132 Ill. 2d 86 - People v. Ferguson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

86 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 87 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"(b) the following factors may be considered by the court as reasons to impose an extended term sentence * * *: (1) When a defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois of the same or greater class felony, within 10 years, excluding time spent in custody, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts." Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b). As noted, the trial court found defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence based upon defendant's 1980 aggravated battery conviction. It is undisputed that this conviction was obtained within 10 years prior to defendant's instant conviction. It is also undisputed that aggravated battery, like unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, is a Class 3 felony. (See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 12-4(e), 24-1.1(d).) Finally, there is no dispute that the instant conviction and the 1980 aggravated battery conviction stem from completely separate incidents and were tried separately. All of the requirements for imposing an extended term under section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) were thus satisfied in this case. Defendant nonetheless challenges the application of this provision in his case on the ground that it resulted in an impermissible "double enhancement."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 151 Ill. 2d 79 - People v. Gonzalez · 197 Ill. App. 3d 215 - People v. Bosley

2. “[w]here the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the law as enacted without considering other aids of construction.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 139 Ill. 2d 206 - People v. Drakeford · 223 Ill. App. 3d 247 - People v. Bole

3. ““A reading of the statutory language in section 5 — 9—1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005— 9 — 1(c)) in conjunction with section 9.1 of ‘An Act to establish the Illinois Local Government Law Enforcement Officers Training Board ***’ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 85, par. 509.1), setting forth the means of distribution of the funds, reveals that the disputed amount is referred to as other than a fine. For example, every fine shall include an amount payable to the Fund (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 9—1(c)); such amounts payable shall be collected in addition to the fines and costs (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 9—1(c)); and, in addition to every fine imposed an additional assessment payable to the Fund shall be imposed. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 85, par. 509.1. The above statutory language evinces the legislature’s intent to distinguish the amount payable to the Fund from any fines imposed. Furthermore, the purpose of providing financial assistance to the training of law enforcement personnel (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 85, par. 509) would be thwarted by subjecting the amounts payable to the Fund to the credit provisions of section 110 — 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 110 — 14). We conclude that defendant is not entitled to credit against the amount payable to the Fund, imposed under section 5 — 9—1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 3”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 395 Ill. App. 3d 186 - People v. Sulton