¶1*125The following opinion was filed November 5, 1907:
¶2
¶3It is further contended that the account appearing in the record is not in compliance with sec. 677, Stats. (1898), and therefore the county board was without jurisdiction to act on the claim. Sec. 676, Stats. (1898), provides that no action shall be brought or maintained against a county upon any account, demand, or cause of action when the only relief demandahle is a judgment for money; and sec. 677 provides, in effect, that any persons having a claim against a county shall make a statement thereof in writing setting out the nature of the claim and all facts upon which it is founded, and, if the claim be an account, the items thereof separately, the nature of each, and the time expended in the performance of any services charged for when no specific fees are allowed therefor by law, and, where the claim is for mileage, the statement must specify dates and places so as to show between what points the travel was had and for what purpose. It seems quite clear that by this legislation a difference between an account and a demand was contemplated, and that the legislature intended that only accounts or claims in the nature of accounts should be itemized, and that a claim for a fee of a physician for performance of a post-mortem examination under sec. 4870, Stats. (1898), is not an account required to be itemized by sec. 677. This we think is quite apparent from the nature of the services to be performed by the physician. Originally he was allowed a fee as a witness, but by amendment to the statute, which is embodied in sec. 4870, he is to receive, instead of witness fees, such reasonable compensation as may be allowed by the county hoard of supervisors, not less than $5 for each examination. As will be seen from an examination of the claim set out in the statement of facts, the services performed are quite specifically detailed, and as much so as could well be expected even if *127claimant were required to make a statement in tbe form of an accpunt. We think this claim sufficiently complied with the statute to give the county board jurisdiction.
¶4The cases relied upon by counsel for appellant are where the claims were accounts consisting of a long list of items. Hence it was necessary under the statute that the items be stated separately, the nature of each, and the time expended in the performance of the services charged for. But every claim or demand is not an account, though every account is a claim. Stringham v. Winnebago Co. 24 Wis. 594; Grimm v. Jefferson Co. 62 Wis. 572, 22 N. W. 857. The object of the legislature in the provisions with reference to accounts was plainly to bring before the county board such information as would enable it to examine intelligently and eliminate improper charges and thus detect abuses in the allowance of claims. Northern T. Co. v. Snyder, 113 Wis. 516, 89 N. W. 460.
¶5
“Such physicians and surgeons so subpoenaed shall, instead of witness' fees, receive such reasonable compensation as may be allowed by the county board of supervisors, provided that such additional compensation shall not be less than five dollars for each examination.”
¶6It is claimed that this section vests in the county board power to fix the fee subject only to the limitation of $5. The question presented under this head involves the construction of this statute. It seems the legislature had in mind that the physicians and surgeons so subpoenaed should be paid reasonable compensation for their services in lieu of witness fees, which under the former statute they received. True, the legislature provided that such reasonable compensation shall be allowed by the county board. But did the legislature *128mean, tbat the county board might fix the compensation 'for the services at an unreasonable amount and such allowance be not subject to review? If so-, then the phrase “such reasonable compensation” is surplusage and without effect in the statute. We cannot think that the legislature had any such purpose in mind, but, on the contrary, intended what the ordinary meaning of the words import, namely, that tire physicians and surgeons performing such services should receive reasonable compensation for their services. Nor can we see any sound reason for a different construction. To require the performance of such services for such compensation as the county board might allow, though one half or one third what such services were reasonably worth, would seem to be out of harmony with the letter and spirit of the statute. Dane Co. v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585. Moreover, see. 683, Stats. (1898), providing for an appeal to the circuit court from the disallowance in whole or in part of any claim by the county board, seems clearly to cover the case before us. If so, then no reason is perceived why a person appealing in such a case should not be entitled to a review the same as in any other appeal from the decision of the county board. We think the appeal provided for brings the whole matter before the circuit court for review and determination unhampered by the determination of the county board. Under the Iowa statute, quite similar to our own, the supreme court of that state held that a physician making a post-mortem examination by direction of the coroner was entitled to reasonable compensation for his services, and, if the allowance made by the board was not reasonable, the physician might maintain an action to recover reasonable compensation for his services against the county. Moser v. Boone Co. 91 Iowa, 359, 59 N. W. 39. And in Stone v. Marion Co. 78 Iowa, 14, 42 N. W. 570, it was held that a statute providing for the employment of ,an attorney to- assist the district attorney, and that such assistant employed shall be allowed a reasonable *129compensation for bis services -to be fixed by tbe board of supervisors, does not render tbe decision of tbe county board final as to tbe amount to be allowed, but, if an unreasonably small sum be fixed, proper compensation may be recovered by action against tbe county. Tbe court below found tbe amount allowed unreasonable, and tbe finding is well supported by tbe evidence. In fact no evidence was offered to tbe contrary.
¶7
¶8
¶9It follows that the judgment below must be affirmed.
¶10By the Gourt. — The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
¶11A motion for a rehearing was denied January 8, 1908.'