¶1 I dissent. Upon the face of the record in this case, appellant acquired title to the land in controversy under the receiver’s deed. No facts appear here affecting the validity of that deed; and the court expressly found that the order of sale and the order confirming the receiver’s sale were duly made and entered by the court, and that *39 thereafter a deed was executed by the receiver to appellant, conveying to her “all the right, title, and interest of the said George B. White in and to” certain lands, which include the land here involved. Under this original title she had a right to redeem, which was not affected by the transactions between the defendant and Linforth, and the deed to her from Linforth was, in legal effect, a redemption. But I think that, under the circumstances, defendant had an equitable lien for the amount paid by him to Linforth; and as a condition to the quieting of appellant’s title, she should be required to pay that amount, with interest, to defendant within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court. I think that the judgment should be reversed, with directions to render judgment on the findings as above indicated.
134 Cal. 33
66 P 78
White v. Costigan
Decided August 17, 1901
California Supreme Court · decided 1901-08-17
<p>Divorce Suit — Receiver — Mortgage Permitted by Court — Subjection of Plaintiff’s Rights.—The plaintiff in a divorce suit, in which a receiver was appointed, cannot question the validity of a mortgage permitted to be made by the defendant under an order of the court, which was affirmed upon appeal; and any title acquired by her under a receiver’s sale must be subject to such mortgage.</p> <p>Id. — Foreclosure of Mortgage — Parties — Receiver — Purchase Pending Suit—Right of Redemption. — Upon the foreclosure of the mortgage permitted by the court, the plaintiff in the divorce suit, not having acquired an interest in the mortgaged premises, was not a proper or necessary party. But where the receiver appeared by leave of the court, and set up the rights of the plaintiff, with her full knowledge, any interest acquired by her at a receiver’s sale, made pending the suit, was subject to the decree of foreclosure, and could give her no more than a statutory right of redemption from the sale under the decree, as successor in interest of the mortgagor.</p> <p>Id. — Title Lost by Failure to Redeem—Action to Quiet Title.— Where no redemption was made or attempted from the sale under the decree of foreclosure by the purchaser at the receiver’s sale, and title passed under such foreclosure sale to another person, any title acquired under the receiver’s sale was thereby lost, and could not be successfully asserted in an action to quiet title against the holder of the sheriff’s deed under the decree of foreclosure. [McFarland, J., dissenting.]</p> <p>Id.—Redemption by Mortgagee of Other Lands — Money Retained by Purchaser — Estoppel — Sheriff’s Deed — Assignment. — Where no redemption from the sale under foreclosure of the mortgage was made or attempted by the purchaser at the receiver’s sale, but the payment of redemption-money was made by the holder of a judgment for deficiency under the foreclosure of a mortgage of other lands, which was accepted and retained by the purchaser under the foreclosure sale, and a certificate of redemption was thereupon issued to him, the purchaser was estopped from questioning his right to redeem, and the sheriff’s deed passed title to him, with like effect as if the certificate of sale had been assigned to him when the money was received.</p> <p>Id. — Subsequent Quitclaim Deed by Purchaser—Interest Previously Transferred. — A subsequent quitclaim deed executed by the purchaser at the sale under the decree of foreclosure, after reception and retention of the redemption-money by him, can have no greater effect than a second assignment of the certificate of purchase, after all of his rights thereunder had passed to the one from whom he received the redemption-money, and such quitclaim deed could confer no right.</p>
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1901-08-17
How this case has been cited
Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently May 1956
8 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
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