Frost v. Witter’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 172 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 178 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““On this point I find no general rule laid down by the decisions in this state. All that is said is, that great liberality should be used by the courts in allowing amendments (Burns v. Scooffy, 98 Cal. 276 [ 33 P. 86 ], and cases cited); and that the allowance of amendments is a matter within the discretion of the courts. (Coubrough v. Adams, 70 Cal. 378 [ 11 P. 634 ] ; Lestrade v. Barth, 17 Cal. 228 .) And in practice the courts have been extremely liberal, —as, e.g., in Heilbron v. Heinlen, 72 Cal. 376 [ 14 P. 24 ], where the complaint was amended so as to describe a different tract of land from that described in the original complaint; or in Walsh v. McKeen, 75 Cal. 519 [ 17 P. 673 ], where the case was changed from an action at law to a case in equity; or in Cox v. McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60 [ 18 P. 100 , 9 Am.St.Rep. 164 ], where the change allowed was from an action on a special contract to an action on a quantum meruit; or as in Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal. 256 [ 23 P. 127 ], where the change was from an action on a mechanic’s lien to an action on the special contract, or in assumpsit-, or in Bogart v. Crosby, 80 Cal. 195 [ 22 P. 84 ], where the principal debtors, who had been omitted from the original complaint, were brought in by amendment.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 169 Cal. App. 2d 692 - Vick v. Grasser

2. ““ . . . Some confusion has resulted from the neglect to define the terms, ‘cause of action’ and ‘action’. . . . “The latter term is very commonly confounded with the suit (litis) in which the action is enforced. But this is not the technical meaning of the term. . . . ‘An action is nothing else than the right or power of prosecuting in judicial proceeding what is owed to one,’—which is but to say, an obligation. . . . The action, therefore, springs from the obligation, and hence the ‘cause of action’ is simply the obligation. This is in accordance with the view of Mr. Pomeroy. . . . “The ‘cause of action’ is therefore to be distinguished, also, from the ‘remedy’,—which is simply the means by which the obligation or the corresponding action is effectuated,—and also from the ‘relief’ sought. ...””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Broderick v. Kunde

3. ““In applying the rule, some confusion has resulted from the neglect to define the terms, ‘cause of action' and ‘action', to which, therefore, our attention must be first directed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Manufacturing Co.