Tawzer v. McAdam’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Where determination of the main issue of fact must largely depend upon the credence to be accorded to the testimony of a litigant who is the principal witness in his own behalf, a wider range of cross-examination should be allowed than is commonly permitted in the cross-examination of witnesses in general.” (Syl. 12.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kelly v. Meyer · Wood v. McKeever

2. ““The statute [60-2911] which provides for the seclusion of the jury from all communication with any person other than their own membership is quite strict and specific.' “The only pertinent exception to the foregoing statutory rule deals with the jury’s possible desire to be further informed on the law or the evidence, in which case the jury should be brought into court and counsel for the litigants notified and given an opportunity to attend, [p. 599] “In view of these statutory provisions it was altogether irregular for the presiding judge to go to the jury room and hold conversation with members of that body while they were deliberating on their verdict. It was highly improper to do so touching any aspect of the case under consideration in the absence of counsel for the litigants. The law books are laden with decisions holding that such departure from correct practice constitutes reversible error, [p. 600.] “. . . the jurors could hardly fail to be influenced by the judge’s conversation with them on that point in the jury room. This court therefore feels bound to hold that the incident complained of was prejudicially erroneous.” (p. 601.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Howard v. Miller

3. ““It is no answer to defendants’ complaint touching the restrictions placed upon the cross-examination of plaintiff to say that the questions sought to elicit matters not touched on in plaintiff’s direct examination. The case was bound to turn largely on the credence the jury would attach to the testimony of plaintiff. For that reason defendants were entitled to discredit plaintiff’s testimony in his own behalf by a searching cross-examination—if they could. (McIntosh v. Oil Co., 89 Kan. 289 , 131 Pac. 151 , 47 L. R. A., n. s., 730 and note; Zinn v. Updegraff, 113 Kan. 25 , 213 Pac. 816 ; Reeser v. Hammond, 122 Kan. 695 , 253 Pac. 233 .) It is a salutary rule of trial practice that when a party is a witness in his own behalf, and where the issues of fact must largely turn on the credence which the triers of fact will give to his testimony, the fullest inquiry should be permitted on cross-examination to discover not only the accuracy of his understanding, but his memory and his credibility as well. To that end he may be cross-examined on collateral matters which may throw light upon the matters in issue.’’ (Italics supplied.) (p. 603.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kelly v. Meyer