131 Ill. App. 2d 995 - Stark v. Stark’s Empirical Analysis
1971
Citation profile
29 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently September 2004 · most notably 12 Ill. App. 3d 467 - Slavis v. Slavis (1973), 22 Ill. App. 3d 147 - Strum v. Strum (1974)
29 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 52 Ill. App. 2d 262 - Gregory v. Gregory · 108 Ill. App. 2d 240 - Stanard v. Stanard · 120 Ill. App. 2d 263 - Lewis v. Lewis · 344 Ill. App. 157 - Shuff v. Fulte
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““It is one of the sad but true facts of the current time that children become the innocent pawns in the divorce chess game. In order to obtain a divorce, the parties will promise almost anything by way of child support or visitation. After the fact of divorce, and generally after remarriage, efforts commence to scale down these promises. If the law were to tolerate retroactive limitation, nothing could prevent a party from promising twice or three times his annual income as child support or alimony to soften resistance to obtaining a divorce with the sure and certain knowledge that the troublesome financial details could be worked out by hindsight. For better or for worse, the policy of the law and of the State is to preserve marriage (Stanard v. Stanard (3rd Dist. 1969), 108 Ill.App.2d 240 , 247 N.E.2d 438 ) and one means of implementing this policy is to insure that obligations arising out of its dissolution are fixed and determinable. The courts of this state are heavily burdened enough with litigation growing out of petitions for rule and petitions for modification without adding to that burden petitions for retroactive modification. If defendant’s theory were to prevail, no divorce decree containing alimony or support provisions would ever be final in the true sense, but would be like Mr. Justice Roberts’ complaint about the decisions of the United States Supreme Court: ‘ * * c a restricted railway ticket, good for this date and this trip only $ # # >99”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““Although section 18 of the Divorce Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 40, par. 19) grants the trial court wide latitude in making adjustments in child support, we believe that the orderly administration of justice would be better served if the trial courts would confine their orders and decrees to the issues made up by the pleadings. If modification can be predicated upon a petition for rule, it requires no great stretch of legal imagination to envision that partition or wage assignment, or any other remedy, could likewise be engrafted upon it. Proper pleading would vanish and we would resort to the hoary witticism of ‘a letter to the judge’.” Stark, 131 Ill. App. 2d at 997 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.