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← 134 FSUPP 313 - Dodson v. Sisco

Dodson v. Sisco’s Empirical Analysis

1955

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
4
states following
March 1995
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently March 1995

2 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

4019551960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. De Maison · Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"`The original permittee who has been given permission to use the automobile but had been expressly forbidden to delegate this authority cannot do so, and the use of the car by the second permittee in violation of the named insured's express order is not within the protection of the policy.'" (p. 332.)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[W]e return to the language of the omnibus clause in the Hartford policy . (the Hartford omnibus clause) which is said by Allstate to have afforded coverage for [the] second permittee . under the following language, to wit, ‘any other person using such automobile with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission ’ (an actual operation omnibus clause). The terms ‘use ’ and ‘operation ’ are not synonymous and in this setting are words of quite different meaning. ‘For the “use" of an automobile by an individual involves its employment for some purpose or object of the user while its “operation ” by him involves his direction and control of its mechanism as its driver for the purpose of propelling it as a vehicle.’ Thus, as employed in an omnibus clause ‘use’ is a term of much broader scope and application than ‘operate’ or ‘drive,’ and conversely the latter terms are of narrower and more restricted meaning. Although one who operates an automobile obviously uses it, one can use an automobile without operating it. The omnibus clause in some earlier policies extended coverage upon the use, rather than the actual use, of the automobile by the named insured or with his permission. However, it appears that for many years the then ‘standard’ omnibus clause extended coverage to ‘any person while using the automobile provided the actual use of the automobile is by the nam”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The initial permission given by the named assured to the original permittee includes, according to the better view, the use of the automobile by the second permittee where in doing so the second permittee serves some purpose, benefit, or advantage of the first permittee.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.