Magee’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

cited by 28 later decisions

January 2011

most recently cited

11 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently January 2011 · most notably 280 F. Supp. 2d 919 - South Dakota Ex Rel. South Dakota Railroad Authority v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. (2003), 33 F. Supp. 2d 1117 - Graff v. Qwest Communications Corp. (1999)

11 district ·

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California · Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams · Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Taylor · Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis · Gaming Corporation of America v. Dorsey & Whitney Dorsey & Whitney

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

“[C]ongressional intent is the touchstone of the complete preemption analysis. We must determine whether Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make a cause of action pleaded under state law removable to federal court, see Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 66 , 107 S.Ct. at 1547-48 , mindful that in the ordinary case federal preemption is merely a defense to a plaintiffs lawsuit, see id. at 63 , 107 S.Ct. at 1546.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
e.g. 327 F. Supp. 2d 1022 - Arnold v. First Greensboro Home Equity Inc. · 453 F. Supp. 2d 1104 - Connolly v. Union Pacific R. Co.
“The credit buyers never moved to remand this case to state court, nor do they question federal jurisdiction on appeal. A plaintiff has only thirty days after a defendant files a notice of removal to move for remand “on the basis of any defect in removal procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (1994); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 69 , 117 S.Ct. 467, 473 , 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996). Lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, however, cannot be waived, and we may raise the issue ourselves even if the parties do not. See Berger Levee Dist. v. United States, 128 F.3d 679, 680 (8th Cir.1997); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action”).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
e.g. 92 F. Supp. 2d 891 - Foslip Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Metabolife International, Inc.
“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant. Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is required. The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
e.g. 280 F. Supp. 2d 919 - South Dakota Ex Rel. South Dakota Railroad Authority v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.