to the lexicon of not-to-be-condoned behavior. . . . The attitude of the State here cannot be described as ‘capricious,’ ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unreasonable.’ There is nothing to suggest that the conduct of the State was ‘more to meet the convenience of individuals,’ ‘more than mere negligence,’ or an exhibit of ‘unpardonable neglect and total indifference to the rights of the appellant’ — the sort of motivational attitude we deplored in Caesar, at 4”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 17 Md. App. 526 - McIntyre v. State

3. ““If, upon preliminary examination, we may determine that there has been no ‘delay’ of ‘constitutional dimension’ — if the claim of ‘speedy trial’ denial is clearly frivolous — if the passage of time is patently not inordinate — we are relieved of all necessity to make further analysis. If this threshold of ‘constitutional dimension’ has not been crossed, there is no need for the delicate weighing of social values in order ‘to balance the right of the individual to obtain a speedy trial against the right of society to punish those who are properly shown to have committed a crime against it.’ There is no need to look to the subtle interaction of the four factors: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) prejudice to the accused, and (4) assertion of the right by the accused.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 26 Md. App. 39 - State v. Wynn