132 Ind. App. 378 - Chambers v. Boatright’s Empirical Analysis
1961
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 19 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently March 1981
3 federal appellate · 19 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Allen v. Bond · 89 Ind. App. 431 - Clayton v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co. · 121 Ind. App. 708 - Hill v. Rogers · 125 Ind. App. 151 - Carr v. Troutman · 90 Ind. App. 664 - Baker v. Eades
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Appellants, however, persist in their view and further say in their brief: ‘the appellees by their agreement also agreed that the Waiver by the Appellants of any default should not constitute a waiver of any subsequent default upon their part/ We do not find that the contract contains such provision. The contract contains a provision that if any taxes, assessments or insurance premium be not paid when due, or if any installment of the purchase price or interest thereon, shall become delinquent for a period of five (5) days, or if the buyer shall fail to observe or perform any other conditions or terms of the contract, the seller may ‘at his option’ cancel the agreement, take possession of the real estate, etc., ‘without any notice or demand whatsoever, the necessity therefor being hereby expressly waived/ etc. and said contract further provides: ‘Failure or delay of the seller to exercise any option hereunder . . . shall not operate as a waiver of the right of the seller to exercise such option for the same or any subsequent default at any time thereafter/ There is no provision in the contract that we can find that a waiver by appellants of any ‘default’ does not constitute a waiver of any subsequent ‘default’ by appellees. As pointed out in South Side State Bank v. Snyder, supra, the contract contains ‘an option’ in appellants but this was ‘only an option’ that ‘had not been exercised.’ ” (Original emphasis.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage““We are of the opinion that in view of appellants’ consistent acceptance of payments by appellees at irregular times and in irregular amounts, as we have heretofore said is revealed by the record evidence before us, the appellants were required to give appellees personal notice of their intention to forfeit the said contract.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.