Cuddy’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

87 federal appellate · 17 district · 42 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 260 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The record in .the present case shows that the appellant was before the court, that testimony was heard in respect to the matter of contempt, and that the appellant testified in his own behalf. The judgment being attacked collaterally, and the record disclosing a case of contempt, and not showing one beyond the jurisdiction of the court, it must be presumed, in this proceeding, that the evidence made a case within its jurisdiction to punish in the mode pursued here. We do not mean to say that this presumption as to jurisdictional facts, about which the record is silent, may not be overcome by evidence. On the contrary, if the appellant had alleged such facts as indicated that the misbehavior with which he was charged was not such as, under section 725 of the Revised Statutes, made him liable to fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, he would have been entitled to the writ, and, upon proving such facts, to have been discharged. Such evidence would not have contradicted the record. But he made no such allegation in his application, and, so far as the record shows, no such proof. The general averment, in the petition, that he was detained in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the District Court had no jurisdiction or authority to try and sentence him, in the manner and form above stated, is an averment of a conclusion of law, and not of facts, that would, if found to exist, displace the presumption the law makes in support of th”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ex parte Steiner

2. ““'.flie next contention of the respondent is that our Act of Congress of March 2, 1831, c. 99 (4 St. at Large, 487; Rev. St. § 725), has deprived the court of the power to punish for such contempts as that alleged against him. It is generally understood that the object of that statute, which has been substantially enacted in Tennessee (Code 1858, § 4106) and other states, was to enlarge the liberty of criticism by the press and others by curtailing the-power to punish adverse comments upon -the courts, their officers, and proceedings, as contempts which tend to impair respect for the tribunal, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice. * * * I do not find it necessary to go into the distinctions between direct and constructive con-tempts, which are so unsatisfactory to all who study this subject. There is always a struggle to relegate every contempt to the odious category of constructive contempt’s, in order to take shelter under these restrictive statutes. But I may say that in my judgment the courts will find that the Legislature has not taken away any valuable power, when these statutes are properly understood. Notwithstanding the seemingly formidable array of authority, it may be that, after all, it is a mistake to say that all contempts not committed in the presence of the court are constructive only. The mere place of the occurrence may not be an absolute test of that question, and it may depend on the character of the particular conduct in other respects, besi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Huff

3. “`There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus in order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against infringement through any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention, although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction to a sufficient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court to proceed to a judgment against him. ... "`... it is open to the courts of the United States upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus to look beyond forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter, ...'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 48 Cal. 2d 851 - In Re Carmen