135 Md. App. 615 - Blankenship v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2000
Citation profile
6
cited by 6 later decisions
3
states following
July 2010
most recently cited
6 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Duncan v. State · Winston v. State · State v. Blondin · 10 Mass. App. Ct. 618 - Commonwealth v. Carter · Fleeger v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“If two defendants receive identical sentences for similar crimes, it is the self-evident purpose of Sect. 638C(a) that the indigent prisoner who could not make bail not serve more time (pre-sentence incarceration plus post-sentence incarceration) than the more affluent prisoner who did make bail (post-sentence incarceration only). It is, moreover, clear that the Legislature contemplated a practical one-day-for-one-day method of reckoning. If a defendant has suffered 85 days of pre-sentence incarceration, for instance, he will serve 85 fewer days of actual incarceration pursuant to his sentence or aggregate sentences of incarceration. The State mil not be permitted to deny a defendant his credit for time served by applying it to one concurrent sentence but not to another. It is more than a “paper” credit. If the prisoner had been in jail for 85 days prior to being sentenced, he would be entitled to walk out of jail 85 days sooner, even on multiple concurrent sentences. Nash v. State, 69 Md.App. 681, 691-93 [ 519 A.2d 769 , cert. denied, 309 Md. 326 , 523 A.2d 1013 ] (1987). By the same token, the defendant is not entitled to double or triple or quadruple credit for time served in the case of consecutive sentences. The defendant is entitled to a single credit against the aggregate sentence, not to multiple credits against each and every constituent segment of that aggregate. The elemental equation is one actual day for one actual day, and the paper shuffling of multiple sentenc”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“On the facts of Fleeger, the problem was that of giving Fleeger “as much credit as possible” up to and hopefully including 100% credit for his pre-sentence incarceration actually served. What was before the Court in Fleeger did not in any way involve a claim of entitlement to 200% credit or 900% credit for the pre-sentence incarceration and the Court of Appeals was not even giving thought to such a nonexistent issue. The use of the phrase “as much credit as possible” by the Court of Appeals simply will not, therefore, carry the semantic weight urged by the appellant. The appellant here, of course, received 100% credit for the 238 days he served of pre-sentence incarceration. That is as much credit as the “as much credit as possible” language of Fleeger ever contemplated. Although the issue is one of first impression in Maryland, our resolution of it is in line with the undeviating resolution of the same issue by our sister states under virtually identical “credit for time served” statutes.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.