D.E.&J. Ltd. Partnership v. Conaway’s Empirical Analysis
2005
Citation profile
3 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 21 later decisions — most recently June 2020
3 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 78J (§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78T (§ 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78U (§ 21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78U (§ 21d of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder · Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores · Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo · Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“But, even so, the “short and plain statement” must provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” The complaint before us fails this simple test. As we have pointed out, the plaintiffs’ length complaint contains only one statement that we can fairly read as describing the loss caused by the defendants’ “spray device” misrepresentations. That statement says that the plaintiffs “paid artificially inflated prices for Dura’s securities” and suffered “damage[s].” The statement implies that the plaintiffs’ loss consisted of the “artificially inflated” purchase “prices.” The complaint’s failure to claim that Dura’s share price fell significantly after the truth became known suggests that the plaintiffs considered the allegation of purchase price inflation alone sufficient. The complaint contains nothing that suggests otherwise. For reasons set forth in Part II-A, supra, however, the “artificially inflated purchase price” is not itself a relevant economic loss. And the complaint nowhere else provides the defendants with notice of what the relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal connection might be between that loss and the misrepresentation concerning Dura’s “spray device.” We concede that ordinary pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff. But it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Because a purchaser may sell the shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out, a seller’s misrepresentations (and its associated inflated price) does not inevitably lead to a loss, but rather might mean a later loss. Even if the purchaser later resells those shares at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower price.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) failed `to claim that Dura's share price fell significantly after the truth became known,' (2) failed to specify the relevant economic loss,' and (3) failed to describe the causal connection . . . between [the] loss and the misrepresentation.'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.