Appellate Case: 24-6124 Document: 59 Date Filed: 04/09/2025 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
April 9, 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_____________________________________________
JOSHUA LAMLE, Co-Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Penelope Lamle; LEXY JOBE, Co-Personal Representative of the
Estate of Penelope Lamle; DAL
HOUSTON, Personal Representative
of the Estate of Maxine Houston,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
and
MARILYN GARRISON, by and
through Devra Boyd, next friend and
attorney-in-fact,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 24-6124
SUSAN EADS, individually; KEVIN
CORBETT, CEO of Oklahoma
Health Care Authority, in his
official capacity; and DEBORAH
SHROPSHIRE, Director of
Oklahoma Department of Human
Services,
Defendants - Appellees.
___________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00391-JD)
___________________________________________
Appellate Case: 24-6124 Document: 59 Date Filed: 04/09/2025 Page: 2
Michael Craig Riffel, Riffel, Riffel & Benham, P.L.L.C. (Katresa J. Riffel
with him on the briefs), Enid, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Daniel J. Card, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Human Services,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Josh Holloway, Deputy General Counsel,
Oklahoma Health Care Authority, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on
the briefs) for Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________________
Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and BACHARACH, Circuit
Judges.
___________________________________________
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
___________________________________________
Two elderly individuals (Ms. Penelope Lamle and Ms. Maxine
Houston) sued based on alleged irregularities in the processing of their
Medicaid applications. 1 In their suit, the applicants sought
an injunction ordering an expedited decision and payment of
Medicaid benefits and
damages from a state official.
The applicants died, and their estates were substituted as parties in the
appeal. The claim for an injunction became moot when the agency denied
benefits and the applicants died, and the state official can’t incur personal
liability because she has qualified immunity.
1
Ms. Marilyn Garrison also sued. But Ms. Garrison’s suit isn’t
involved in the appeal.
2
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Background
1. Two individuals apply for Medicaid.
Ms. Lamle and Ms. Houston applied for Medicaid. To be eligible,
they couldn’t have more than $2,000 in assets. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V); Okla. Admin. Code § 317:35-5-41(a). In
reviewing the applicants’ eligibility, a state agency (the Oklahoma
Department of Human Services) observed that the applicants had loaned
money to relatives. So the agency posed questions, allegedly at the
direction of an attorney (Ms. Susan Eads).
Ms. Lamle and Ms. Houston refused to answer the agency’s
questions. After learning of this refusal, Ms. Eads explained to Ms. Lamle
why the agency believed that it needed the information. In addition,
Ms. Eads allegedly threatened denial of benefits if the agency didn’t get
answers to the questions.
2. The applicants sue, but they die before the district court rules.
Ms. Lamle and Ms. Houston still declined to answer. Instead, they
sued, claiming that
the agencies had taken too long to process the applications and
Ms. Eads had directed the Oklahoma Department of Human
Services to pose impermissible questions and threatened denial
of benefits.
While the lawsuit was pending, the applications were denied.
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The district court entered a judgment for the defendants, dismissing
the action with prejudice based on the applicants’ failure to state a valid
claim. Unbeknownst to the court, however, the applicants had died while
the action was pending.
Discussion
1. The claims against the agencies became moot before the district
court ruled.
In an amended complaint, the applicants requested remedies
consisting of an order for the state agencies to
evaluate their Medicaid applications within 45 days of
submission and
pay the requested Medicaid benefits.
These requests became moot when the agency denied benefits and the
applicants died.
If the district court were to require evaluation within 45 days, the
relief would not help Ms. Lamle, Ms. Houston, or their estates because the
Oklahoma Department of Human Services had denied the applications
before the district court ruled. See Keller Tank Servs. II v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 854 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating that a case
is moot if granting relief will not “have some effect in the real world”).
Ms. Lamle and Ms. Houston also sought an injunction ordering
payment of benefits. But the estates for Ms. Lamle and Ms. Houston
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concede that the Eleventh Amendment bars this form of retrospective
relief. Appellants’ Opening Br. at 2; Appellants’ Reply Br. at 14.
On appeal, the applicants’ estates changed the desired remedy,
seeking a new timely decision without the need to answer the agency’s
questions. For the newly requested remedy, the estates argue that they can
still obtain meaningful relief: an order to reprocess the applications that
might result in a voluntary grant of the benefits.
But we consider mootness of the claims asserted in the amended
complaint, not theoretical claims that the applicants could have asserted.
See Lancaster v. Sec’y of the Navy, 109 F.4th 283, 289 (4th Cir. 2024)
(stating that “mootness hinges on the type of relief sought” in the
complaint). And in the amended complaint, the applicants requested
certification of eligibility and timely payment of benefits. Because these
requests became moot before the district court ruled, we can’t consider the
viability of a claim that the applicants might have pleaded instead. See
Harris v. City of Houston,
151 F.3d 186, 190–91 (5th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the claim in the complaint became moot even though
additional relief could remain viable); Williams v. McClellan,
569 F.2d
1031, 1032–33 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (concluding that a claim in the
complaint for an injunction against termination became moot when the
plaintiff was terminated even though she had argued on appeal that the
termination was unlawful); Melville v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Elections,
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462 F.2d 486, 487 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (concluding that a case
became moot when the claim for an injunction couldn’t yield meaningful
relief and the complaint hadn’t included a request for a declaratory
judgment).
In their reply brief, the estates concede that the applicants “asked for
an injunction certifying them eligible for Medicaid benefits with the State
of Oklahoma paying those benefits.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 12–13. But
the estates assert that the applicants “also pled and asked for an injunction
preventing [the agencies and their officials] from unlawfully processing
and evaluating their Medicaid applications.” Id. at 13. For this assertion,
the estates cite pages 22, 23, 28, and 29 of their appendix. These pages
contain no such allegation. To the contrary, these pages contain a request
for an injunction that would
order the agencies “to cease denying Medicaid coverage” to the
applicants,
order the agencies “to certify [the applicants] eligible for
Medicaid benefits,”
order the agencies “to pay Medicaid benefits,” and
order the agencies “to evaluate Medicaid applications within 45
days after receiving Medicaid applications.”
Appellant’s App’x at 28. These remedies could no longer yield any
meaningful relief.
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But the claim would remain moot even if we were to consider the
possibility that the agencies might voluntarily pay the requested benefits in
a new proceeding. A virtually identical argument appeared in Estate of
Schultz v. Brown, 846 F. App’x 689 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished). There
the applicant sought a fair Medicaid system, but died during the litigation.
Id. at 693. The estate argued that the claim hadn’t become moot because
the applicant had sought only “an impartial and legal review process”
rather than certification of eligibility for Medicaid benefits. Appellant’s
Reply Br. at 6–7, Est. of Schultz v. Brown, No. 20-6079 (10th Cir. Sept. 14,
2020); see also Appellant’s Opening Br. at 31–32, Est. of Schultz v. Brown,
No. 20-6079 (10th Cir. July 21, 2020) (similar argument). We held that
the applicant’s death had ended the “continuing or impending
harm required to pursue prospective relief” and
the estate had no independent injury that would permit
continuation of the suit on behalf of the applicant.
Est. of Schultz, 846 F. App’x at 693.
The same is true here, and the factual similarity renders Estate of
Schultz persuasive. See Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir.
2010) (concluding that an unpublished Tenth Circuit opinion was
persuasive because its facts were “very similar to the case at bar”). The
request for a reevaluation of the Medicaid applications became moot with
the deaths of Ms. Lamle and Ms. Houston because their injuries had ended
without any chance of reoccurring. Est. of Schultz, 846 F. App’x at 695.
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And even if the state agencies were to reconsider the applications for
Ms. Lamle and Ms. Houston, we couldn’t require payment of benefits.
Granted, the agencies could voluntarily pay benefits. But the agencies
don’t need an order to voluntarily pay the benefits. As a result, injunctive
relief would no longer benefit the estates.
The resulting question involves the appropriate disposition. The
disposition in district court was a judgment of dismissal with prejudice.
Because mootness is jurisdictional, however, this dismissal should have
been without prejudice. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1179 (10th
Cir. 2016). So we remand with instructions to (1) vacate the judgment on
the claim for a prospective injunction and (2) dismiss this claim without
prejudice. See
id. (remanding with instructions to vacate a judgment and
order dismissal without prejudice because the suit had become moot prior
to the district court’s final adjudication).
2. Ms. Eads enjoys qualified immunity.
The applicants also sued Ms. Eads in her individual capacity. In the
amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Ms. Eads had
participated in processing the applications,
told the Oklahoma Department of Human Services to pose
impermissible questions, and
threatened denial of benefits for failing to respond to the
questions.
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For the sake of argument, we can assume that Ms. Eads had violated the
Constitution through these alleged actions.
With this assumption, Ms. Eads urged dismissal based on qualified
immunity. 2 To avoid dismissal, the applicants needed to allege facts that
would plausibly show the violation of a clearly established right. Robbins
v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir.
2008). A violation would be clearly established only if “every reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Colbruno v.
Kessler,
928 F.3d 1155, 1160–61 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting District of
Columbia v. Wesby,
583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Generally, “[t]he plaintiff must show there is a Supreme Court
or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains.” Id. at 1161.
The estates present no case law or other support, and the applicants
didn’t allege that Ms. Eads had participated in the decision to deny
benefits. Instead, the applicants alleged only that Ms. Eads
2
The district court didn’t discuss the claim against Ms. Eads in her
personal capacity. Given the lack of discussion, the estates argue that
Ms. Eads can’t defend the dismissal based on qualified immunity. The
estates are mistaken: Ms. Eads can urge us to affirm based on any ground
supported in the record. GF Gaming Corp. v. City of Black Hawk, 405 F.3d
876, 882 (10th Cir. 2005).
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had directed the Oklahoma Department of Human Services to
ask impermissible questions and
had told the applicants that a refusal to answer would lead to a
denial of benefits.
These allegations don’t plausibly indicate the violation of a clearly
established right.
The estates rely on Rose v. Brown, 14 F.4th 1129 (10th Cir. 2021).
But Rose held only that a triable fact-issue existed on eligibility for
Medicaid.
Id. at 1131–40. The Court said nothing to suggest that a state
official would violate the Constitution by participating in the processing of
the applications, directing an agency to ask impermissible questions, or
telling applicants that a refusal to answer those questions would result in a
denial of benefits. Given the lack of a clearly established constitutional
violation, Ms. Eads was entitled to qualified immunity.
…
We remand to the district court to (1) vacate the judgment of
dismissal with prejudice on the claim for a prospective injunction and (2)
dismiss this claim without prejudice based on mootness. For Ms. Eads,
however, we affirm the dismissal with prejudice because she is entitled to
qualified immunity on the claim for damages.
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