¶11. Injunction — Preliminary Resteainins Oedee — Dissolution—Appeal.
¶2Act Cong. June 6, 1900, c. 803, 31 Stat. 060 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 551], amending Court of Appeals Act, § 7, and providing that an appeal will not lie from an order dissolving a preliminary restraining order, did not deprive the Court of Apxieals of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from such an order where it was in fact a final order granted on a decision that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief under the prayer of his bill, though the order did not in terms dismiss the bill.
¶3Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina.
¶4On Motion of Appellee to Dismiss.
¶5Cothran, Dean & Cothran and Adams, Jerome & Arnffield, for appellant.
¶6R. B. Redwine and A. M. Stack, for appellee.
¶7Before WADDILU, BOYD, and REDDER, District Judges.
¶9This motion is based upon the idea that the decree appealed from in this case is merely an interlocutory decree dissolving the preliminary restraining order awarded by the Circuit Judge in the first instance, and that since the passage of the act of June 6, 1900, c. 803, 31 Stat. 660 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 551], amending section 7 of the act establishing Circuit Courts of Appeals, no appeal lies from such an order or decree. It is conceded that, if this were an interlocutory order, the appeal would not lie to this court; but it appearing in this case from an inspection of the bill, the order appealed from, and the opinion of the court as contained in the record, that the court finally decided that it could grant the appellant no relief under the prayer of his bill, and that the order made was in fact a final order, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, regardless of the fact that the order does not in terms dismiss the bill.
¶10The motion to dismiss is accordingly refused.