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13 Wend. 63

Faulkner v. Brown

New York Supreme Court

Decided October 15, 1834

New York Supreme Court · decided 1834-10-15

Error from the Schenectady common pleas. Faulkner had in his possession a quantity of leather, belonging to one Van Slyck, who had left the same with him, and requested him to take care of it. It was stolen from the possession of Faulkner, and sold by the the thief to Brown. Faulkner demanded the leather of Brown, and on his refusal to deliver it up, brought an action of trover against him in a justice’s court.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1834-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently May 1928

9 state decisions

201834184018501860187018801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1By the Court,

Savage, Ch. J.

¶2Both courts were clearly wrong. To maintain trover, the plaintiff must have the general or special property. The plaintiff here had a special pro*64perty in the leather; Van Slyck had the general property. The action may, in most cases, he brought either by the general or special owner of the goods for a conversion by a stranSeT> judgment obtained by one is a good bar to the action of the other. 2 Saund. 47, e. Possession under the rightful owner is sufficient against a person having no color of right. An agister, a carrier, a factor, may bring trover; even a general bailment will suffice without being made for any special purpose, but only for the benefit of the rightful owner. Here is a general bailment. It would be monstrously inconvenient if a wrongdoer could come and take things out of the possession ofhim who had the possession under the rightful owner. Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt. 309, per Chambre, justice. Though a mere servant has not such a special property as will enable him to maintain trover, yet a bailee, or trustee, or any other person who is responsible to his principal, may maintain the action, and the lawful possession of the goods is prima facie evidence of property. 11 Johns. R. 143, n. 2 Saund. 47. 1 East, 244. 4 id. 214. 1 Salk. 290. Cro. Eliz. 819. 12 Johns. R. 407, per Spencer, J. The defendant may, undoubtedly, show a paramount title in a third person, 11 Johns. R. 529, but in this case the plaintiff is the bailee of the general owner. Numerous other cases might be cited, but they are unnecessary.

¶3Judgment reversed.

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