State v. Brownlee

¶1Defendant was taken into custody by Multnomah County law enforcement officials on June 13, 1972, pursuant to a robbery information. Not until 34 days later was he arraigned on the charge against him.① Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment because he had not previously been brought before a magistrate as directed by ORS 133.550.② After a hearing on the motion, an order dismissing the indictment and prosecution was entered by the Multnomah County Circuit Court on July 27, 1972. No reasons are recited in the court’s order as the basis for dismissal except “that the ends of justice will be best served thereby.”

¶2ORS 134.150 authorizes the court on its own motion, “in furtherance of justice,” to dismiss an indictment. The statute further recites that “the reasons of the dismissal shall be set forth in the order … This statute, we hold, gave the court jurisdiction to dismiss the indictment, from which dismissal order an appeal would lie, even though the order was irregular in that the reasons for the dismissal were not set forth.

¶3The state filed a timely appeal from the- order to this court. Thereafter, while the appeal was pending, another indictment- based upon the same facts and charging the same crime was returned by the Multnomah County Grand Jury. The ‘state then moved to dis*482miss its appeal upon the first indictment and an order dismissing that appeal was entered "by this court on November 30, 1972. The defendant then moved to dismiss the new indictment. The Circuit Court of Multnomah County, acting through another judge, allowed the motion and dismissed the indictment on the basis that the original dismissal by the other judge was proper and was with prejudice to the bringing of another indictment based on the same facts. The state now appeals this latter order. The defendant contends that the court had the inherent power to dismiss the indictment because of the delay in bringing him before a magistrate.

¶4We affirm, but we do not reach the issue urged by the parties here. ORS 138.060 provides:

“The state may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from:

“(1) An order made prior to trial dismissing the indictment;

sfc … ?5

¶5The state took such an appeal from the original dismissal order.③

¶6*483The second indictment was, in effect, an effort to obviate the ruling which was the subject of the first appeal.④ In State v. Stahley, 12 Or App 579, 507 P2d 1159 (1973), we held that the failure to appeal a suppression order rendered the matter res judicata where the state, rather than appeal the suppression order, attempted to proceed under a new indictment charging possession of the same marihuana which had been the subject of the suppression order. Stahleyis. controlling here.

¶7Affirmed.