¶1MEMORANDUM
¶2The Government appeals the District Court’s grant of pretrial release to Jeffrey *893Langenhorst. The Government argues that the district court improperly granted pretrial release because no conditions will reasonably assure Langenhorst’s appearance at trial or the safety of the community. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 and we reverse the District Court’s release order and remand with instructions.
¶3Section 3142 of Title 18 of the United States Code governs pretrial detention and release. A district court may not order pretrial release unless it determines that a “condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”
¶4The first factor is the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged.
¶5The second factor is the weight of the evidence against Langenhorst.
¶6The third factor is Langenhorst’s history and characteristics.
¶7As to Langenhorst’s character, letters submitted in support of Langenhorst’s good behavior indicate fairly strong family ties, a newly created support network, and the possibility of employment should Langenhorst be released. However, given Langenhorst’s extensive criminal past and the very recent nature of his ties to the community, we conclude that even giving him the benefit of the doubt,
¶8*894As to Langenhorst’s detention status, Langenhorst has conceded that he was either in state custody or on some type of release from custody when the alleged conduct occurred. Thus, this part of the history and characteristics inquiry weighs against pretrial release. Accordingly, because the first part of the inquiry is at best neutral with respect to release and this part weighs against release, we conclude that the history and characteristics inquiry overall weighs against release.
¶9The fourth and final factor is the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or to the community posed by Langenhorst’s release.
¶10In sum, all of the statutorily required factors clearly weigh against release. Thus, we agree with the Government that no conditions will reasonably assure Langenhorst’s appearance at trial or the safety of the community. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order granting pretrial release and remand with instructions that the district court enter an appropriate order denying pretrial release.
¶11REVERSED and REMANDED.
¶12 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts *893of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
¶13. "The standard of review for pretrial detention orders is one of deference to the district court’s factual findings, absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous, coupled with an independent review of the facts, the findings, and the record to determine whether the order may be upheld.” United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.1991).
¶14. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
¶15. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
¶16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1).
¶17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2).
¶18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3).
¶19. See id.
¶20. See United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir.1985).
¶21. The record also reflects that Langenhorst has been a "model prisoner” over the past two years. However, given Langenhorst’s extensive criminal history we do not find his recent behavior to be that significant in the overall evaluation.
¶22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4).