State v. Bridges’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Ladies and gentlemen, if you find one defendant guilty of a purposeful or knowing murder and also find he did not act in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation, then you must determine whether the other defendant is or is not guilty of the same offense by reason of complicity or aiding and abetting. The law of complicity reads as follows: "A person is guilty as an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense he aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it." This provision means that not only is the person who actually commits the criminal act responsible for it but those who are accomplices are also responsible. The word aid as contained in the statute means to assist, support or supplement the efforts of another. If you find that the defendant willfully and knowingly aided another in the commission of the offense, you must consider him a principal. Aiding does not have to be proven by direct evidence of a formal plan to commit a crime which is verbally agreed to by all that are charged. The proof may be circumstantial. Participation and agreement can be established from conduct as well as spoken words. An accomplice has committed the same crime of purposeful or knowing murder only if the accomplice had the purpose to promote or facilitate the crime of purposeful or knowing murder as I have defined those terms for you. However”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 267 N.J. Super. 520 - State v. Bielkiewicz

2. “a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; (3) He is an accomplice of mch other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person. c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if (1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he (a) Solicits such other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (e) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. [Ibid. (emphasis added).]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Rumblin

3. “[A] conspirator can be held liable for the acts of others that constitute a reasonably foreseeable risk arising out of the criminal conduct undertaken to effectuate the conspiracy, and occurring as the necessary or natural consequences of the conspiracy. The substantive crime must be reasonably and closely connected to the conspiracy even though those crimes may not have been within the actual contemplation of the conspirators or within the scope of the conspiracy as originally planned.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 409 N.J. Super. 552 - State v. Cagno