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133 Ind. 169

Barnes v. Born

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided March 16, 1892

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1892-03-16

<p>Partition. — Sale of Husband’s Land on Personal Judgment. — Death of Husband. — Inchoate Interest of Wife in.' — Does not Constitute Her a Tenant in Common. — Eight Rarred by Limitation. — Co-tenants.—Adverse Possession.— Ouster. — While A. ivas in possession and owned a certain tract of land, B. obtained a judgment against him for §500; but, prior to the judgment, A. and his wife had mortgaged said land to C., and after B. had bought said land at sheriff’s sale, under said judgment, and had obtained a sheriffs deed for the same, O. obtained a decree of foreclosure, on his said mortgage, against A. and his wife. B. became replevin bail on the decree in foreclosure, and paid the same and took an assignment of the decree from C. Soon after obtaining his deed, B. took possession of said land, and from that time to the present B. and his heirs and their grantees have been continually in the actual possession of said land, receiving the rents, paying the taxes, making repairs thereon, and treating it as their •own to the exclusion of A. and his wife, and all other persons. Soon after the foreclosure of said mortgage, A. died, and shortly after him his wife died. Afterwards B. died intestate, and his' wife, by conveyance from his heirs, became the sole owner of said land. After the death of A., B. and his heirs and their grantees continued to occupy the premises to the exclusion of all others, receiving and converting to their own use all the rents and profits, paying taxes, and making improvements, for more than twenty years; nor was A.’s wife nor any one else recognized as having any interest in said land, nor did any other person make any claim of title to the land. D., a descendant, and heir of A. and his wife, brought suit to have said land partitioned, and one-third of said land set off to him, claiming it as the inchoate interest of his mother, which descended to him upon her death.</p> <p>•Qucere, was the action barred by the fifteen year statute of limitation ?</p> <p>Held, that where one tenant openly occupies the premises as his own, to the exclusion of all others, taking and converting the rents to his own use, ignoring and failing to recognize others as having any interest in the premises or right to the possession of the same, and no claim is made by the co-tenant out of possession, such possession for fifteen years will bar an action for partition.</p> <p>Held, also, that if a tenant in possession occupies the premises, and does so recognizing the rights of his co-tenants, he gains no rights, nor does any one lose any rights as being barred from a recovery by the statute of limitation, even though the tenant in possession retains the rents and profits, pays the taxes, and makes improvements.</p> <p>Held, also, that B., under his sheriff’s deed, had possession of all the-premises as of right, and that an occupancy thus raken will continue so until interrupted; and that A.’s wife, upon his death, only obtained a legal right to the undivided one-third of the land which was in the adverse possession of another, and that she and n«r heirs slept upon their rights until they were barred by limitation.</p> <p>Held, also, that as there was no effort to obtain possession of the land,, either by the widow or her son, until after tne decree assigned to B. had-, been barred by limitation, in equity, there is as strong reason for applying the statute of limitation to the right ol the widow or her heir, as for-applying it to the decree of foreclosure in favor of the purchaser.</p>

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently April 1919

3 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1892-03-16

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¶1Dissenting Opinion.

McBride, J.

¶2During the life of the husband, Barnes was entitled to and did hold the entire premises, subject to the inchoate interest of the wife. When the husband died her inchoate interest became absolute, and she was thereafter the owner in fee of the undivided one-third of the premises, and tenant in common with Barnes.

¶3I doubt that the mere continued occupancy of Barnes, which is all that is shown by the record, was, of itself, sufficient to set in operation the statute of limitation as against his co-tenant. I, therefore, doubt the correctness of the conclusion reached.

¶4Miller, J., also doubts upon the same grounds.

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