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132 Wash. 2d 472

State v. Rohrich

Washington Supreme Court

Decided July 3, 1997

Washington Supreme Court · decided 1997-07-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“both competent and physically available,”

quoted by 1 later decision, including In Re Personal Restraint of Grasso

Applies WA 9A § 9A.44.120

Relies on Davis v. Alaska · 98 Wash. 2d 140 - State v. Parris · 57 Wash. App. 7 - State v. Borland

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1997-07-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently July 2015

24 state decisions

160199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Guy, J.

¶1(concurring) — I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately because, in my view, the majority opinion strays from the issues to be decided in this appeal; is not sufficiently grounded in solid authority for its broad sweeping statements of law; and contains page after page of dicta.

¶2We accepted review in this case in order to resolve a conflict between the Court of Appeals decision in this case, State v. Rohrich, 82 Wn. App. 674, 918 P.2d 512, review *483granted, 130 Wn.2d 1017 (1996), and that of State v. Bor-land, 57 Wn. App. 7, 786 P.2d 810, review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1026 (1990). See RAP 13.4(b)(2); Petition for Review at 8-11.

¶3In Borland, Division One of the Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.44.120(2) "is satisfied when the child witness is both competent and physically available to testify. . . . Actual testimony is not required as a condition of admission of the out-of-court statements.” 57 Wn. App. at 13.

¶4In the Court of Appeals decision in Rohrich, Division Three disagreed with Borland and held that the statutory meaning of "testify” should be interpreted to be consistent with the fundamental purpose of the Confrontation Clause. That purpose is to provide an accused with the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Rohrich, 82 Wn. App. at 677-78 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); State v. Parris, 98 Wn.2d 140, 144, 654 P.2d 77 (1982)). The Court of Appeals also held a constitutional construction is consistent with the accepted definition of the word "testify.” As the Court of Appeals noted, "Black’s Law Dictionary 1476 (6th ed. 1990) defines the term "testify” as follows: 'To bear witness; to give evidence as a witness; to make a solemn declaration, under oath or affirmation, in a judicial inquiry, for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ” 82 Wn. App. at 677.

¶5The language of the statute evidences an intent on the part of the Legislature to allow hearsay statements in certain child abuse cases if (1) the child testified as a witness or (2) the child was unavailable as a witness. Under the ordinary meaning of the word, the child would "testify” for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. Black’s Law Dictionary 1476. Such testimony protects the defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses, as it provides him an opportunity for cross examination related to the elements of the charge or charges against him.

¶6I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision in this case and overrule Borland.

¶7*484Talmadge, J., concurs with Guy, J.

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