Appellate Case: 23-1018 Document: 59 Date Filed: 04/11/2025 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 11, 2025
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
DAVID KNELLINGER; ROBERT
STOREY,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 23-1018
DAVID YOUNG, in his individual and
official capacities as Colorado State
Treasurer, Colorado Office of Treasury;
BIANCA GARDELLI, in her individual
and official capacities as Director of
Colorado Department of Treasury,
Unclaimed Property Division,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:22-CV-01379-CNS-STV)
_________________________________
Richard M. Paul III, Paul, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri (Jonathan Greiner and Christopher
Ross, Griener & Associates, PLLC, San Antonio, Texas; and Laura C. Fellows and David
W. Bodenheimer, Paul, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri; with him on the briefs), for
Plaintiffs-Appellants
LeeAnn Morrill, First Assistant Attorney General (Amy Colony and Jennifer H. Hunt,
Senior Assistant Attorneys General, with her on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants-Appellees
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
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EID, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
This case concerns the application of Colorado’s Revised Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act (“RUUPA”), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-13-201–220, and its interaction
with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
After learning that the state of Colorado took possession of specific property
under RUUPA, David Knellinger and Robert Storey (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Colorado’s unclaimed property scheme
violated the Takings Clause. The district court dismissed their claims for lack of
standing. In its view, they failed to sufficiently allege ownership of the property at
issue, in part because Plaintiffs never filed an administrative claim to establish
ownership as required by RUUPA.
Knellinger and Storey now appeal that decision, arguing that they alleged facts
sufficient to state a claim that Colorado took their property for public use without just
compensation. We agree. Property owners who plausibly allege that Colorado has
taken custody of their property under RUUPA, and used it for public purposes, need
not file administrative claims with Colorado before they may sue for just
compensation. The moment a state takes private property for public use without just
compensation, a property owner has an actionable claim under the Takings Clause.
At this phase in the litigation, it is premature to decide whether any such taking
occurred here. However, taking the allegations of the complaint as true and viewing
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them in the light most favorable to the non-movant, we hold that the property owners
in this case stated a plausible claim for damages and therefore adequately pleaded an
injury sufficient to confer standing. The district court, however, properly dismissed
Plaintiffs’ equitable claims because § 1983 provides an adequate basis for Knellinger
and Storey to obtain just compensation for any taking.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ equitable
claims, REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of their damages claims, and
REMAND to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Under RUUPA, Colorado presumes that certain property has been abandoned
after a period of time defined by statute.1 See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-13-201–220.
The time period differs depending on the type of property. For example, if an
employee has failed to collect his wages “one year after the amount becomes
payable,” those wages are “presumed abandoned.”
Id. § 38-13-201(1)(k). If a retail
store owes a customer a refund, however, the customer has three years to collect such
refund before Colorado presumes that money to be abandoned. See id.
§ 38-13-201(1)(f). Once Colorado presumes property to be “abandoned” under
RUUPA, whoever holds the property must report it and then pay or deliver it to the
Colorado State Treasurer. Id. §§ 38-13-401, 38-13-603. If, for instance, someone
1
RUUPA itself took effect in 2020, but Colorado has employed a similar
unclaimed property scheme since at least 1987. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-13-101–
134 (1987). RUUPA also contains some exceptions to the following provisions, not
relevant here.
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waits more than one year to collect or to cash his final paycheck, his former employer
must report and pay the uncollected wages to the Treasurer.
RUUPA requires the Treasurer to hold the unclaimed property he receives “in
custody for the benefit of the owner.” Id. § 38-13-803. If the relevant property is
money, the Treasurer holds it in Colorado’s unclaimed property trust fund. Id.
§ 38-13-801. If the property takes another form, the Treasurer may typically sell it
after three years, with all proceeds to the trust fund. Id. §§ 38-13-701, 38-13-801. In
theory, such property “is not owned by the state,” id. § 38-13-803, and it “does not
revert to the general fund” automatically, id. § 38-13-801. Nevertheless, Colorado
regularly reappropriates money from the unclaimed property trust fund to the state’s
general fund, or to specific public uses, such as the Colorado state fair. See id.
§§ 38-13-801, 38-13-801.5.
A property owner who discovers that Colorado has taken his property may
recover it by filing an administrative claim. Id. § 38-13-903. If the Treasurer denies
such claim or fails to respond to it, RUUPA authorizes a suit to recover the property
in the district court for the City and County of Denver. Id. § 38-13-906.
Under RUUPA, once Colorado takes possession of the abandoned property,
the Treasurer must provide direct notice to a property owner if the Treasurer has the
property owner’s email address and “does not know [it] to be invalid.” Id.
§ 38-13-503. The Treasurer also may, but need not, notify the property owner by
other means such as first-class mail or telephone. Id. If the Treasurer does not have
a valid email address for the property owner, the Treasurer is not required to provide
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direct notice, but need only maintain a website with a list of all property owners
whose property has been transferred to the Treasurer. Id. Colorado maintains such
an unclaimed property website in compliance with RUUPA.
In 2022, David Knellinger and Robert Storey visited Colorado’s unclaimed
property website and discovered a listing for their property. The website listed
property previously possessed by “DAVID KNELLINGER” and “STOREY
ROBERT E,” valued at “$50–$249” and under “$50,” respectively. App’x at 10–11.
The website did not list the type of property or the precise value. Moreover,
Plaintiffs had never received notice of Colorado taking any of their property, nor any
compensation for it.
Knellinger and Storey did not file administrative claims, nor did they file a suit
in Denver County Court as authorized by RUUPA. Instead, Plaintiffs sued in federal
district court. As relevant here, Knellinger and Storey brought a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Colorado’s unclaimed property scheme violated the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. They filed suit against the officials in charge of
administering RUUPA: David Young (the Colorado State Treasurer) and Bianca
Gardelli (the Director of the Unclaimed Property Division of the Treasury) in their
individual and official capacities (collectively, “Defendants”). Knellinger and Storey
alleged that Defendants had “taken control of and liquidated” their property and
“converted [it] to public use” without “just compensation.” App’x at 34. They
sought a monetary remedy of “restitution of the proper value of their property . . .
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according to the applicable principles of law for reimbursement purposes”—that is,
“just compensation.” Id. at 34–35. They also sought to enjoin Defendants from
violating the Takings Clause in the future.
In addition to their personal takings claims, Plaintiffs also sued on behalf of a
putative class of “[a]ll persons or entities who did not receive actual notice before
their property was taken by the State of Colorado between May 27, 2016[,] and the
present.” Id. at 30. They asserted the same rights and sought the same remedies for
the class as for their individual claims.
In addition to the facts described above, Knellinger and Storey alleged other
facts relevant to the elements of their takings claims. They alleged facts concerning
Colorado’s public use of the property—for instance, that Colorado “commingle[s]”
the unclaimed property trust fund “with the General Revenue Fund to supplement the
State’s budget, and to pay general State debts,” and that property from the trust fund
is “appropriated by the State for various spending initiatives, including Colorado
State Fair Cash.” Id. at 19–20. Plaintiffs therefore alleged that, because Colorado
uses the unclaimed property trust fund for other purposes, Colorado’s Department of
Treasury “unlawfully converts the property owner to the State,” rather than “keeping
custody of the abandoned property in trust for the life of the property owner.”
Id.
at 20. Plaintiffs’ complaint also claimed that, when Defendants “seized” their
property, they did so “without notice, [their] knowledge, or [their] consent.”
Id.
at 10. Further, Knellinger and Storey asserted that Defendants did not compensate
them upon taking their property.
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Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Following briefing and argument, the district court
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Although the district court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ Takings Clause claims for lack of standing, its analysis of standing was
coextensive with its analysis of the merits of the Takings Clause claims.
Relying only on the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint, the district court
considered whether Plaintiffs could “establish standing,” or whether, as Defendants
argued, Plaintiffs “fail[ed] to allege within the Complaint that they are the actual
owners of any unclaimed property as identified on the Colorado Treasury’s website.”
App’x at 202. The district court agreed with Defendants that Knellinger and Storey
“ha[d] not sufficiently alleged ownership of the respective property identified in the
Complaint.” Id. at 204.
The district court identified three purported shortcomings on the face of
Plaintiffs’ complaint. First, the district court determined that the “potential claims”
identified in the complaint “may be claims of individuals who have similar names.”
Id. Second, the district court noted that Knellinger and Storey did not allege that
they had filed “an administrative claim to establish ownership over the property.”
Id.
Third, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to allege the specific dollar
value of the property and “fail[ed] to specify or identify what type of property was
allegedly improperly seized and whether the property was actually owned by them.”
Id.
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For these reasons, the district court concluded that Knellinger and Storey did
not plead that a taking had occurred, and thus did not plead “an actual injury in fact.”
Id. at 204–05; see
id. (evaluating whether Plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged ownership
of the respective property identified in the Complaint”). The district court also
determined that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to give rise to claims for
equitable relief. Accordingly, it dismissed their § 1983 claims for monetary and
equitable relief without prejudice. Because a class representative must have
individual standing for a class to be certified, the district court likewise dismissed
Plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of the putative class.
II.
The parties dispute the standard of review applicable to the district court’s
order dismissing the complaint. Although the parties both argue that we should
review the district court’s order as a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule12(b)(1), they disagree about how to review the facts alleged in the
complaint. Plaintiffs argue that the district court ruled on “a facial attack on the
sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations as to subject matter jurisdiction.” Ruiz v.
McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002). Thus, Plaintiffs claim, we should
accept all allegations in the complaint as true. See
id. Conversely, Defendants argue
that they brought and the district court ruled on “a challenge to the actual facts upon
which subject matter jurisdiction is based.”
Id. If Defendants are correct, any facts
found by the district court are reviewable only for clear error. See
id.
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We have the “unavoidable” obligation to determine our standard of review in
each case, regardless of the standard advocated by any party. Gardner v. Galetka,
568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009); see United States v. Fonseca,
744 F.3d 674, 682
(10th Cir. 2014) (“Although both parties thus suggest a standard of review that is
more favorable to the opposing side, we note that the court, not the parties, must
determine the standard of review.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
We conclude that the analysis of standing in this case is inextricably
intertwined with the merits—as the district court recognized in its order. Therefore,
we deem the district court’s order to have dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we review the dismissal de novo and
accept all allegations in the complaint as true.
Rule 12(b)(1) concerns whether federal courts have “[s]ubject-matter
jurisdiction,” which “refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.” Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “[Q]uite separate” is the question at issue in Rule 12(b)(6), which is the
“merits question” of “whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to
relief.”
Id. Therefore, a district court “is required to convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56 summary judgment motion when
resolution of the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case.”
Pringle v. United States,
208 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). A
jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case when “the
jurisdictional question requires resolution of an aspect of the substantive claim.”
Id.
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at 1223; See Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l
Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1292–93 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding that if “[t]here is
no overlap between the cause of action and the jurisdictional” question, it is
“appropriate for the district court to consider extra-pleading evidence in its resolution
of [a] Rule 12(b)(1) motion”); see also 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350 (4th ed. 2024) (“If, however, a decision of the
jurisdictional issue requires a ruling on the underlying substantive merits of the case,
the decision should await a determination of the merits either by the district court on
a summary judgment motion or by the fact finder at the trial.” (footnotes omitted)).
As the district court recognized, the merits question and jurisdictional question
entirely overlap in this instance. Consider what is actually in dispute. Knellinger
and Storey pleaded that the property at issue has some monetary value, which no one
contests. Nor is there any question that an uncompensated taking of valuable
property would be a “financial harm,” indeed a “classic pocketbook injury,”
sufficient to confer standing. Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 636–37
(2023). The only disagreement is whether Defendants took Plaintiffs’ property in the
first place. Although Plaintiffs would not have standing if Defendants did not take
their property, neither would they have a claim on the merits. That is why the district
court’s analysis of whether Plaintiffs alleged “an injury in fact” began and ended
with its analysis of whether they “sufficiently alleged ownership of the respective
property identified in the Complaint.” App’x at 204. The two questions are
inherently intertwined.
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We thus must decide whether to convert Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion
into a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a motion
for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1222.
Notwithstanding Defendants’ argument to the contrary, we do not read the district
court’s order as making any findings of fact relevant to the question before us.
Although the district court acknowledged Defendants’ factual contentions, the district
court relied only on the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint when it concluded that
they failed to plead an injury in fact. Therefore, as is the practice in this Circuit, we
construe Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).2 See Bell v. United States,
127 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th
Cir. 1997).
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. E.W. v. Health Net
Life Ins. Co., 86 F.4th 1265, 1280 (10th Cir. 2023). “At this initial stage, we take the
facts in the complaint as true,” Tyler,
598 U.S. at 636, and we view such facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, E.W.,
86 F.4th at 1280. Dismissal for failure to
state a claim “is appropriate only if the complaint . . . lacks enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
2
We would reach the same conclusions were we to deem Defendants’ motion
one for summary judgment under Rule 56, because there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendants took Plaintiffs’ property or the property of
other unrelated individuals named David Knellinger and Robert Storey, and because
Defendants have not demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
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III.
Having determined the correct standard of review, we conclude that the district
court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief. Knellinger and
Storey pleaded facts sufficient to state a plausible claim that Colorado took their
property for public use and did not compensate them for it, in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. As mentioned above, an uncompensated taking is a
classic example of a financial harm sufficient to confer standing. Tyler, 598 U.S.
at 636–37. Plaintiffs’ allegations are thus enough to maintain their claim for
monetary relief under § 1983, and enough for standing.
Under our Constitution, “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. When it is, the property owner
suffers a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S.
180, 185 (2019). “The Fifth Amendment right to full compensation arises at the time
of the taking, regardless of post-taking remedies that may be available to the property
owner.”
Id. at 190. Accordingly, the moment “the government takes . . . property
without paying for it,” the owner of such property “has an actionable Fifth
Amendment takings claim,” and “therefore may bring his claim in federal court under
§ 1983 at that time” without first seeking other state-law remedies. Id. at 185. What
counts as “property” depends both on existing “state law” and on “‘traditional
property law principles,’ plus historical practices and [Supreme Court] precedents.”
Tyler,
598 U.S. at 638 (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,
524 U.S. 156, 167
(1998)).
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In short, to make out a Takings Clause claim, a plaintiff must plead that:
(1) something was “taken” by the government; (2) it was “property”; (3) it was the
plaintiff’s property; and (4) it was taken “for public use, without just compensation.”
Plaintiffs pleaded facts sufficient to make plausible each of these elements.
Therefore, they sufficiently stated a Takings Clause claim.
First, Knellinger and Storey adequately pleaded that Colorado took property
for public use. In particular, they pleaded that Defendants reappropriated money
from the unclaimed property trust fund to pay public expenses. See App’x at 13, 19–
20. They thus alleged that Defendants took money from a trust fund that “is not
owned by the state,” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-13-803, and moved it into Colorado’s
coffers. Taking money that is not owned by the state and transferring it to state
ownership, for state use, is a quintessential taking.3
Next, Plaintiffs’ complaint also adequately pleaded that they were not
compensated for such taking. Plaintiffs alleged that they did not even receive notice
of the taking—much less compensation. That is why their complaint sought
“restitution of the proper value of their property.” App’x at 34; see id. (“To the
3
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants took their property even earlier, when
Colorado seized and took custody of the abandoned property. This presents the
question of whether a state may avoid a Takings Clause claim by defining ownership
such that a citizen remains the de jure “owner,” even if the state takes de facto
ownership. Cf. Tyler, 598 U.S. at 638 (recognizing that a state may not “sidestep the
Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests” or by “exclud[ing] from
its definition of property any interest that the state wished to take”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). At this stage, we need not reach that
question; we need only decide whether Plaintiffs had a cognizable Takings Clause
claim by the time they filed suit.
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extent that said Plaintiffs’ property was converted to public use, Plaintiffs are entitled
to just compensation . . . .”).
That leaves the question of whether Knellinger and Storey sufficiently alleged
that Defendants took their property, rather than someone else’s. We conclude that
Plaintiffs pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim that they owned the property at
issue. Knellinger pleaded that Defendants took property belonging to someone with
the name “DAVID KNELLINGER.” Id. at 10. Likewise, Storey pleaded that
Defendants took property belonging to someone with the name “STOREY
ROBERT E.” Id. at 11. They further pleaded that Colorado lists such property on its
unclaimed property website, and that Colorado provides value ranges to the property.
Knellinger and Storey pleaded that they have been Colorado residents subject to
Colorado’s unclaimed property scheme for the last decade. It is reasonable to infer
that the property listed on Colorado’s unclaimed property website belongs to
Plaintiffs. We therefore draw that reasonable inference in their favor.
The district court ruled otherwise. It concluded that Plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently allege ownership and thus dismissed their Takings Clause claim for lack
of standing. However, the district court made two errors in ruling against Knellinger
and Storey.
First, the district court drew improper inferences against Plaintiffs, instead of
drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. For instance, the district court
inferred that the property owned by “DAVID KNELLINGER” and “STOREY
ROBERT E” might belong to individuals with “similar names.” Id. at 204. But the
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names Knellinger and Storey are uncommon enough that it is reasonable to infer that
the David Knellinger and Robert Storey from whom Colorado took property are the
same individuals who filed this suit. The fact that Plaintiffs have both lived in
Colorado since 2013 further supports such an inference. It was thus improper for the
district court to draw a contrary inference against Plaintiffs.
Second, the district court imposed a de facto requirement that a plaintiff must
file an administrative claim with Colorado prior to proceeding in federal court. See
id. However, under Knick, it is clear that a property owner has no obligation to seek
a remedy through state administrative proceedings or through litigation in state court.
588 U.S. at 185. A property owner’s “right to full compensation” is not contingent
on “post-taking remedies that may be available.”
Id. at 190. Rather, that right vests
“when the government takes his property without just compensation.”
Id. at 185.
That is true even if an administrative proceeding—or state court discovery—could
yield additional facts helpful to a federal Takings Clause suit.4
4
Defendants invite us to go further than the district court, arguing that
Knellinger and Storey must not only file an administrative claim but have it approved
by the state. Aple. Br. at 20 (“Absent approved administrative claims establishing
their actual ownership of the property identified in the complaint at the outset of this
litigation, the ability to redress their alleged injuries in the later damages phase is
wholly ‘speculative.’”). Defendants would have us hold that, absent state approval,
Knellinger and Storey could sue only if they could provide proof that Colorado
denied their claim in bad faith. See id. at 38–39. In other words, Defendants appear
to argue that property owners must exhaust whatever administrative procedures a
state imposes and must receive state approval of their Takings Clause claims before
filing in federal court.
For the same reasons stated in our discussion of Knick, we decline Defendants’
invitation. A property owner’s compliance with state-imposed procedures is
immaterial to the determination of whether a taking occurred. See Knick,
588 U.S.
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We therefore disagree with the district court’s approach. Colorado’s
unclaimed property website lists the property it took as belonging to David
Knellinger and Robert Storey. The plaintiffs here, David Knellinger and Robert
Storey, live in Colorado, and have for many years. It is reasonable to infer that the
property is theirs. That is enough, at this stage, for their Takings Clause claims to
survive; it is not necessary for Plaintiffs to identify what piece of their property
Defendants allegedly took without their knowledge. Nor is it necessary for Plaintiffs
to plead the precise value of the property taken in order to avoid a motion to dismiss.
That is a question of precise damages for a much later stage.
Knellinger and Storey alleged that the property at issue in this case was theirs.
They also did so with adequate specificity under the circumstances. Because
Knellinger and Storey alleged facts sufficient to state a claim that Defendants, acting
on behalf of Colorado, took their property for public use without just compensation,
the district court erred in dismissing their Takings Clause claims.
IV.
While Plaintiffs’ monetary claims survive, their equitable claims do not share
the same fate. “As long as an adequate provision for obtaining just compensation
at 190 (“[N]o matter what sort of procedures the government puts in place to remedy
a taking, a property owner has a Fifth Amendment entitlement to compensation as
soon as the government takes his property without paying for it.”). Thus, a property
owner has “a claim for a violation of the Takings clause as soon as” Colorado takes
“his property for public use without paying for it.” Id. Consequently, an aggrieved
property owner would be able to “bring his claim in federal court under § 1983 at that
time.” Id. at 185.
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exists, there is no basis to enjoin the government’s action effecting a taking.” Id.
at 201; see id. at 202 (“Given the availability of post-taking compensation, barring
the government from acting will ordinarily not be appropriate.”). In this instance,
§ 1983 provides an adequate basis for Knellinger and Storey to obtain just
compensation for any taking. Because Knellinger and Storey may “pursue a suit for
compensation” under § 1983, they have “an adequate remedy at law,” and “equitable
relief is . . . unavailable.” Id. at 200–01.
Of course, if Colorado wishes to avoid defending against § 1983 suits for
unclaimed property, it may always decide voluntarily to revise its laws or practices
with respect to unclaimed property. For instance, Colorado may implement
administrative procedures designed to make just compensation more convenient or
timely compared to inverse-condemnation litigation. But the Fifth Amendment
describes a right to just compensation, not a right to particular procedures to secure
such compensation, so Knellinger and Storey have no ability to force Colorado to
compensate property owners through their procedure of choice. In other words, it is
the role of our Court to ensure just compensation, not to rewrite a state’s procedures
for obtaining it.5
5
Because the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ equitable claims, we
need not consider Defendants’ arguments that federal courts should abstain from
deciding such claims under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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V.
We express no opinion as to whether Knellinger and Storey should prevail on
the merits. The question of whether Defendants in fact took their property is not
before us at this stage of the litigation. Nor is the question of whether Knellinger and
Storey may bring suit on behalf of the proposed class. For now, all we decide is that
Plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants, acting on behalf of the state,
took their property for public use and without just compensation, and thus alleges a
violation of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. That alleged violation, in
turn, provides Plaintiffs with standing to sue. Because the district court ruled
otherwise, it erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under § 1983.
We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ equitable
claims, REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of their damages claims, and
REMAND to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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