135 N.J. Super. 154 - State v. Russell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The precise question here presented, that is, whether a defendant can be identified by name only where his identity is not otherwise in apparent dispute, has not been dealt with by our courts nor, apparently, by any other jurisdiction with the exception of Indiana, which has consistently held such form of identification to be sufficient under circumstances similar to those here. See State v. Schroeppel, 240 Ind. 185 , 162 N.E.2d 683 (Sup.Ct.1959); Preston v. State, 259 Ind. 353 , 287 N.E.2d 347 (Sup.Ct.1972); Stevenson v. State [ 162 Ind.App. 222 ] 318 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ind.App.1974) (not yet officially reported). The Indiana rule is based upon the assumption that defendant is, in fact, in court during the trial, as required by Indiana practice, and its application apparently requires that a state’s witness has testified to circumstances evidencing his personal knowledge of who the defendant is, i.e., that the person apprehended and the person charged and the person whose name he refers to as defendant and the person present in the courtroom are, in fact, all one and the same. From such testimony the trier of the fact clearly may draw the inference that the named defendant is in fact the offender. See Evid.R. 1(2). This court agrees with the soundness of the Indiana rule and the appropriateness of its application here. [Id. 135 N.J.Super at 157-158]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Bain