McGahey v. State of Virginia’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

45 federal appellate · 10 district · 71 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 219 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ First, That the provisions of the act of 1871 constitute a contract between the'State of Yirginia and the lawful holders of the bonds and coupons issued under and in pursuance of said statute; “ Second, That the various acts of the General Assembly of Yirginia passéd for the purpose of restraining the use of said coupons for the. payment of taxes and other dues to the State, and imposing impediments and obstructions to that use, and to the proceedings instituted for establishing their genuineness, do in many respects impair the obligation of that contract, and cannot be held to be valid or binding in so far as they have that effect; Third, That no proceedings can be instituted by any holder of said bonds or coupons against the Commonwealth of Yirginia, either directly by suit against the Commonwealth by name, or indirectly against her executive officers to,control them • in the exercise of their official functions as agents of the State; “ Fourth, That any. lawful holder of the tax-receivable cou;pons of the State, issued under the act of 1871 or the subsequent act of 1879, who tenders such coupons in payment of taxes, debts, dues and demands due from him to the State, and. continues to hold himself ready to tender the same in payment thereof, is entitled to be free from molestation in person ■ or goods on account of such taxes, debts, dues or demands, and may vindicate such right in all lawful modes of redress, — by suit to recover his property, by suit against the officer”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pennoyer v. McConnaughy · Belknap v. Schild

2. “"... But if they were not paid at maturity the alternative right was given to the holder of them to use them in the payment of taxes, debts, dues and demands due to the State. The very nature of the case shows that such an application of the coupons could not be made immediately or in any very short period of time. If all the bonds were of the denomination of one thousand dollars each, it would require twenty thousand of them to make up the funded debt of twenty millions of dollars. These twenty thousand bonds would be likely to be scattered and dispersed through many States and countries, and it would be impracticable for the holders of them to use the coupons which the State- should fail to pay in cash, in the alternative manner stipulated for in the con-, tract, unless they had a reasonable time to dispose of them to taxpayers.” (Emphasis added.) And at page 708: “The only way in which they (non-resident bondholders) could, within the year prescribed, utilize their coupons, the accumulation perhaps of years, would be to sell and dispose of them to the taxpayers. How this could be done, especially in view of the onerous laws which were passed with regard to the sale of coupons in the State, it is difficult to see. Under all the circumstances of the case, and the peculiar condition of the securities in question, we are compelled to say that in our opinion the law is an unreasonable law and that it does materially impair the obligation of the contract. ’ ’ Moreover, the court”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 27 Cal. 2d 61 - Rand v. Bossen

3. “It ignores the difference between, the statute and the contract, and confuses the two entirely distinct matters of' construction and validity. The statute precedes the contract. Its scope and meaning must be determined before any question will arise as to the validity of the contract which it authorizes. .It is elementary law that every statute is to be read in the light of the Constitution. However broad and general, its language, it cannot be inter-' preted as extending beyond those matters which it was within the constitutional power of the legislature to reach. It is the same rule which obtains in the interpretation of any private' contract between individuals. .That, whatever may be its words, is always to be construed in the light óf the statute; of the law then in force; of the circumstances and conditions of parties. So, although general language was introduced into the statute of 1871, it is not to be read as reaching to matters in respect to which the legislature had no constitutional power, but only as to those matters within its control. And if there were, as it seems there were, certain special taxes and dues which under the existing provisions of the state constitution could not -be affected by legislative action, the statute is to be read as though it in terms excluded them from its operation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Employers' Liability Cases