135 Ill. 2d 252 - People v. Redd’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

235 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 237 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"If a prior inconsistent statement is to be admitted in Illinois *** as substantive evidence against a defendant, the statement must meet the requirements set out by the General Assembly in section 115 — 10.1. If the prior statement fails to meet these requirements, it is not admissible as substantive evidence.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 276 Ill. App. 3d 466 - People v. McDonald · 333 Ill. App. 3d 622 - People v. Smith

2. “"The privilege against self-incrimination does not exist where there are no reasonable grounds to fear self-incrimination. [Citation.] Neither an unreasonable fear of self-incrimination nor a mere reluctance to testify is a ground for claiming the privilege. [Citation.] Furthermore, the mere 'say-so’ of a witness 'does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.’ (Hoffman v. United States (1951), 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 95 L. Ed. 1118, 1124 , 71 S. Ct. 814, 818 .) Once a witness asserts his fifth amendment privilege not to incriminate himself, then 'it is for the circuit court to determine if under the particular facts there is a real danger of incrimination.’ [Citations.]” (Redd, 135 Ill. 2d at 304 , 553 N.E.2d at 339 .)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 264 Ill. App. 3d 197 - People v. Taylor

3. ““Ordinarily a witness is regarded as ‘subject to cross-examination’ when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions. Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations on the scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the process to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer exists. But that effect is not produced by the witness’s assertion of memory loss — which, as discussed earlier, is often the very result sought to be produced by cross-examination, and can be effective in destroying the force of the prior statement.” Owens 484 U.S. at 561-62 , 98 L. Ed. 2d at 959 , 108 S. Ct. at 844 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 387 Ill. App. 3d 206 - People v. Hampton