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← 132 F.2d 829 - Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.’s Empirical Analysis

132 F.2d 829 · 1943

Citation profile

70
cited by 70 later decisions
10
states following
September 2014
most recently cited

26 federal appellate · 5 district · 16 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 70 later decisions — most recently September 2014 · most notably Venters v. City of Delphi (1997), Varhol v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (1990)

26 federal appellate · 5 district · 16 state decisions — followed in 10 states

18019431950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 7 U.S.C. § 601

Relies on United States v. Butler · Sargent v. . McLeod · Creason v. Harding · Morton v. Forsee · Bunge v. Downers Grove Sanitary District

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““When «defendant moved for summary judgment it had filed an answer, the legal effect of which was a waiver of its defense of the statute of limitations. It could not, therefore, unless relieved from, its default, revive the defense it had waived. We need not consider when a defendant may be excused from its failure to plead the statute of limitations, and be permitted to amend its answer, because the instant case presents no such question. The defendant herein sought no such relief.” 132 F.2d at 832 (emphasis added). 3”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “As Mr. Mulqueen's fees were contingent under personal contracts with his clients, his estate had no enforceable claim against his clients under contracts not performed when he died. (Cite omitted.) Yet when the cases were successfully completed a lien for compensation in so far as Mulqueen had performed arose in favor of his estate under the law of New York. (Cites omitted.) To this extent, it may be said that Mrs. Mulqueen, as executrix, had an inchoate right to some portion of the ultimate fee in each case, eventually completed, when she entered into the contract with Lamb.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We are, however, convinced that the decisions are well nigh unanimous in holding that recovery may be had in contingent fee cases if the client ultimately recovers on its claim and the attorney rendered service in respect thereto, but dies before the client recovered. The theory seems to be that death terminates the contract of employment but the attorney having rendered services of value to his client, his estate may recover the fair value of the services rendered pursuant to the contract. (Footnotes omitted.)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.