Volume 132 — Louisiana Reports

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Tenancy in Common (§ 20*) — Sales por Taxes — Purchase by Co-Owneb.</p> <p>A co-owner who purchases property held in common at a sale for taxes acquires no greater interest in the property than he held before, except that he has a claim against his co-owners for reimbursement for taxes and expenses paid by him. Hake v. Lee, 106 La. 482, 31 South. 54; Bossier v. Herwig, 112 La. 539, 36 South. 557; Alexander v. Light, 112 La. 925, 36 South. 806; Harris v. Natalbany Lumber Co., 119 La. 978, 44 South. 806; Washington v. Filer, 127 La. 862, 54 South. 12S; Miller v. Vivian Oil Co., 131 La. 761, 60 South. 236.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — -For other cases, see Tenancy in Common, Cent. Dig. §§ 60, 61; Dec. Dig. § 20.*]</p> <p>2. Adverse Possession (§ 1*) — Loss oe Ownership-Prescription.</p> <p>"The owner exposes himself to the loss of his right of ownership in a thing if he permits it to remain in the possession of a third person for a time sufficient to enable the latter to acquire it by prescription.” Eev. Civ. Code, art. 496.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 1-10, 12-65, 67-76; Dec. Dig. § 1.*]</p> <p>3. Tenancy in Common (§ 15*) — Adverse Possession.</p> <p>A có-owner is not a third person, and he cannot prescribe against his co-owners, even though he holds a tax title to the properly. Alexander v. Light, 112 La. 925, 36 South. 806.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Tenancy in Common, Cent. Dig. §§ 42-52; Dec. Dig. § 15.*]</p> <p>4.-Cancellation op Instruments (§ 32*) — Eemedy — Contracts.</p> <p>In all cases the dissolution of a contract may be demanded by suit or by exception. Eev. Civ. Code, art. 2047; Code Prac. art. 20.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Cancellation of Instruments, Dec. Dig. § 32;* Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 1195.]</p>

F. Blackman, Judge. Jim Johnson was indicted for attempting to administer poison with intent to kill, for carrying concealed weapons, and for an assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to kill, and there was a nolle prosequi on the first charge, and trial and conviction on the other two charges.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Husband and Wire (§ 207*) — Suit by Married W oman — Authority or Husband —Failure to Obtain Suspension or Suit.</p> <p>An exception that a married woman is not authorized by her husband to bring suit is properly disposed of by relieving the defendant of the necessity of answering until the authorization is obtained, and, after such authorization is obtained, has no foundation in the fact.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 756-758; Dec. Dig. § 207.*]</p> <p>2. Specific Performance (§ 10*) — Contracts —Particular Stipulations.</p> <p>Where all parties to a contract are before the court, in a suit to enforce particular stipulations which have not been complied with, the objection that the contract is indivisible, and that particular stipulations cannot be selected for enforcement, is not well made.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Specific Performance, Cent. Dig. §§ 20-25, 50; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]</p> <p>3. Specific Performance (§ 70*) — Transfer of Corporate Stock.</p> <p>There being a contract whereby a stockholder in a corporation transfers her stock to another stockholder, who thereby becomes the owner of all the stock, and, as president of and through the corporation, is in possession of all the assets, and whereby, in consideration of such transfer and of the compromise of certain lawsuits pending against the transferee, and the corporation, an undivided interest in said assets is conveyed to the transferror, which interest remains in the possession of the corporation agreeably to stipulations in the contract, that as to part it shall be paid for in cash, and as to part as the assets are reduced to cash, subject to a liability for a due proportion of debts due at a fixed date, that the corporation shall furnish a list of assets, as of the date of the conveyance, and that it and the transferee of the stock shall furnish “satisfactory security” for the fulfillment of their respective obligations, held, that a petition annexing the contract and setting forth its terms discloses a cause, of action for specific performance of the obligation on the part of the corporation to account for the property of the plaintiff thus left in. its possession, but that the obligation to furnish “satisfactory security” is too indefinite for such relief.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Specific Performance, Gent. Dig. § 203; Dec. Dig. § 70.*]</p> <p>4. Corporations (§ 116*) — Transfer of. Shares ■— Accounting — Indebtedness — Capital Stock — “Debt.”</p> <p>A corporation and the real owner of all its stock, save certain outstanding shares and a few shares standing in the names of nominal holders, having united in a contract whereby they conveyed to the holder of such outstanding shares an undivided interest in all the assets of the corporation, as part of the consideration for the transfer of such shares to said owner of the other stock, but with the condition that such interest was conveyed subject to liability for its proportion of the existing debts of the corporation, held, the capital stock is not a “debt” of the corporation, within the meaning of the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 493, 494, 496; Dec. Dig. § 116.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1864-18S6; vol. 8, p. 7628.]</p> <p>5. Corporations (§ 121*) — Transfer of Stock — Consideration—Proportion of Assets — Decree.</p> <p>Where, in a suit on a contract whereby plaintiff has acquired an undivided interest in all the assets of a corporation as of a fixed date, subject to the liability of such interest for its proportion of the debts of the corporation as of the same .date, with the stipulation that the corporation should furnish a list of such assets and (by implication) of the debts to be paid therefrom, it appears that a portion of such assets consisted of cash, that another portion was to be dealt with on a cash basis, and that the interest so acquired in still another portion was, and is, to be paid for as the assets were, and are, collected or converted into cash, and further appears that nothing has been paid, either from the original cash, the cash assets, or the collections, and that all settlements have been held up in consequence of the corporation’s erroneous conception of what constitute the assets and liabilities contemplated by the contract, and further appears that the amount due the plaintiff, less the deduction for debts, is definitely ascertained, but that defendant fails to prove such debts with reasonable certainty, and further appears that other settlements are to be made in which defendant may be amply protected, judgment will be rendered in favor of plaintiff for the amount found due, with reservation of the rights of the parties, as to the deductions to be made and other matters, for adjustment in such future settlements.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 504, 505 ; Dec. Dig. § 121.*]</p>

Action by T. T. Nixon and others against the Police Jury of Allen Parish to contest the validity of an election for the location of the parish seat. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Valentine K. Irion against J. Rollo Knapp and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Slander of title by the City of Shreveport against J. C. Simon and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Rajah Samaha against Nahoom Saik. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>Railroads (§ 72*) — Deeds — Construction— Restrictions as to Use oe Property.</p> <p>Where a small tract of land adjoining a village was sold to a railroad company, and the deed recited that the transfer was made solely for the purpose of enabling the company to use the same for the necessary side track, yard, depot, grounds, warehouses, landing, turntables, roundhouses, etc., and for all necessary purposes for the use and enjoyment of the railroad company, and many years afterwards the railroad company leased to a third party the right to erect a warehouse on the premises for the purpose of collecting and storing grain to be shipped over the line of the railroad company, and the lessee used said warehouse not only for that purpose, but also for his own private purpose, and the heir of the original vendor sued the railroad company and the lessee ‘to annul the contract of sale and the lease for breach of the condition of user, and, in the alternative, to enjoin the defendants from using said warehouse for private purposes, held, that the stipulation as to the use of the premises was not a resolutory condition, or condition subsequent; but that the plaintiff had the right to enjoiD the defendants from using the warehouse fox-private purposes.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 168-178; Dec. Dig. § 72.*]</p>

P. Madison, Judge. Mandamus by the State, on the relation of the Parish of Ouachita Board of School Directors, to compel the City of Monroe and others to turn over certain taxes. From a judgment granting the writ, the defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Union; Robert B. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Benj. N. St. John against M. A. Talbot & Son and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; Don E. Sorelle, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Paul G-. R. Bell against the Houston & Shreveport Railroad Company and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Ejrbob (§ 1008*) — Review—Questions oe Fact.</p> <p>On questions of fraud and simulation and the credibility of witnesses, the opinion of the trial judge who saw the witnesses and heard their testimony is entitled to great weight, and his judgment, unless clearly wrong, will be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3955-3969; Dec. Dig. § 1008.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; Edgar W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Guessippi Buceóla against the Shreveport Traction Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

Edrington, Judge. Action by the State, on the relation of I-I. M. Bourg, District Attorney Twentieth Judicial District, against L. H. Marrero, Jr., District Attorney Twenty-Eighth Judicial District, for the removal of defendant from office. From a judgment for defendant, the relator appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>1. Tbade-Mabks and Tbade-Names (§ 11*)— Right to Exclusive Use — Duration.</p> <p>The right of the defendants to the exclusive use of the word “Tabasco” as a trade-mark for pepper sauces expired in 1887, with the patent issued to E. Mcllhenny in 1870.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Trade-Marks ■and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 15; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]</p> <p>'2. Tbade-Mabks and Trade-Names (§ 9*)— Registration — Decisions oe Commissioner ob Patents.</p> <p>The decision of the Commissioner of Patients, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, D. C., canceling the registration in 1906 of defendants’ trade-mark “Tabasco,” concludes them from as-serting a legal right to the exclusive use of the word “Tabasco,” as descriptive of the pepper sauces made by them.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 9.*]</p> <p>3. Libel and Slander (§§ 9, 112*) — Words Actionable — Injury to Business —Good Paith.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff and the defendants in 1906 were engaged in the manufacture of “Tabasco” pepper sauce in the same parish and ■state, and the defendants sent out circulars and letters to the customers of the plaintiff, and to •dealers generally, asserting their legal right to use the trade-mark “Tabasco,” registered in the United States Patent Office, and declaring their purpose to institute legal proceedings against any dealer who might in the future offer for sale under the name “Tabasco” pepper sauces manufactured by any person, firm, or corporation other than E. Mcllhenny’s Son, held, that such circulars and letters constituted a libel of the plaintiff in the way of his business, and further held, that the defense of good faith was not sustained by the evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 80-90, 325-341; Dec. Dig. §§ 9, 112.*</p> <p>Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4116-4125.]</p> <p>4. Libel and Slander (§ 33*) — Damages— Presumption.</p> <p>In the case of libel or slander of a person in the way of his trade, substantial damages will be presumed, and a reasonable amount will be awarded by the court or jury, without proof of special damages.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig.. §§ 112, 277; Dec. Dig. § 33.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>5. Libel and Slander (§ 116*) — Actions— Damages — Attorney’s Pees and Expenses.</p> <p>In an action for libel in sending out circulars threatening proceedings against those who offer for sale under a trade-name used by the senders of the circular, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as damages attorney fees and expenses incurred in a prior proceeding to cancel the registration of defendants’ trade-mark.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 343, 345, 346, 348, 349; Dec. Dig. § 116.*]</p> <p>Breaux, C. J., dissenting in part.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Evidence (§ 158*) — Best Evidence — Title to Realty.</p> <p>Parol evidence is not admissible to show title to realty. ■. ■</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other- cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 471-473, 474^-526; Dee. Dig. § 158.*]</p> <p>2. Trespass (§ 72*) — Judgment for Defendant.</p> <p>Where plaintiff, in an action for trespass, neither showed title to nor possession of any part of the land, so that he was not entitled to recover, absolute judgment for defendant should have been rendered, instead of judgment of nonsuit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trespass, Cent. Dig. §§ 157-159; Dec. Dig. § 72.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 13*) — Relevancy — Value.</p> <p>In considering the value of real estate, every reasonable element going to create value should be considered, and no one fact should be controlling in the determination of its value.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. § 13.*)</p> <p>2. Action eor Lesion Beyond Moiety — Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for lesion beyond moiety, the plaintiff need only prove the value of the property with reasonable certainty.</p> <p>3. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 98*) — Rescission oe Contract — Action—Restoration oe Consideration.</p> <p>Where the vendor 'sues for the rescission of a sale for lesion beyond moiety, he must return the purchase price, together with interest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 163-165; Dec. Dig. § 98.*]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>4. Vendor and Purchaser (S 13*) — Validity oe Contract — “Lesion.’*</p> <p>Lesion is the injury suffered by one who does not receive a full equivalent for what he gives in a commutative contract. Civ. Code, art. 1860.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. § 13.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, p. 4093.]</p> <p>5. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 104*) — Rescission oe Contract — Action—Issues.</p> <p>The intrinsic value of the land at the time of the sale and of the plaintiff’s pretensions and the nature of his title should be examined and inquired into, as matters put expressly at issue in an action for the rescission of a sale on account of lesion. Copley v. Flint & Cox, 16 La. 380.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 178-182; Dee. Dig. § 104.*]</p> <p>6. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 104*) — Rescission oe Contract — Action—Evidence.</p> <p>Proof must be strong to sustain a suit for lesion.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 178-182; Dec. Dig. § 104.*]</p>

Chretien, Judge. Richard Meredith and M. J. Long were convicted of violation of Act No. 156 of 1902. A motion for arrest of judgment was sustained, and the State appeals.

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Vernon; Don E. So Relie, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Commercial National Bank against W. J. Sanders and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1.Appeal and Error (§ 797*)-Dismissal-Time for Motion.</p> <p>.It is immaterial at what time a motion .to dismiss an appeal for want of necessary parties is filed, or where they are not, in fact, cited, there is no prayer for citation, and they fail to appear, whether it is filed at all, for, without such parties, there can be no final judgment, and this court is therefore bound, in disposing of the case, to take notice of their absence, and, if the failure to cite them be attributable to the fault of the appellant, must, ex proprio motu, dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3149-3154; Dec. Dig. § 797.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error (§ 430*) — Proceedings for Transfer of Cause — Prayer for Citation.</p> <p>Where the party cast makes no application for an appeal at the term of court at which the adverse judgment was rendered, and at a subsequent term makes his application by motion, without praying for the issuance of citation, the failure to cite the appellee cannot be attributed to the fault of the clerk or sheriff. “</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2173, 2174; Dec. Dig. § 430.*]</p> <p>3. Courts (§ 61*)— Sessions — Constitutional and Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>The Constitution and the statute law, in requiring the district courts to hold continuous sessions during ten months of the year, leave it to the discretion of the judges to determine when they will take their vacations of two months, and in districts composed of one parish the ten months sessions are terms, which are separated from the preceding and subsequent terms by the vacations; it being required of the judges that they shall establish such terms and vacations by rules, in order that those having business in, or with, their courts may know what to expect.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 206;' Dec. Dig. § 61.*]</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error (§§ 361, 396, 407, 434*) —Proceedings for Transfer of Cause-Citation to Appellees — Extension of Time — Waiver of Objections.</p> <p>The propositions that a prayer for general relief in a motion for appeal filed at a term of court subsequent to that at which the judgment sought to be appealed from was rendered should be held to include a prayer for the citation of the appellees, that this court should extend the time for citing the appellees in a case in which no attempt was made to cite them until after the filing of the motion to dismiss the appeal, and until more than a year had elapsed from the signing of the judgment sought to be appealed from, that, though the appellees were not cited, their counsel knew that the appeal had been taken, and that they should be held bound by such knowledge, and that, by coming into court and showing the facts relied on for the purposes of the motion to dismiss the appeal, they waived their right to be heard upon the motion, notwithstanding that they had declared that they, came in only for said purposes and reserved their rights are in conflict with well-settled jurisprudence and principles, and are untenable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1941-1959, 2099, 2102, 2104, 2120, 2128-2132, 2150, 2183; Dec. Dig. §§ 361, 396, 407, 434.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 374*) — Bond—Necessity-Municipal Boards.</p> <p>Under Act No. 173 of 1902, all municipal boards or commissioners exercising public functions, or performing administrative acts, are-exempt from furnishing a bond for appeal, and, as the board of fire commissioners for the city of New Orleans is a public functionary, it need' not furnish a bond for an appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2005-2010; Dec. Dig. § 374.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error (§ 749*) — Answer— Amendment oe Judgment.</p> <p>An answer to an appeal, asking for an amendment of the judgment, must be filed within three days after the case has been set for hearing in this court, and, unless it is timely filed, it will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3065-3073; Dec. Dig. § 749.*]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error (§ 749*) — Amendment oe Judgment.</p> <p>Where the case against one of two codefendants has been dismissed, this codefendant is without right to answer an appeal taken by the other codefendant, and to ask for the amendment of the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3065-3073; Dec. Dig. § 749.*]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations (§ 747*) — Injuries to Pedestrian — Negligence oe Fire Department.</p> <p>Where the employés of a fire department of a city needlessly hitch to an engine a pair of untrained horses, and attempt to drive through the streets of the city, and, through some cause or other, these horses go upon a sidewalk with the engine and injure a pedestrian, who has an undoubted right to be upon the sidewalk, the injured person has a cause of action for his injuries.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1570-1577; Dec. Dig. § 747.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. P. Brunot, Judge:</p> <p>Suit by the Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railway Company against the Railroad Commission of Louisiana to contest the reasonableness of an order of the Commission. Prom a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law (§ 633*) — Triai>-Discretion of Court.</p> <p>Courts are intrusted with sufficient discretion to enable them to expedite the trial of cases.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1450, 1451, 1453, 1454, 1459; Dec. Dig. § 633.*]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law (§ 904*) — Discharge of Panel — Objections.</p> <p>Where a jury panel is discharged immediately after having returned a verdict by the court without objection on the part of the accused, it is too late for the accused to object two hours later after the jurors have already left the .court, and when a jury had already been selected to try the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2127; Dee. Dig. § 904.*]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law (§ 1111*) — Bill of Exceptions — Refusal to Sign — Grounds.</p> <p>Where the trial judge refuses to sign a bill of exceptions, alleged by counsel to have been reserved during the trial, on the ground that the bill had not been reserved, this refusal will be held conclusive, in the absence of any effort being made to establish the fact that such a bill was reserved and to compel the court to sign the bill.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Lav/, Cent. Dig. §§ 2894r-2896; Dec. Dig. § 1111.*]</p>

Mary; C. J. Boatner, Judge. Action for partition by Walter J. Suthon against Harry L. Laws and others, in which defendants controverted plaintiff’s title, and called his vendors in warranty. From a judgment bn a rule to tax costs, defendants appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations (§ 622*) — Police Regulations — Construction op Ordinance.</p> <p>A town ordinance which prohibits drunkenness in the streets, alleys, and public places of the town, and within sight of such places, prescribes no rule of sobriety to be observed by persons within their own doors, or by their guests, so situated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1370; Dec. Dig. § 622.*]</p> <p>2. Arrest (§ 63*) — Authority oe Oebtcer— Violation oe Ordinance.</p> <p>Where a town ordinance prohibits cursing, swearing, and the use of boisterous and indecent language within the corporate limits, a town marshal is within his rights in entering a building from which such language may be heard through a window opening upon an alley, used as a thoroughfare, in order to suppress the disturbance; and, under an ordinance imposing a penalty therefor, he may arrest the proprietor of the place, or other persons who resist or interfere with him in the discharge of that function.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Arrest, Cent. Dig. §§ 145-156; Dec. Dig. § 63.*] '</p> <p>3. Assault and Battery (§ 18*)-^Justieica-tion — Making Arrest.</p> <p>But where, in such case, the marshal is accompanied by a deputy, and they are each heavier and more powerful than the person whom they arrest, and together can readily handle him without beating him on the head with a loaded pistol, at the risk of killing him, thereby so lacerating his scalp as that he is covered with blood, the marshal by whom such unwarranted assault is committed will be held liable in damages, and there is no reason why the amount of the award should be less than if the assault had been committed by a citizen.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Assault and Battery, Cent. Dig. I§ 17, 18; Dec. Dig. § 18.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mary E. Cuggy, wife of Henry Egert, against Henry Zeller and another. Erom a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Bankruptcy (§ 198*) — Administration op Estate — Attachment.</p> <p>Section 67 of the United States bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3448]) strikes with nullity all attachments sued out against an insolvent within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and wholly discharges and releases the property affected by the attachment, if the insolvent is adjudged a 'bankrupt. Hence a state court has no jurisdiction in such a case to enforce garnishment process under a writ of attachment against property in the hands of a third person, for the purpose of subjecting the same to a vendor’s lien and privilege claimed by the plaintiff, but not enforced by seizure of the property under some other writ.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 289, 296-316; Dec. Dig. § 198.*]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy (§ 210*) — Administration op Estate — Atta chment.</p> <p>An attachment by means of a writ of garnishment does not change the possession of the property and place it either in the possession of the court, or the one who has obtained the writ; for it may be that the property may never pass out of the hands of the garnishee. The writ of attachment does not, therefore, create any lien in favor of the attaching creditors which is recognized by the 'bankruptcy law, and the property is subject to the jurisdiction of the ba nkrupt court notwithstanding the attachment; and it is in.that court that the attaching creditor must assert his rights against the debtor.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 321-323; Dec. Dig. § 210.*]</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Master and Servant (§ 276*) — Actions eor</p> <p>Injuries — Sueeiciency oe Evidence.</p> <p>In an employe’s action for injuries caused by varnish, which he was taking from a barrel, catching fire from a lantern, which he was using, in which he claimed that it was benzine varnish, though he had been told it was nonexplosive, and that the electric bulb provided for use instead of a lantern was out of order, evidence held to support a verdict for defendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 950-952, 954, 959, 970, 976; Dec. Dig. § 276.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Carriers (§ 303*) — Injuries to Passengers — Liability.</p> <p>A street car company is liable to a passenger injured while attempting to alight from a car by the sudden and negligent starting of the car.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1216, 1218, 1224-1243; Dec. Dig. § 303. -]</p> <p>2. Damages (§ 62*) — Elements of Compensation — Duty to Reduce Damage.</p> <p>Where one has been injured, but is advised by competent physicians that the injury can be remedied by an operation that is ordinarily not dangerous, but refuses to submit to the operation, she is not minimizing her damages, and cannot recover for the sufferings which would be avoided, by the needed operation. It is incumbent upon the injured person to submit to reasonable treatment, and to follow the advice of competent physicians.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 119-132; Dec. Dig. § 62.*] '</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of West Feliciana; George J. Woodside, Judge.</p> <p>Action between Charles T. Keplinger and others and A. Feltus Barrow. Judgment for the latter, and the former appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lincoln; R. B. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Action by W. H. Martin against Rufus Gary and wife. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law (§ 1169*) — Appeal—Prejudicial Error — Evidence.</p> <p>Where testimony concerning the occupation or connection of a defendant in a criminal case is wholly irrelevant to the issue to be tried, and is likely to operate to his prejudice, its admission is reversible error.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3088, 3130, 3137-3143; Dec. Dig. § 1169.*]</p> <p>2. Homicide (§ 163*) — Evidence—Reputation of Deceased.</p> <p>Testimony as to the reputation of the deceased as a dangerous man at other times and places than the time and place of his killing by the defendant on trial for his murder is properly excluded, where it does not appear that defendant knew of such reputation, and upon the finding of the trial judge that no overt act on the part of deceased had been proved.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 310-317; Dec. Dig. § 163.*]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law (§ 667*) — Reception of Evidence — Reduction to Writing.</p> <p>It is within the discretion of the trial judge in a criminal case appealable to this court to order that the testimony of the witnesses to the killing and to the occurrences which immediately preceded it be taken down, to be used in case it should thereafter be needed for the purposes of bills of exception, but the defendant in such case has no right to demand that it shall be so taken down. When. however, the defendant offers to prove threats by, or the dangerous character of, the deceased, and the testimony so offered is excluded, on the ground that no overt act on the part of the deceased has been proved, he has the right to except to such ruling, and, for the effective presentation of the question so reserved to this court, to demand that such witnesses be recalled, and required again to give their testimony in so far as it bears upon that question; the purpose of the Act No. 113 of 1896 being to enable this court to go behind the findings of the trial courts upon the questions of fact on which their rulings on questions of law are based, in order to determine the correctness vel non of such fiúdings and rulings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1599, 1601; Dec. Dig. § 667.*]</p> <p>4. Criminal Law (§ 667*) — Reception op Evidence — Reduction to Writing.</p> <p>The facts which, under Act 113 of 1896 the clerk may be ordered to “take down,” consist of the testimony, which is made the subject of objection, the objection thereto, and the ruling thereon.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1599, 1601; Dec. Dig. § 667.*]</p> <p>5. Witnesses (§ 37*) — Competency—Knowledge — Reputation.</p> <p>When a witness is placed on the stand in a prosecution for murder to prove the reputation of the deceased in the community in which he lived — i. e., whether he was regarded as orderly and peaceful or turbulent and dangerous —what is called for is the opinion of the community, not that of the witness, and, when he testifies that he never heard the reputation of the deceased discussed or talked about, he disqualifies himself quoad the purposes for which he was called.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 80-87; Dec. Dig. § 37.*]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <§ 913*) — New Triaí>Grounds — Absence op Witness.</p> <p>Where no application for a continuance is made, the fact that a defendant in a criminal prosecution was disappointed by the nonappearance of a witness, whom he had expected from another parish, affords no ground upon which he has the right to demand a new trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Ltrar, Cent. Dig. §§ 2136-2145; Dec. Dig. §</p> <p> (Additional Syllalms hy Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>7. -Criminal Law (§ 673*) — Trial—Impeaching Evidence — Limiting Eppect.</p> <p>In a prosecution for murder, testimony offered for purposes of impeachment that a defense witness had said three weeks before the trial that, when defendant entered the place where the killing occurred, witness noticed that his eyes were flashing, and thought he was going to do something, that defendant reviled deceased, and shot him before witness could get hold of him, should not have been admitted without a warning that it was merely to prove that the witness had made the statements, but they were not to be taken as substantive evidence against defendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1597, 1872-1876; Dec. Dig. § 673.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Cow't.) </p> <p>1. Taxation (§ 746*) — Tax Titles — Validity.</p> <p>Where, years after an adjudication _ of property for taxes, a tax collector, succeeding to the office, assumes, as by virtue of such adjudication and previous assessment and advertisement, to make a title to property which was neither assessed, advertised, nor adjudicated, his act bears no resemblance to a tax deed, and is utterly void of effect in so far as it relates to the property not assessed, advertised, or adjudicated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1491, 1492; Dec. Dig. § 746.*]</p> <p>2. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 231*) — Bona Fide Purchasers — Notice—Record.</p> <p>The General Assembly, in declaring that all contracts, affecting immovable property, which are not recorded, “shall be utterly null and void, except as between the parties thereto,” has, from considerations of public policy, provided a method, intended to be simple, sure, and inflexible, whereby those who desire to invest their money in real estate may be able to find, upon the public records, the evidence, and all the evidence, needed to establish or defend the title thereto; and the law which has been enacted to that end would be improperly interpreted, and its purpose defeated, if it were held that an unrecorded vendee can convey to another a title good against a purchaser from the owner of record and against the world.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 513-539; Dec. Dig. § 231.*]</p> <p>3. Statutory Provisions — Record of Conveyances.</p> <p>The concluding paragraph of C. C. art. 2266, which reads, “The recording shall have effect from the time when the act is deposited in the proper office and indorsed by the proper officer,” finds its application outside of, but not within, the parish of Orleans, since in other parishes the original acts are “deposited” with the parish recorders and become parts of the archives of their offices, whilst in the parish of Orleans excerpts from such acts are registered or recorded, but the acts are not “deposited.”</p> <p>4. Mortgages (§ 94*) — Record—Mode of Recording.</p> <p>There is a difference 'between the law regulating the recording of mortgages and that by which the registry of conveyances is governed. The mortgage is not recorded until actually “inscribed” in the book of mortgages, and this rule applies throughout the state, as well as in the parish of Orleans.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 205; Dec. Dig. § 94.*]</p> <p>Breaux, C. J., dissents.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>C. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 231*) — Bona Fide Purchasers — Notice—Record.</p> <p>Acts of sale, contracts, and judgments, affecting immovable property, must be recorded in the office of the parish recorder or the register of conveyances. If not recorded, they shall be utterly null and void, except between the parties thereto. The recording may be made at any time, but shall only affect third persons from the time of the recording. Article 2266, Civil Code.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 513-539; Dec. Dig. § 231.*]</p> <p>6. Deeds (§ 81*) — Record—Statutes.</p> <p>“The recording shall have effect from the time the act is deposited in the proper office and indorsed by the proper officer.” This provision of law has equal application to all of the parishes of the state, including Orleans. Article 2266, C. C.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 177; Dec. Dig. § 81.*]</p> <p>7. Deeds (§ 81*) — Record—Statutes.</p> <p>Article 2254 of the Civil Code, relative to the recording of conveyances in the parishes outside of Orleans, and article 2262, relative to the recording of conveyances in the city of New Orleans, provide that such acts shall have no effect against third persons, but from the date of their being deposited in the proper office, and article 2264 is to the same effect. Article 2266 contains the same provision, and further explains that the resulting effect of such recording takes place when the act to be recorded is deposited in the proper office and indorsed by the proper officer. This last article is general in its terms and embraces all the parishes of the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 177; Dec. Dig. § 81.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>8. Records (§ 4*) — “Registry”—Deposit for Record.</p> <p>The “registry” of which Civil Code, c. 6, § 3 (arts. 2251-2266), treats is understood in its usual sense of the act of recording or writing in the register or depositing in the place of public records, and is used interchangeably with “deposit” and “record.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Records, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. § 4.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, p. 6035.]</p> <p>9. Records (§ 4*) — “Deposit.”</p> <p>The term “deposit,” as used in Civil Code, c. 6, § 3 (arts. 2251-2266), relating to registry, does not necessarily mean a permanent deposit; and, when a notary public in the city of New Orleans is required to deposit his act of conveyance with the register of conveyances, it means that he shall make a mere temporary disposition of the act for the purpose of being indorsed and recorded, since the law makes him the permanent custodian of his acts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Records, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. § 4.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1996-1999.]</p> <p>Monroe and Provosty, JJ., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations (§ 46*)--Quali-fication op Officers — Validity op Charter.</p> <p>The amendment and re-enactment of the legislative charter of the town of Lake Charles, under the alleged authority of section 43 of Act 136 of 1898, was unauthorized, in so far as it purports to require a property qualification of the mayor and aldermen of the town, since it is, in that respect, inconsistent with section 2446, Revised Statutes, and sections 20 and 21 of said act of 1898, which prescribe the qualifications of such officers without including the ownership of property within the corporate limits.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 123-125; Dec. Dig. § 46.*]</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations (§ 46*) — Officers — Property Qualifications.</p> <p>Even if the property qualification requirement, in the amended charter of Lake Charles, were authorized, it could not he held to apply to persons who are merely candidates for nominations, but would have to be restricted in its application to the time of the actual assumption of the offices to which it refers.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 123-125; Dec. Dig. § 46.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>3.Officers (§ 18*) — Qualification of Officers — Statutes—‘ ‘Eligible. ’ ’</p> <p>The word “eligible,” though defined as meaning “fitted or qualified to be chosen _ or elected, legally or morally suitable, as an eligible candidate,” has not unfrequently, when used in statutes determining eligibility to public office, been held to relate to the time of assumption of an office rather than that of the election thereof.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. § 22; Dec. Dig. § 18.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2346, 2347.]</p>

B. Claiborne, Judge. Action by Tregre & Shexnayder against the Carter Packet Company, and Ephraim Carter files an intervention and third opposition. From a judgment rejecting the claim of the intervener and third opponent, he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph Petrie and wife against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>Husband and Wife (§ 74*) — Notes of Married Woman — Validity — Estoppel to Deny — Mortgages.</p> <p>Where a married woman appears before the judge of a district court, and, upon the necessary statement of facts, obtains from him a certificate authorizing her to mortgage her separate property to secure a note made by her, she will thereafter, be estopped from attacking the validity of this certificate, and contradicting her statements to obtain it, where she has been sued by the holder of the note, who acquired it in good faith and before maturity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 309-312; Dec. Dig. § 74.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; Thos. M. Burns, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Elizabeth Caroline Morris against the Great Southern Lumber Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

B. Claiborne, Judge. In the matter of the succession of John Yoist. Action by collateral heirs, to set aside a universal legacy. Judgment in favor of the collateral heirs, and defendants appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Constitutional Law (§ 180*) — Impairing Obligation op Contracts — Exemptions.</p> <p>Property exempted from seizure by the Constitution of 1898 is seizable under a judgment obtained on a claim of a date anterior to its passage, because to hold that the Constitution could retroactively impress that property with a new characteristic would have the effect of impairing the obligations of the parties to the contract, and depriving the judgment creditor of a right which he formerly possessed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 498-500; Dec. Dig. § 180.*]</p> <p>2. Homestead (§ 46*) — Constitutional Provisions — Construction.</p> <p>As the rights and obligations of the parties were governed by the Constitution of 1879, the judgment debtor cannot claim the homestead exemption under that Constitution, as he failed to register his homestead, a necessary prerequisite to claiming a homestead exemption from seizure.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. § 63; Dec. Dig. § 46.*]</p>

Action by Eugene Nolan against the New Orleans Casualty Company. Exception of want of jurisdiction overruled, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law (§ 1020*) — Appellate Jurisdiction-Penalty.</p> <p>This court is without jurisdiction of an appeal from ■ a judgment by a mayor’s court imposing a fine of $5, or imprisonment for 10 days, for violation of a town ordinance.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2578-2580; Dec. Dig. § 1020.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of St. James; Paul Leche, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Marian Robertson against Jacob Lebermuth. Prom a judgment for</p> <p>plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil 'District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph Franek against William Flynt. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; Chas. A. O’Niell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by William F. Williams against the Ellerslie Planting Company, Limited. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1.Husband and Wine (§ 276*) — Executors and Administbatobs (§ 495*) — Community Property — Rights on Survivor — Right to Appointment as Administrator.</p> <p>The surviving husband, administering the succession of his deceased wife and the estate of the community, is bound to account for all property belonging to the community which may be or may come in his hands; but, unless the decedent has otherwise disposed of it, and unless and until he remarries, of dies, he is entitled to hold in usufruct so much of the share of the decedent as may be inherited by the children, issue of their marriage, and such right is not defeated by reason of the fact that he takes out letters of administration, nor is his right to the commission of an administrator defeated by reason of his enjoyment of such usufruct.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 1032-1045; Dec. Dig.</p> <p>§ 276;* Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 2089-2106, 2108; Dec. Dig. § 495.*]</p> <p>2. Husband and Wine (§ 276*) — Community Property — Rights on Subvivob.</p> <p>Where the surviving husband’s usufruct of farming lands begins before the crops are planted and terminates after they are harvested, such crops belong to him; and he is bound for the taxes assessed against the property during such period.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 1032-1045; Dec. Dig. § 276.*]</p> <p>3. Husband and Wine (§ 273*) — Community Pbopeety — Rights on Survivor.</p> <p>Where the husband owns property before the marriage, which is sold during the marriage and the proceeds of which are used for the enrichment of the community, he becomes a creditor of the community for the amount realized by the sale, rather than for the amount originally paid by him for such property.</p> <p>,[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 1008-1024; Dec. Dig. § 273.*]</p>

King, Judge. Action by Lewis Fishel against Michael Irwin and another, in which the Interstate Trust & Banking Company and others intervene. From a judgment for plaintiff and interveners, defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Mary Emma Landphere, widow, against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans ; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Salmen Brick & Lumber Company, Limited, against the Southern Pacific Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and</p> <p>defendant appeals.</p>

‘ Ellis, Judge. ’ ' - Action by Joseph A. Schultze and others against the Frost-Johnson Lumber Company, and the W. W. Carre Company, Limited, and others were called in warranty. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.

Proceeding by Mrs. Josephine Pons and others to have Marie Madeline Pons1, widow, interdicted and a curator appointed to take charge of her and her affairs. The demand of plaintiffs for a trial by jury was refused, and they apply for writs of mandamus and certiorari.

M. Burns, Judge. Fed Thomas and others were accused of cutting timber from the land of another, and, from an order quashing the indictment, the State appeals.

Action by Willis J. Roussel and others against the Railways Realty Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and the Railways Realty Company and another apply for certiorari or writ of review.

M. Burns, Judge. Bob and Henry Phelps were indicted for cutting and removing timber from the lands of another. From a judgment quashing the indictment, the State appeals.

F. Brunot, Judge. Action by Osear R. Brugier and others against the Railroad Commission of Louisiana and another. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant Railroad Commission appeals, and plaintiffs move to dismiss the appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Contracts (§ 171*) — Construction—Divisible or Indivisible Obligation.</p> <p>“An obligation is divisible or indivisible according as it has for its object either a thing which, in its delivery, or a fact which, in its execution, is or is not susceptible of division, either material or intellectual.” Civ. Code, art. 2108.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 754r-757; Dec. Dig. § 171.*]</p> <p>2. Contracts (§ 171*) — Construction — Divisible or Indivisible Obligation.</p> <p>“The obligation is indivisible though the thing, or the fact which is the object of it, be by its nature divisible, if the light, in which it is considered in the obligation, does not admit of its being partially executed.” Civ. Code, art. 2109.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 754-757; Dec. Dig. § 171.*]</p> <p>3. Contracts (§ 173*) — Construction — Divisible or Indivisible Obligation.</p> <p>The courts at the present day incline strongly against the construction of promises in a contract as independent; and, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, promises which form the consideration for each other will be held to be concurrent and dependent, and not independent. 9 Cyc. 643; Lowber v. Bangs, 2 Wall. 728, 17 L. Ed. 768.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 762-764; Dec. Dig. § 173.*]</p> <p>4. Contracts (§ 171*) — Construction — Divisible or Indivisible Obligation.</p> <p>Contracts are to be considered divisible or indivisible, dependent or independent, separable or entire, according to the intention of the parties, which is to be deduced from the whole instrument. ' Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 312, 14 L. Ed. 157.</p> <p>[Éd. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 754-757; Dec. Dig. § 171.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>5. Logs and Logging (§ 3*) — Sale oe Standing Timber — Breach oe Contract.</p> <p>Where defendant sold timber standing on his premises to plaintiff to be manufactured into lumber by plaintiff on defendant’s premises, and plaintiff, after erecting a mill, sold it to third persons, he violated the entire contract, and is not entitled to recover of defendant damages for the latter’s refusal to deliver the timber.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Logs .and Logging, Cent. Dig. §§ 6-12; Dec. Dig. § 3 ;* Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 890.]</p>

<p>Certiorari to Court of 'Appeals, Pirst Circuit.</p> <p>Action by the North British & Mercantile Insurance Company of London and Edinburg, United States Branch, against Robert Nicholls Sims. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and defendant applies for certiorari, or writ of review.</p>

Action by William Guillaume and others against Alexander Guillaume. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Victoria Perry against the Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

So Relie, Judge. Action by John Johnson and wife, for the use of their minor son, against the Pickering Land & Timber Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles; G. H. Couvillon, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Alfred F. Lacombe against George P. Laborde. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Mary Roberts, widow, against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman. Judge.</p> <p>Action by Jules P. Turregano against William W. Whittington, Jr. From a judg-</p> <p>ment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>. Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist; P. E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Edward. Bernard was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Consolidated suits by City of Shreveport against Noah W. McClure and others. From the judgments all parties appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appearance (§ 8*)— General Appeaeance— Waiver op upjections — Exceptions.</p> <p>Where a foreign corporation doing business in, but not represented in, the state was sued by one of its employés for damages for personal injuries, and appeared through counsel and excepted to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personse, and a.t the same time, with reservation of the benefit of the exception, further excepted that the petition was vague, indefinite, and set forth no. cause of action, and subsequently both exceptions, without objection, were tried together, and were overruled, held, that the exception to the jurisdiction of the court was waived by the defendant. Bank v. Walker, 130 La. 810, 58 South. 580, reaffirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Fo,r other cases, see Appearance, Cent. Dig. §§ 23-41; Dee. Dig. § 8.*]</p>

D. King, Judge. Tutorship of minor children of James Oliphant. From a dismissal of the rule, and a holding that the tutrix could not resign, the tutrix appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Elections (§ 112*) — Registration—Purging Registration Roll.</p> <p>Act No. 98 of 1908 is entitled an act “relative to a new registration of voters throughout the state; to regulate the manner and mode of registering voters; to provide for the appointment of special canvassers and to provide penalties for the violation; * * * and to provide for the appointment or selection of registrars of voters throughout the state; defining their duties and powers and fixing their compensation.” Section 9 provides the proceedings for purging the roll of names improperly on the register. Section 10 provides how a voter who has changed his residence may have the change noted on the roll, and also provides that in the parish of Orleans a new certificate of registration shall be issued to him. Section 12 provides a remedy for a voter denied a registration, and section 13 provides for the bringing of suits without costs by any citizen to have stricken from the registration roll illegal names. Sections 16 to 25 are set apart under the heading “Registrars of Voters Outside of the Parish of Orleans,” and the remaining sections, 26 to 44 inclusive, are under the heading “General Provisions,” but sections 1 to 15 are not set apart under separate heading, but. it appears that whenever it was desired to restrict one of such sections to the parish of Orleans it so provided, unless the subject-matter clearly confined its operation to that parish. Bold, that section 13 did not apply merely to the parish of Orleans but to the country parishes as well.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 108; Dec. Dig. § 112.*]</p> <p>2. Elections (§ 95*) — Registration — Constitutionality oe Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 98 of 1908, § 13, providing for the bringing of suits “without cost” by any .citizen to have stricken from the registration roll names illegally placed thereon, was not impliedly forbidden by Const, art. 122, providing that there shall be a clerk of the district court in each parish, except the parish of Orleans, who shall receive no compensation from the state or parish for his services in criminal matters; the act being expressly authorized by Const, art. 201.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. §§ 95, 96; Dec.. Dig. § 95.*]</p> <p>3. Statutes (§ 125*) — Titles and Object.</p> <p>Act No. 98 of 1908 is entitled an act “relative to a new registration of voters throughout the state; to regulate the manner and mode of registering voters; to provide for the appointment of special canvassers and to provide penalties for the violation of the provisions of the act; to provide for the appointment or selection of registrars of voters throughout the state; defining their duties and powers and fixing their compensation.” Section Í3 provides for bringing suits without costs by any citizen to have stricken from the registration roll the names illegally placed thereon, being enacted pursuant to Const, art. 201, requiring the General Assembly to provide by law for such application and appeals without costs. Bold, in view of the fact that the section of the statute was enacted pursuant to the Constitution, that the act was not unconstitutional on the ground that the object was not expressed in its title.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 187-191; Dec. Dig. § 125.*]</p> <p>4. Statutes (§ 109*) — Subjects and Title.</p> <p>A statute will not be held unconstitutional on the ground that the object is not expressed in the title, unless the title is clearly insufficient.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 136-139; Dec. Dig. § 109.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Master and Servant (§§ 101, 102*) — Injuries to Servant — Negligence.</p> <p>A defendant is not at fault and will not be held in damages to a plaintiff who was injured while in defendant’s employ, if defendant’s planing mill was properly equipped with all necessary appliances, and was in good order.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §1 135, 171, 174, 178-184, 192; Dec. Dig. §§ 101, 102.*]</p> <p>2. Master and Servant (§ 105*) — Injuries to Servant — Appliances.</p> <p>The use of an appliance which is shown to be general by persons of good standing in the same business with defendant, and which appliance was not shown, prior to the accident, to be more dangerous than other appliances used for the same purpose, will not constitute negligence and fault on the'part of a defendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 185-191; Dec. Dig. § 105.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Pelicien and Aristide Bellard were convicted of manslaughter, and they appeal.</p>

<p>Suit by S. McC. Lawrason against Edward G. Swartz and others. Edward G. Swartz applies for writ of certiorari and prohibition.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; R. S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Edwin B. Kennon against the Brooks-Scanlon Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Succession of T. Scott Burbank. The account of Mrs. Josephine Ernst, as tutrix, was homologated, and Mrs. Hanna M. Burbank, executrix, and others appeal.</p>

Action by the Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland against C. C. Hardman and others.. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and the defendants apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company against John M. Dresser. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Bienville; B. P. Edwards, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Continental Bank & Trust Company against J. L. Baker and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Union; R.. B. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Two actions by J. P. Blanks and others against W. H. Lephiew and others. From the judgment, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by May Newman against Walter L. Gleason. Judgment for plaintiff, and'defendant appeals.</p>

Suit by the Board of Health of the State of Louisiana against Adolph Susslin. Judgment for defendant, and complainant applies for writs of certiorari and mandamus.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Bills and Notes (§ 519*)— Surety— Consideration— Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence held, to support a finding that a surety, signing a note reading, “I, we, or either of us, promise to pay,” signed it synchronously with the maker before delivery to the payee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. § 1802; Dec. Dig. § 519.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law (§ 622*) — Severance—Discretion.</p> <p>Applications for severance on the trial of a cause are addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Lee, 46 La. Ann. 623, l5 'South. 159; State v. D'esroche, 47 La. Ann. 651, 17 South. 209; State v. St. Paul, 110 La. 722, 34 South. 750; State v. Johnson, 116 La. 856, 41 South. 117.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1380-1383, 1385, 1386, 1388-1890; Dec. Dig. § 622.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law (§ 1131*) — Appeal—Dismissal-Escape.</p> <p>Where one convicted of a crime appeals, ■but pending the appeal escapes from custody, his appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2971-2979, 2985; Dee. Dig. .§ 1131.*]</p>

Suit by Edward. Edwin Sullivan against Jack Maynor and others. The court of Appeal reversed a judgment for plaintiff, and he applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by the Ooivrt.) </p> <p>1. Sales (§ 5*) — Nature oe Transaction— Lease.</p> <p>The-law looks beyond the mere terms used to describe a transaction to the substance of the transaction. The designation of a contract as a “sale” will not make it such where it is apparent that the parties were making a lease.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. § 12; Dec. Dig. § 5 ;* Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 7.]</p> <p>2. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 13*) — Sale oe Realty — Consideration.</p> <p>The recited price of $1 cannot serve as the price of the thing where it is grossly inadequate, and its payment or recited payment can confer no right or title and amounts to nothing, as the law intends that there shall be a real price before a real sale can be perfected.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. § 13.*]</p> <p>3.Mines and Minerals (§ 58*) — Oil and Gas Lease — Rights oe Lessor — Annulment.</p> <p>A contract of lease which provides that the lessee shall drill for oil or gas within six months of the day the lease is signed, or pay the lessor 10 ¿cents per acre a year until the drilling is commenced, but the lessee may terminate the contract at any time by merely giving notice and paying $1, while the lessor can annul it only six years after giving notice contains a potestative condition, as the existence of the contract depends entirely on the will of the lessee, and the lessor is entitled to its annulment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 168, 169; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Wills (§ 130*) —- Validity — Omission of Date.</p> <p>Assuming that the will of decedent was mutilated by -the universal legatee in the presence of testator, and that the latter, instead of writing a new will, attempted to reconstruct the old one by pasting the fragments thereof on a sheet of paper, but omitted one showing the last two figures of the date of the year, the testament so reconstructed is null and void for want of a complete date. An olographic testament must be wholly written, dated, and signed in the handwriting of the testator. Rev. Civil Code, art. 15S8.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 336, 338-340; Dec. Dig. § 130.*]</p>

Action by Mrs. Annie E. Tracy and others against the Queen City Fire Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Carriers (§ 132*) — Injury to Shipment-Burden op Proof.</p> <p>Where, in an action to recover the value of goods intrusted to a carrier and destroyed in transit, it is shown that the proximate cause of the loss was an unprecedented flood, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff to show that, the flood notwithstanding, the loss could have been averted by the exercise by the carrier of reasonable care and skill.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 578-582, 605; Dec. Dig. § 132.*]</p> <p>On Rehearing — On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>2. Motion Overruled.</p> <p>The facts do not sustain the grounds of the motion. The motion is therefore dismissed.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3. Carriers (§ 132*) — Injury to Shipment-Burden of Proof.</p> <p>According to law and jurisprudence of this state, to be relieved from liability the carrier must prove that the loss or damage has been occasioned by accidental or uncontrollable event, and this involves the proposition that the carrier must prove that it was free from fault.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 578-582, 605; Dec. Dig. § 132.*]</p> <p>4. Carriers (§ 134*) — Injury to Shipment-Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>No timely attempt was made to save the property.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 588-592, 607; Dec. Dig. § 134.*]</p> <p>5. Carriers (§§ 119, 132*) — Injury to Shipment— Negligence — Burden of Proof — Carmack Amendment.</p> <p>Whether under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States or under state law, the defendants were at fault and are liable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 523-530, 578-582, 605; Dec. Dig. §§ 119, 132.*]</p> <p>6. Carriers (§ 119*) — Shipment of Goods— Duty to Carrier.</p> <p>There had been a general storm in the northern part of the state in which the cars were destroyed. There was warning given by the Weather Bureau of the floods; besides, the defendants had other sources of information. The water reached the flood stage on the 26th of August, 1908. The cars were left in the lowest part of the defendants’ yards — anterior to the rise of the waters — and they failed to haul them out. The train was made up in part of the two cars destroyed. There were in the train on the yard cars loaded with lime, which were ignited by water of the flood. On learning that there was to be an unprecedented rise, it behooved defendants to be unusually careful with the cars loaded with lime and haul them away from the danger line.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — F'or other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 523-530; Dec. Dig. § 119.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) ■ </p> <p>7. Carriers (§ 119*) — Injuries to Shipment —Defense—Report of Weather Bureau.</p> <p>In a shipper’s action for destruction of a shipment by flood, an inaccuracy in the Weather Bureau’s forecast as to the extreme height which the waters would reach constituted no defense, where the carrier showed no reasonable activity to guard against injury to the shipment after being warned.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 523-530; Dec. Dig. § 119.*]</p> <p>8. Carriers (§ 156*) — Injury to Shipment-Waiver — Negligence.</p> <p>. A carrier is liable for loss occasioned by ordinary negligence, notwithstanding a waiver in the bill of lading purporting to exempt it from liability.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 697-719; Dec. Dig. § 156.*]</p> <p>Monroe, J., dissenting.</p>

Arthur Morrough was convicted of perjury. From a judgment sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment and quashing the indictment, the State appeals.

B. Claiborne, Judge. In the matter of the succession of O.'Hi. Dizier. On the opposition of W. B. Thompson & Co. to the first amended provisional account. From the judgment, the accountant appeals.

Action by Emile C. Larido, individually and as tutor, against Robert J. Perkins. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.

Action by Junius Garlick against the Williams Medical & Surgical Institute and others. Judgment for plaintiff, who levied on the rights of defendant Leon Williams, plaintiff in another action. Garlick applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Feliciana; George J. Woodside, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Henry K. Simmons against Inez Stevens. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Board of Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund against Mayer Israel. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Action by the State, on the relation of Peter Hanly, for writ of mandamus against Samuel A. Montgomery, Registrar of Voters. From an order granting the writ, defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Thos. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Isabela Carroll against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Master and Servant (§ 276*) — Injuries to Servant — Evidence.</p> <p>In damages for personal injuries, the evidence must do more than merely raise a conjecture, or show a probability as to the cause of the injury, and no recovery can be had if the evidence leaves it to conjecture which of several probable causes might have resulted in the injury, or that the cause was unavoidable.</p> <p>[Bd. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 950-952, 954, 959, 970, 976 ; Dec. Dig. § 276.*]</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Action by the Producers’ Oil Company against L. Hanszen and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. The map referred to in the opinions here follows:

<p> (Syllabus "by the Oorn-t.) </p> <p>Malicious Prosecution (§ 18*) — Probable Cause — Evidence.</p> <p>The defendant in a damage suit for malicious prosecution shows probable cause for such prosecution when she testifies that she was reliably informed that her coat was being worn by the mistress of plaintiff, after she had intrusted it to plaintiff to be cleaned, and he had reported that the coat had “walked off.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. §§ 23, 24, 29-38; Dec. Dig. § 18.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Divorce (§ 167*) — Judgment—Suit to Vacate — Prescription—Separation from Bed and Board.</p> <p>A petition, which alleges that a judgment o£ separation from bed and board was procured by the husband against the wife by gross fraud, and prays for the nullity of the judgment, shows a cause of action, even though the attack is made on the judgment more than a year after its rendition. The attack was made within the year after the knowledge came to defendant. The D'aspit Case, 32 La. Ann. 1174.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 533-548; Dec. Dig. § 167.*]</p> <p>2. Divorce (§ 167*) — Decree — Fraud — Suit to Set Aside.</p> <p>A suit by the wife to have a judgment of separation from bed and board set aside, on the ground that it was procured by fraud, is an action in nullity of judgment, but one which has unusual features; and the suit should not be dismissed on -an exception of no cause of action, but the wife ought to be allowed to prove her allegations of fraud.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 533-548; Dec. Dig. § 167.*]</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. The admission of the will of Raphael G. Villa to probate was objected to, and from a decree annulling a bequest to Dr. J. C. Barr he appeals.

Théard, Judge. Action by John S. Mioton, Jr., and another against John F. del Corral and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff named appeals.

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Gabriel Gonsoulin and others against Antoine Gonsoulin. From an adverse judgment, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

Ellis, Judge. In the matter of the succession of F. J. Campbell, deceased. Rule by the American Bonding Company, the surety on the bond of Mrs. Mary M. Campbell, tutrix administering the succession, to show cause why she should not file an account of her administration, and in default be dismissed from office. Prom a judgment denying relief, the American Bonding Company appeals.

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of La Salle; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>D. B. Drummond was convicted of burglary in the nighttime, and he appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staf.) </p> <p>1. Counties (§ 183*) — Parishes—Bonds—Validity.</p> <p>The fixing of a tax rate at a lower limit than that prescribed 'by Const, art. 281, as amended in 1910 (see Act No. 197 of 1910), authorizing the issuance of highway improvement bonds by road districts on a vote of the people, and requiring the collection of a tax sufficient to pay the interest and principal falling due, provided that the taxes shall not exceed ten mills on the dollar, invalidates the bonds.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Counties, Cent. Dig. §§ 275-281, 283, 284; Dec. Dig. § 183.*]</p> <p>2. Counties-(§ 183*) — Parishes—Bonds—Validity.</p> <p>The curative provision added in 1912 (see Act No. 132 of 1912) to Const, art. 281, par. 2, declaring that all bonds authorized by taxpayers of any subdivision not contested on any ground of fraud are valid, has reference exclusively to drainage district bonds, and will not affect bonds for constructing and maintaining highways.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Counties, Cent. Dig. §§ 275-281, 283, 284; Dec. Dig. § 183.*]</p> <p>3. Counties (§ 183*) — Parishes—Bonds—Validity.</p> <p>The curative provision added in 1912 (see Act No. 132 of 1912) to Const, art. 281, par. 6, validating bonds issued and sold by any subdivision for any of the purposes specified in paragraph 1, protects bona fide holders of bonds and does not validate bonds not sold, and a bidder for bonds subject to the conditions that he shall become a successful bidder for the improvement for which the bonds are issued, and that the 'bonds are valid, is not within the protection of the provision where he refuses to accept the bonds because invalid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Counties, Cent. Dig. §§ 275-281, 283, 284; Dec. Dig. $ 183.*]</p> <p>On Application for Rehearing.</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error (§ 1175*) — Disposition of Case on Appeal — Agreement of Parties.</p> <p>Where both parties on appeal from an erroneous judgment suggested that the suit Should not be remanded but finally disposed of, the court will set aside the judgment and dismiss the suit.</p> <p>• [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4573^587; Dec. Dig. § 1175.*]</p>

D. Chretien, Judge. Arthur Barba was convicted of violating Act 245 of 1912, § 1, limiting the hours of employment, and from a reversal of such conviction by the criminal district court the State appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Adele B. Shield against the F. Johnson & Son Company, Limited, and others. Verdict for plaintiff against the F. Johnson & Son Company and for defendant the New Orleans Railway & Light Company. From the judgment for the Railway & Light Company, plaintiff appeals, and the F. Johnson & Son Company, Limited, also appeal. Judgment reversed as to defendant the F. Johnson & Son Company, Limited, and affirmed as to the New Orleans Railway & Light Company.</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Action by Lena Fuchs and others against the Kansas City Southern Railway Company. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals, and plaintiffs, answering, pray that the award, appealed from be increased.

F. Blackman, Judge. Action by Oliver C. Watson, for minor Carl L. Watson, against tbe J. F. Ball Bro. Lumber Company, Limited, and others, and Mose Eli Mercer and wife against the same defendants. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs Watson appeal.

Action by Samuel Haas against E. P. Z. Fontenot and others. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and case remanded, and defendants apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard,,Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Benjamin Lewis against James J. Manson. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

X. Ransdell, Judge. Action by Kate S. Agee, individually and as administratrix of George Washington Agee, against Samuel Gordon Brent, Jr., and others for partition. Order for sale of property, and the same adjudicated to Frank Janes. Rule to compel him to accept title, from which rule he appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Brokers (§ 94*) — Vendor and Purchaser (§ 16*) — Sales by Agent — Liability oe Vendor.</p> <p>A person may confer upon another any lawful power which he himself may exercise; and he is bound to execute the engagement contracted by his mandatary conformably to the power confided to him. If the owner of real estate makes a written offer of it to another at a stated price, and the offer is accepted in writing, in accordance with its terms, the obligation to convey the property is complete; and the same is true where the offer is made by the duly authorized mandatary of the owner. To hold otherwise would be to hold that the owner may not do through another that which he himself may do; and that a third person, dealing with an owner of property through his agent, acquires no rights as against such owner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec. Dig. § 94;* Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 17, 20; Dec. Dig. § 16.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 330*) — Parties — Transfer of Interest — Corporations.</p> <p>An appeal taken by a corporation from a money judgment and prosecuted by its presi- j dent and counsel will not'be dismissed on the ground that the corporation has become defunct by reason of the judicial sale of all of its property and the failure of its officers to exercise their charter functions. Under the Code of Practice, actions do not abate by the death of parties after answer filed.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1837-1841; Dec. Dig. §</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error (§ 797*) — Dismissal-Defective Appeal Bond.</p> <p>A motion to dismiss an appeal for alleged defects in the bond for the appeal comes too late when presented more than three days after the filing of the transcript in the appellate court.</p> <p>[Ed. .Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent. Dig. §§ 3149-3154; Dec. Dig. §. 797.*]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3. Corporations (§§ 30, 406*) — Contracts of-Promoters — Unauthorized Act of President.</p> <p>A corporation is not bound in law by the contracts of its promoters or by the unauthorized acts of its president not adopted or ratified by resolution of its board of directors, and is not bound in equity when the corporation has derived no pecuniary benefits from the execution of the contracts or the unauthorized acts of its president.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 97-100, 1611-1614; Dec. Dig. §§ 30, 406.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Constitutional Law (§ 137*) — Impairing Obligation op Contract — Special Tax-Application op Proceeds.</p> <p>The property taxpayers of New Orleans petitioned for the levy 'of a special tax, to be devoted, among other purposes, “to the construction * * * of a free sewerage system, with free water therefor.” Act No. 270 of 1908 authorizes the Sewerage & Water Board to fix the rate, to consumers, for such water as they may use “for drinking and domestic purposes, exclusive of sewerage,” and the board has adopted rules fixing such rate, making a liberal allowance for water required fox-sewerage purposes. Hence neither the act nor the rules operate to impair the obligations of thé contract between the city and the taxpayers; for the petition of the taxpayers stipulates, in effect, that only such water as may be required and used for the purposes of the sewerage system shall be free, and water required and used for other purposes, such as drinking, cooking, bathing, laundering, sprinkling, etc., and which goes into the free sewers only after those purposes have been served, does not fall within that stipulation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 354; Dec. Dig. § 137.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; Winston Over-ton, Judge.</p> <p>Alfred Tufanio was convicted of violating the Intoxicating Liquor Law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany; Thomas M. Burns, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Jones & Pickett; Limited, against the Michigan Fire & Marine Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>1. Evidence (§ 265*) — Admissions—Effect-Genuineness op Note.</p> <p>While the acknowledgment of a defendant made prior to the institution of a suit that she was the maker of the note sued on is admissible as evidence to prove the genuineness of the note, still this acknowledgment should not be held to be determinative of the whole issue, as the court must consider the circumstances under which the acknowledgment was made, and the state of mental and physical health of the person making the acknowledgment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1029-1050; Dec. Dig. § 265.*]</p> <p>2. Execution (§ 172*) — Injunction—Burden op Proop — Forgery.</p> <p>When a defendant in executory process enjoins the seizure and sale on the ground that the note sued on is not genuine, the burden of proving forgery is on the plaintiff in injunction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor, other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 519-539; Dec. Dig. I 172.*]</p>

<p>Action by Fred J. Heintz against Fred Hold. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant applies for writs of mandamus and certiorari.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Corporations (§§ 374, 461*) — Powers—Loan of Money — Mortgages.</p> <p>The loan by a corporation created to carry on a general logging and wood manufacturing business of a sum of money out of its surplus and the taking of a mortgage to secure the loan does not constitute an ultra vires act, so as to entitle a creditor of the mortgagor- to have the mortgage declared a nullity. ' While it is true that an industrial corporation cannot change to a commercial corporation engaged in a different pursuit, still it may do all acts incidental to its business, and the loan by defendant was such an incidental act as was authorized by its charter.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1517, 1518, 1814; Dec. Dig. §§ 374, 461.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabitg hy the Court.) </p> <p>1. Limitation of Actions (§ 60*) — Suit to Reduce Donation Mortis Causa — Commencement of Period — Prescription.</p> <p>The prescription applicable to the reduction of a donation mortis causa to the légitime begins to run from the date the will is probated and not from the date of -the death of the decujus.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 333-341; Dec. Dig. § 60.*]</p> <p>2. Limitation of Actions (§ 105*) — Annulment — Judgment—Interruption of Prescription.</p> <p>A judgment setting aside a will is not an absolute nullity and is sufficient to interrupt the prescription applicable to the action in reduction of a donation mortis causa.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 514, 515; Dec. Dig. § 105.*]</p> <p>3. Wills (§ 561*) — Construction—'“Farm.” The term “farm” does not necessarily include only the land under cultivation and within a fence. It may include all the land which forms part of the tract, and may also include several connected parcels under one control; and when one devises his “farm,” he devises the whole farm, or all of the land above designated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1221-1224; Dec. Dig. § 561.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2695-2698.]</p> <p>4. Wills (§ 601*) — Contradictory Devises— Validity.</p> <p>Where a testator devises all his property to his wife, and then leaves her the usufruct, these devises are contradictory and irreconcilable and cannot stand.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1340-1350, 1608; Dec. Dig. § 601.*]</p> <p>5.Wills (§ 564*) — Construction—Intent of Testator.</p> <p>The devise evidenced by the words, “I leave and bequeath to my wife, ail I may die possessed of at the time of my death, she to have the usufruct during her life time, * * * with the exception of my farm, * * * which I will * * * to my sons,” is a devise of the usufruct of the farm to the sons, as the expressions of. the testator, taken as a whole, showed such an intention.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1228-1232; Dec. Dig. § 564.*]</p> <p>6. Wills (§ 472*) — Construction— Conflicting Disposition.</p> <p>When a person has made two contradictory dispositions of property, that which is last written is presumed to be the disposition which was intended by the testator and the one in' which he persevered and it has the effect of nullifying the former disposition.</p> <p>I Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 990, 991; Dec. Dig. § 472.*]</p> <p>7. Wills (§ 453*) — Construction — Ambiguity-Equal Distribution.</p> <p>Whenever the terms and dispositions are ambiguous and doubtful, the law favors that interpretation which will cause the property to be distributed more nearly in accordance with the law. The law favors an equal distribution, and,_ unless the testator clearly expressed an intention to dispose of his property otherwise, the law holds that he intended that his children should share it equally.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 971; Dec. Dig. § 453.*]</p> <p>8. Wills (§ 534*) — Construction—Presumption— Collation.</p> <p>A testator bequeathing certain property to one or more of his children will not be presumed to have intended this property as an extra share and portion, in the absence of words showing such an intent, and the property so bequeathed is subject to collation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1153-1156; Dec. Dig. § 534.*]</p> <p>9. Wills (§ 818*) — Collation—Valuation.</p> <p>. When property donated mortis causa is subject to collation, the value of the property must be estimated as of the day the succession was opened and not the day the inventory was made.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 2112; Dec. Dig. § 818.*]</p>

Action by Alexander Babin against the Lyons Lumber Company, Limited. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; G. A. Fournet, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by the State against the Calcasieu National Bank. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; (18,813) W. B. Sommerville, Judge; (19,777) Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the Succession of Lydia Burnett White. From a judgment admitting the will to probate, James F. Burnett appeals. From a judgment declaring a document presented not to be the olographic testament of deceased, all the proponents appeal. Cases consolidated.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Iatt Lumber Company, Limited, and another against A. W. Eaircloth. Prom a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; J. E. Clayton, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by the Board of Commissioners of Fifth Louisiana Levee District against the Howard Land & Timber Company. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; John E. Clayton, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action 'by the Board of Commissioners of Fifth Louisiana Levee District against the Concordia Land & Timber Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; John E. Clayton, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by the Board of Commissioners of Fifth Louisiana Levee District against Frank W. Hops. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; John E. Clayton, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by the Board of Commissioners of the Fifth Louisiana Levee District against the Farmer-Wren Land Company. Judgment for defendant, and the board appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error (§ 46*) — Jurisdiction— Amount in Controversy.</p> <p>This court is without jurisdiction of an appeal taken by a clerk of a district court from a judgment rejecting his claim for $194.50 demanded of the appellant in a cause for preparing, for the purposes of the transcript of appeal, a copy of the transcript of the parol testimony taken in such cause.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 198-201; Dec. Dig. § 46.*1</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Thfiard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Orescent City Manufacturing Company, Dimited, against Edward L. Slattery. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Courts (§ 224*) — Supreme Court — Constitutional Question — Legality oe Tax — Ordinance.</p> <p>Where a city counsel has passed an ordinance for the paving of sidewalks, and seeks to compel a property owner to pay for the sidewalks laid before his house, in default of his doing so, there is a constitutional question raised regarding the legality of a tax, where the defendant alleges that the ordinance under which the sidewalk was laid had been improperly passed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]'</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations (§ 407*) — Special Assessment — Statutes — Street Improvement.</p> <p>Statutes giving to municipal corporations the right to exercise the power to tax for municipal improvements should be strictly construed, and, when the power is sought to be exercised, there should be a full and strict compliance with all the requirements of the statute creating the right.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1003, 1004; Dec. Dig. § 407.*]</p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations (§ 335*) — Street Improvement — Validity oe Contract — Notice.</p> <p>Where the law requires that ten days’ notice should be given for inviting the submission of bids for public improvements, a bid accepted before that time cannot form the basis of an enforceable contract. A contract thus made in disregard of the requirements of the law is null and void.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 860, 861, 863; Dec. Dig. § 335.*]</p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations (§§ 488, 489*)— Street Improvement — Illegal Contract— Acquiescence oe Property Owner.</p> <p>As the defendant protested against the town accepting the bid of the contractors on the ground that it was illegal to do so, he can hardly be said to have acquiesced in the placing of sidewalks before his property under the illegal contract. This lack of acquiescence on defendant’s part is further shown by his belief that the sidewalk was a damage rather than an improvement to his property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1147-1152; Dec. Dig. §§ 488, 4)89.*]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>5. Municipal Corporations (§ 336*) — Street Improvement — Letting oe Contract.</p> <p>Act No. 147 of 1902 conferred on the town of Minden full authority to pave and improve sidewalks and curbings by contract let to the lowest responsible bidder. Held, on the facts of the instant case, that the paving contract was properly let.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 862; Dec. Dig. § 336.*]</p> <p>6. Municipal Corporations (§§ 469, 514*)— Cost oe Paving — Apportionment.</p> <p>The same statute provides as ifollows: “That the owners of real estate so abutting shall pay the entire cost of such work, on the basis of the respective frontage of the property on the sidewalk or curbing to be paved or improved.” Held, that the entire cost of construction on each street should have been apportioned on the basis of frontage, and that the assessment against the defendant of the entire cost of the work done in front of his particular lots was illegal; 'but that the failure to properly apportion the cost of tlie work does not preclude the plaintiff from hereafter making a proper assessment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113-1117, 1207-1215; Dec. Dig. §§ 469, 514.*]</p> <p>7. Municipal Corporations (§ 365*) — Paving Work — Acceptance—Eeeect.</p> <p>Where paving work was performed by the contractor and accepted by the municipal authorities, such acceptance, in the absence of fraud, is conclusive that the work was performed in accordance with the terms of the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other .cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 898; Dec. Dig. § 365.*]</p> <p>Breaux, C. J., dissenting.</p>

Action by the State, on the relation of D. W. Stewart, against -the Town of Minden. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and defendant applies forcertiorari or writ of review.

King, Judge. Action by Sophie Gastauer against George Gastauer for separation from bed and board. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; Thomas M. Burns, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Thomas Smith against Andrew D. Kemp. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Application of George Jackson for a writ of habeas corpus. Writ denied, and relator applies for writs of certiorari and mandamus.

<p>Application to amend judgment.</p>

Ouster proceedings by the State, on the relation of R. G. Pleasant, Attorney General, and others against Adolph Dumser and others. Judgment to oust, and defendants apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Vendor and Purchaser (§ 65*) — Sale According to Plan — Right oe Purchaser.</p> <p>Where the owner of an entire square of ground sells lots, as having certain dimensions, according to a particular plan, the vendee is entitled, as against such owner, his heirs, and subsequent vendees of other lots, to the lots purcliased by him; neither the vendor, his heirs, nor any other authority having the power., without some process of law, to divest the title or reduce the dimensions of the lots so acquired.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 93-96; Dec. Dig. § 65.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mathilde Bertrand Davis and others against the Ruddock Orleans Cypress Company. Prom a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

of Washington; Thomas M. Burns, Judge. In the matter of the Great Southern Lumber Company praying for a concursus against A. J. Adams and others. Prom the judgment, defendants appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 627*) — Abandonment— Failure to File Transcript.</p> <p>When an appellant fails to file the transcript in time, he is presumed to have abandoned his appeal, and it will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 274A-2749, 3126; Dec. Dig. § 627.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error (§ 620*) — Statutes (§ 117*) — When Appeals Returnable — Title op Act.</p> <p>Act No. 106 of 1908, entitled “An act relative to appeals to the Supreme Court, and providing for return days therein,” is an independent and general statute which does not purport to amend any other, but which repeals all laws or parts of laws in conflict with its provisions, and the text of which conforms to the title by making general provision, applicable throughout the state, with reference to the return of appeals to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2724-2742; Dee. Dig. § 620 ;* Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 15A-157; Dec. Dig. § 117.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Railroads (§ 398*) — Injuries to Persons on Tracks — Actions—Evidence.</p> <p>In an action against a railroad company for the cutting off of his arm, which plaintiff claimed extended over the track after he had been rendered unconscious by a fall occasioned by a wire on the station platform, evidence held not sufficient to warrant a recovery.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1356, 1358-1363; Dec. Dig. § 398.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District ¡Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Ella Nason Dillon against Mrs. Jessie B. Freville and others. From a .judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Application for writ of habeas corpus by ■George Robinson. The writ was refused, and relator brings certiorari.</p>

P. Madison, Judge. Consolidated actions by the Tensas Delta Land Company, Limited, against Max Fleischer and others, and by Peter J. Nevens against the Friedlaender-Oliven Company and others. Prom a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by O. H. W. Heil against Anna M. Felske, his wife. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Thomas C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Adeline Torres against Mrs. B. Starke. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Mary; C. J. Boatner, Judge ad hoc. Rule to tax costs in an action for partition by Walter J. Suthon against F. C. Viguerie, in which the defendant called J. S. Martel .and another as his vendors in warranty. Judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant and warrantors and in favor of the .defendant against warrantors for costs, and warrantor J. S. Martel appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 640*) — Dismissal-Grounds.</p> <p>An appeal will not be dismissed for imperfection in the stenographer’s report of the testimony where it does not appear that appellant was more to blame for it than appellee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2788, 2829; Dec. Dig. § 640.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error (§ 100*) — Appealability— Dissolution op Injunction.</p> <p>As an appeal will lie from an order of court dissolving a prohibitory injunction against a disturbance of possession of immovable property, even though a bond be required to protect the plaintiff in the writ, a fortiori will it lie when such injunction is, in effect, dissolved, and the status which it was intended to preserve is disturbed by the illegal act of the defendant, and the court by which it was issued denies plaintiff’s application for a mandatory injunction to compel defendant to restore the status as it existed before the disturbance.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.— Error, Cent. 100.*] •Eor other cases, see Appeal and Dig. §§ 670-680; Dec. Dig. '</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error (§ 100*) — Appealability — Injunction — Denial op Immediate 'Reliep.</p> <p>Where the possession of immovable property is disturbed and the possessor invokes the action of the court, by way of a mandatory injunction, for his immediate relief, the judgment of the court refusing to grant the immediate relief is so far final as to entitle the applicant to an appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 670-680; Dec. Dig. §</p> <p>4. Injunction (§§ 229, 231*) — Right op Appeal.</p> <p>Whether a defendant in injunction, who violates the same, should be punished for the contempt shown the court concerns the court in the matter of the maintenance of its dignity and authority; but whether, by coercive or punitory measures, such defendant should be compelled to obey the writ, issued by a competent court, for the preservation of a civil right asserted by the plaintiff, concerns the plaintiff, and the action of the trial court upon that question may be subject to review in this court on appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 496-501, 517; Dec. Dig. §§ 229, 231;* Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 680.]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>5. Injunction (§ 215*) — Mandatory Injunction — Right.</p> <p>It is well established under our law and. jurisprudence, and is a rule of well-nigh universal acceptance, that where the status intended to be preserved by a prohibitory injunction is changed or disturbed by the defendant, in violation of that writ, such defendant may be-compelled by a mandatory injunction, issued-before the trial on the merits, to restore such status. In fact, the authorities hold that a mandatory injunction may in some cases issue preliminarily and ex parte, and not only to restore a pre-existing status, but to compel affirmative action in the establishment of a status which should have existed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 438; Dee. Dig. § 215.*]</p> <p>6. Appeal and Error (§ 1178*) — Decision on-Appeal.</p> <p>A case will be remanded for further evidence where the interests of justice appear to require it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4604-4620; Dec. Dig. § 1178.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans; Joshua G. Baker, Judge.</p> <p>Eugene F. Buhler and Joseph H. Gomilla were convicted of receiving deposits for an insolvent bank, and they appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Chatwin Brothers Riprap & Contracting Company against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans ; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Selina Beatrice Brown, wife of Charles Hudson, against Delphine Green, wife of Frank Walker. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Matthew Warriner and' others against the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans and others. From judgments for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>