Culpepper v. Slater’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In the case of Friede v. Myles Salt Company, Limited, 177 So. 105, 108 , the Court of Appeal of the Orleans Circuit considered a question very similar to the one here presented, and it appropriately and correctly observed that: `We note that prior to 1839, interest was not allowed on accounts or unliquidated claims. Until that time, article 554 of the Code of Practice of 1825 provided that: "No interest shall be allowed on accounts or unliquidated claims." We deem it significant that by Act No. 53 of 1839 that provision was repealed. Now, apparently as a result of Act No. 181 of 1852, the article reads as follows: "Interest at the rate of five per cent shall be allowed on all debts from the time they become due, unless otherwise stipulated." `The Civil Code provision on the subject has sustained a similarly significant alteration. Article 1932 of the Code of 1825 provided that: "In contracts, which do not stipulate for the payment of interest, it is due from the time the debtor is put in default for the payment of the principal, and is to be calculated on whatsoever sum shall be found by the judgment to have been due at the time of the default." `However, that article (1932) of the former Code has now become article 1938 of our present Civil Code, which reads as follows: "All debts shall bear interest at the rate of five per centum per annum from the time they become due, unless otherwise stipulated." `It is obvious that both changes indicate an intention that interest shall”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 279 So. 2d 749 - Wurzlow v. Placid Oil Company

2. “Under this interpretation of the mentioned provisions of our present Civil Code and Code of Practice (Articles 1938 and 554 respectively), it must be held that legal interest on plaintiffs' claim commenced to run on July 25, 1931, the date when defendant received the $3,000 promissory note that rightfully belonged to Pease. This conclusion is further supported by Lotz v. Hurwitz et al., 174 La. 638 , 141 So. 83 , in which we held that the sum defendants were required to pay to make a wall on plaintiff's property a party wall should bear interest from date defendants took possession of it, this being the time when the indebtedness became due and demandable. "The authorities cited and relied on by defense counsel are inappropriate. Bertrand v. Frazier, 11 La. 236 , was decided in June, 1837, before the adoption of our present codal provisions. Crichton et al. v. Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, 178 La. 57 , 150 So. 668 , in which it was incorrectly said that interest on unliquidated claims could not be allowed except from judicial demand, was erroneously predicated on State v. Bank of Louisiana, 6 La. 745 , decided in June, 1834 long prior to the effective date of the aforementioned statutory change.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 279 So. 2d 749 - Wurzlow v. Placid Oil Company

3. ““The seisin of the succession representative operates merely to protect his title as detainer of the property for the purpose of his administration; while the seisin of the heir, conflicting in no respect with the other, operates as the sign of his title as owner of the estate, subject to its liquidation under administration.” (emphasis ours.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 228 So. 2d 732 - Succession of Willis v. Martin