133 Md. App. 64 - Newborn v. Newborn’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(b) Factors in determining amount and method of payment or terms of transfer.—The court shall determine the amount and the method of payment of a monetary award, or the terms of the transfer of the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both, after considering each of the following factors: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all the property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property; (9) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (10) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. McGeehan v. McGeehan · 190 Md. App. 553 - Murray v. Murray

2. “The trial judge did not err in the manner appellant alleges. First of all, Mr. Newborn's testimony that the parties agreed as to how the accounts should be titled was rebutted by the testimony of Ms. Newborn. According to * her testimony, Mr. Newborn acted alone when he decided to title the Legg Mason accounts ninety-five percent to five percent in his favor. Second, even if the parties did agree as to how the accounts were to be titled, that agreement would not be determinative as to whether the property was marital. What would be determinative under FA section 201(e) would be an agreement to exclude as marital property certain (or all) of the proceeds from the personal injury settlement. Here, there was no evidence of such an agreement.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McGeehan v. McGeehan

3. “asks what the award, settlement, or judgment was intended to replace and looks to the nature of the personal injury award or settlement to explain why the property is the separate asset of a spouse or why it should be considered marital subject to equitable distribution. The approach was endorsed by Judge Chasanow in Blake and also in both Queen and Lowery (in a workers' compensation context). Recompense to the injured spouse for non-economic damages—such as pain, suffering, disability, and loss of ability to lead a normal life—are not considered marital property.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 190 Md. App. 553 - Murray v. Murray