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← 130 N.C. App. 380 - Barber v. Constien

130 N.C. App. 380 - Barber v. Constien’s Empirical Analysis

1998

Citation profile

14
cited by 14 later decisions
1
states following
November 2015
most recently cited

14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently November 2015

14 state decisions

60199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Dunn v. Pate · United Leasing Corp. v. Miller · 380 Pa. Super. 292 - Corbett v. Weisband · Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P. A. v. Coleman · Butner v. . Spease

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Proximate cause is a cause which in a natural and continuous sequence produces a person’s injuries and is a cause which a reasonable and prudent person could have foreseen would probably ' produce such injury or some similar injurious result. There may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Therefore, the Plaintiff . . . need not prove that the Defendant’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injuries. The Plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence only that the Defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause; however, a natural and continuous sequence of causation may be interpreted [sic] or broken by the negligence of another operator of a vehicle. This occurs when another operator of a vehicle’s negligence causes its own natural and continuous sequence which interrupts, breaks, displaces or supersedes the consequences of the first operator’s negligence. When I use the term “another operator” or “second operator" in connection with this law, I’m not referring to the Plaintiff.... The Court has ruled that [plaintiff] was not negligent. Under such circumstances, if you so find, the negligence of another or second operator, Alphonso Green, if you so find, would be the sole proximate cause of an injury and the negligence of the first operator would not be a proximate cause of the injury.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “has held the use of the N.C.P.I. to be “the preferred method of jury instruction.” However, a new trial may be necessary if a pattern instruction misstates the law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.