Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works’s Empirical Analysis
131 U.S. 352 · 1889
Citation profile
86 federal appellate · 22 district · 25 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 226 later decisions (29 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1989 · most notably Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford (1935), Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co. (1893)
86 federal appellate · 22 district · 25 state decisions — followed in 11 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Ex parte Lange · William Shields v. Robert R Barrow · Windsor v. McVeigh · Eyster v. Gaff · Pacific Railroad of Missouri v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. And Others. 1
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 226 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““We have considered the case just as if the present suit had been brought by Hill. The appellants have no greater rights than he would have if the present suit had been instituted by him; for Mellen, the trustee for Sophia H. Boyd, acquired his rights pendente lite. Hill sold and conveyed to him, after he had been personally served with copies of the order to appear and plead, answer, or demur, to the original and supplemental bills, and only three days before the time fixed for his appearance to the original suit. His sale was more than three months after he was required to appear, and plead, answer, or demur to the cross-bill. That sale and conveyance could not affect the power of the court to proceed to a final decree, so far as his interest in the property was concerned. Nor by such sale and conveyance did Mellen and his cestui que trust acquire any absolute right to become a party to the suit instituted by the furnace company. Purchasers of property invólved in a pending suit may be admitted as parties, in the discretion of the court; but they cannot demand, as of absolute right, to he made parties, nor can they complain if they are compelled to abide by whatever decree the court may render, within the limits of its power, in respect to the interest their vendor had in the property purchased by them pendente lite. Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521 , 524 [ 23 L. Ed. 403 ]; Union Trust Co. v. Inland Navigation and Improvement Co., 130 U. S. 565 [ 9 S. Ct. 606 , 32 L. Ed. 1043 ]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““It is, however, contended that the furnace company could not rightfully invoke the aid of a court of equity to remove this lien or incumbrance until it had, by obtaining a judgment for its debt and issuing execution, exhausted its legal remedy. But that was one of the questions to be determined in the suit brought by that company, and any error in deciding it would not authorize even the same court in an original independent suit to treat the decree as void. * * * An adjudication that a particular case is of equitable cognizance cannot be disturbed by an original suit. Such an adjudication is not void, if erroneous.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Brown v. Allebach“in any suit ... to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to real or personal property within the district where such suit is brought;”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Greeley v. Lowe
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.