¶1 dissenting.
¶2 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of this appeal reversing the denial of postconviction relief. I would affirm the trial court’s action on res judicata grounds. The majority points out that the trial court apparently failed to review the July 7, 1994 sentencing transcript upon which plaintiffs claims for postconviction relief depended in part. However, whether or not the trial court reviewed the transcript of the July 7 sentencing hearing is immaterial because the doctrine of res judicata precluded the defendant from succeeding on postconviction relief. As stated by this court in State v. Thompson (Nov. 21, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 70532, unreported, at 4, 1996 WL 673999:
“Defendant-appellant’s remaining arguments set forth in the first assignment of error, i.e., whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, whether the indictment was improperly amended and the effective assistance of counsel claim, could have been raised at the appellate level on direct appeal or through a delayed appeal, neither of which defendant-appellant attempted. Accordingly, defendant-appellant’s remaining claims are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata as the trial court properly determined. State v. McCullough, supra [78 Ohio App.3d 587, 605 N.E.2d 962]; State v. Phillips (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 409, 623 N.E.2d 1345.”
¶3 It is plain that if the errors that defendant is now asserting occurred at the July 7 sentencing hearing, they are “not dehors the record and therefore should have been raised in a direct appeal not on post-conviction. … [P]ostconviction petitions are not appropriate substitutes for direct appeals. State v. Nichols (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 40, 42 [11 OBR 188, 189-190], 463 N.E.2d 375, 377.” State v. Burks (Nov. 13, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 71904, unreported, at 2, 1997 WL 711256.
¶4 Although the trial court may, as the majority contends, have abused its discretion in failing to consider the July 7 transcript, it is of no consequence to the merit of the appeal. The postconviction motion was barred by res judicata whether or not the trial court reviewed the transcript because any deficiencies in the transcript could have been raised on direct appeal. I agree with the analysis of this court in State v. Broom (May 7, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72581, unreported, 1998 WL 230425, where this court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for postconviction relief notwithstanding the trial court’s failure to review a trial transcript. It is likewise true here. Nothing would be gained by a “remand for the sole purpose of having the court review matters that are facially barred by res judicata.” Id. at 14.
¶5*521 The majority attempts to distinguish the instant case from Broom on the grounds that the trial court here “did not find that the claims asserted by appellant were res judicata.” However, so long as the judgment of the trial court was correct, we are not at liberty to reverse simply because the trial court’s rationale was incorrect. “[A] reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned as the basis thereof.” State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 125, 698 N.E.2d 987, 989. In other words, defendant has suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s failure to review the July 7 transcript, as a review of it would only have produced the judgment that the postconviction petition was barred by res judicata. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the postconviction petition without a hearing.