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133 Conn. 394

51 A.2d 495

Nowey v. Kravitz

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Decided February 11, 1947

Supreme Court of Connecticut · decided 1947-02-11

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[A] binding agreement for [a jury] waiver made in advance of the institution of . . . an action does not violate public policy; and there is no reason why such an agreement should not be given effect.”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Peabody Internat'l v. Coordination Tech., No. Cv890103418s (May 18, 1992), Bank of Boston Connecticut v. Rusconi, No. Cv 92 0507230 (Sep. 9, 1994)

Relies on Leahey v. Heasley · State v. Rankin · Noren Et Ux. v. Wood

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1947-02-11

How this case has been cited

Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently May 2000 · most notably L & R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank (1998), Falk v. Schuster (1976)

25 state decisions

1701947195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Per Curiam.

¶1 This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing a writ of error in a summary process action. The defendant, hereinafter called the landlord, brought the action against the plaintiff, hereinafter called the tenant, before a justice of the peace. In response to a motion for oyer a copy of the lease was filed. It contained a provision: “. . . the Tenant waives and will waive all right to trial by jury in any summary proceeding hereafter instituted . . . against the Tenant in respect of the demised premises. . . The tenant filed a motion for a jury trial, but subsequently on motion of the landlord the justice struck the case from the jury docket. The only error claimed is this ruling of the justice.

¶2 In this jurisdiction summary process actions are tried to a jury only on motion of one of the parties made in accordance with the provisions of § 5973 of the General Statutes. Thompson v. Main, 102 Conn. 640, 641, 129 A. 786. A right of trial by jury even when guaranteed by the constitution may be waived; Leahey v. Heasley, 127 Conn. 332, 336, 16 A.2d 609; State v. Rankin, 102 Conn. 46, 49, 127 A. *396 916; and, where a statute provides that an action shall be tried by jury only when claimed for the jury docket, a failure to make such a claim waives the right. Noren v. Wood, 72 Conn. 96, 98, 43 A. 649. In a pending action of summary process a party can voluntarily waive trial by jury and does so unless he makes a motion that the case be so tried; a binding agreement for such a waiver made in advance of the institution of such an actioii does not violate public policy; and there is no reason why such an agreement should not be given effect, as the justice did in his ruling. Waterside Holding Corporation v. Lask, 233 App. Div. 456, 253 N.Y.S. 183; Van Leyden v. 360 East 55th Street Corporation, 39 F. Sup. 879. Both parties to the lease are residents of, and the premises are located in, Connecticut; the only “summary proceeding ... in respect of the demised premises” known to our law would be an action of summary process; and the parties must have intended the provision in the lease to apply to such an action.

¶3 There is no error.

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