¶1dissenting:
¶2I am unable to concur in the decision of the majority in this case, and in order to state my views on the questions involved, file this dissent.
¶3The majority opinion holds that the Legislature has constitutional power to provide for the sale of land forfeited to the State, or land sold by the sheriff, purchased by the State,' and which has become irredeemable, in the judicial proceeding required by Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution of this State,' without making the former owner, in whose name the property was forfeited or sold, a party to the proceeding, and that it has properly exer*220cised such power. After mature study, I am of the opinion that it does not possess such power.
¶4In Sims v. Fisher, 125 W. Va. 512, 25 S. E. 2d 216, we held that Section 4 of Article XIII required that the proceeding provided for therein to sell land, the title to which had become vested in the State, must be a judicial proceeding “requiring process or notice in advance of hearing”, which, necessarily, involved the naming of some person or persons upon whom notice could be had, a process issued, and service thereof, and that there must be a judicial finding in such proceeding that the land was subject to sale. Apparently, at that time, it was never questioned that the Legislature had the power, if it desired to exercise it, to require the naming of former owners, or other interested persons, as parties defendant to such proceeding, and the service of process on such persons, if within the jurisdiction of the court, and to provide for other character of notice if they were not within the jurisdiction of the court before whom the proceeding should be instituted. That case was followed by State v. Farmers Coal Co., 130 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 2d 625, in which we held as unenforceable a statute which did not provide a definite period for redemption after a forfeiture, or after a sale by a sheriff, and purchase by the State, beyond which the land became irredeemable, and subject to sale under Section 4 of Article XIII aforesaid. This brought about a new Act which did provide.a certain fixed date subsequent to such forfeiture or sale, when such land became irredeemable, at which time any interest in the land on the part of the former owner, or those holding under him, ended and the absolute title to the land involved became vested in the State. Subsequent to this decision, this Court decided the cases of State v. Blevins, 131 W. Va. 350, 48 S. E. 2d 174; and State v. Gray, 132 W. Va. 472, 52 S. E. 2d 759.
¶5But, the Blevinscase and the Graycase were decided under the provisions of Chapter 160, Acts of the Legislature, 1947, Section 11 of which required the naming as *221parties defendants the former owner in whose name the land was forfeited or sold as the case might be; and Section 12 required the issuance of summons against such named defendants in a form prescribed, and that “The summons shall be served on the named defendants in the manner provided by law for the service of process in other chancery suits.” It will be observed that only the former owners were required to be named as defendants, and the section then provided for the publication of a notice, in the form of an order of publication, as to persons who might have some other type of interest in the land involved and who were not named defendants. But, after making what I contend was a mandatory réquirement, Section 12 ends with the following:
“… £ke Legislature deems it both expedient and necessary to provide that failure to name any such person as a defendant, or failure to serve the summons on any named defendant, shall in no wise affect the validity of any of the proceedings in the suit for the sale of the state’s title to such land.”
¶6In the Graycase, notice of this inconsistency is taken, and a majority of the Court held that service of process was required, where it could be had, notwithstanding the inconsistent provision of the Act. It is now proposed to change this ruling and to hold that the first provision of Section 12 which provides that such process “shall be served on the named defendants” means nothing, and that the nullifying provision at the end of the section controls and shall foe given full force and effect.
¶7In my opinion, if we adopt, as I think we must, the theory that the State, being absolute owner of land which has become irredeemable, either from forfeiture or sale, it follows that it has power to dictate the terms upon which its own property may be sold, so long as the requirements of due process of law aré observed, and, heretofore, until the enactment of Chapter 134, Acts of the Legislature, 1949, has always elected to require that the former owner be made a party to the judicial proceeding *222provided for by Section 4 of Article XIII of our Constitution. Admittedly, under the 1949 Act this is.no longer required. But, this suit was instituted and prosecuted under the provisions of Chapter 160, Acts of the Legislature, 1947, and, in my opinion, the Legislature of 1949 had no constitutional power to enact legislation affecting rights which had been provided for by the very legislation under which this suit was instituted and prosecuted. Certainly the State had the power to require service of process on the former owner, and so long as the legislation which made that requirement is in force and effect, officers of the State, and the courts of the State should be bound thereby. Where a suit or action is instituted under existing legislation, the parties thereto are entitled to have the case determined as the law was at the date either was instituted. The rules of the game cannot be changed while the game is in progress, and for this reason I do not think that the 1949 legislation should be considered in the case at bar.
¶8Section 5 of Article XIII of our Constitution provides that upon timely application therefor, the former owner is entitled to the proceeds from the sale of any land sold under the judicial proceeding required by Section 4 of said Article, remaining after the payment of taxes and a proportionate share of the costs of the proceeding. This right has been held not to be an interest in land, but personal property, Wiant v. Hays, 38 W. Va. 681, 18 S. E. 807, McClure v. Maitland, 24 W. Va. 561, and does not amount to an interest in land. It is not a redemption provision because to so hold would be in conflict with Section 4, which, as we have held, requires the land involved to have become irredeemable, and the title thereto to be absolutely in the State before the proceeding to sell the land can be instituted. Therefore, any idea that Section 5 is, in legal effect, a redemption provision must be cast aside. But the right to this excess is a constitutional right, and a property right, Wiant v. Hays, supra,if asserted within two years after sale as required by the Constitution, and it seems entirely fitting that the Legis*223lature should deem it wise, proper and fair to make the former owner a party to the suit, to the end that he might protect his right to such excess. The 1947 Act prohibits the former owner from purchasing the land formerly owned by him, and the only possible manner in which he can protect his interests is by filing a petition asking that the excess be paid to him. This provision against the purchase 'by the former owner was upheld in State v. Blevins, supra. This right to the excess, being a constitutional right, and one which the Legislature could not destroy, it was apparently in recognition of that right that all Legislatures, prior to 1949, considered it fair, and perhaps necessary, to require that the former owners be named as defendants and be served with process where such process could be had within the jurisdiction of the court, and to publish notice to those outside such jurisdiction, or unknown persons who might have some interest in the land involved.
¶9Aside from these considerations, if the land which has become irredeemable, and the absolute property ■ of the State, could be sold without making former owners parties to the proceeding required under Section 4 of Article XIII of our Constitution, then it has the power, through the Legislature, to prescribe the manner in which such property should be sold, and it has heretofore done so by requiring that former owners be named as parties defendant and served with process. Having so enacted, there would seem to be no reason why the Legislature’s will should not be made effective. Apparently the Legislature has enacted a statute, Section 12 of Chapter 160, Acts of the Legislature, 1947, which in one breath says that named parties, who are former owners, should be served with process as in other chancery suits, and by other language, in the same section, provides that failure to do so will not affect the validity of the proceeding. Given the construction that the later provision nullifies, in effect, the first, then the Act of 1949 was wholly unnecessary and the amazing attempt of the Legislature to legislate upon the intentions of a former Legislature, *224made up, in part, of different members, need not have been resorted to in order to correct or nullify the effect of the failure or refusal of the deputy commissioners of forfeited and delinquent lands in the various counties to carry out a duty to secure the service of process on named defendants within the jurisdiction of the court, as plainly required by the statute.
¶10I do not believe that we should hold that the Legislature ever intended to relieve the State of the duty of serving process on named defendants, who were the former owners of the land sought to be sold, where such process could be had within the State. Section 11 made mandatory the requirement that the former owners should be named as defendants, and Section 12 plainly requires that they should be served with process the same as in other chancery suits, and this, I think, was its paramount purpose. The Legislature of 1947 was composed of sensible men, and in requiring such service of process it was merely following former- legislation, and long continued custom, in -requiring that former owners be made parties and served with process, if within the jurisdiction of the court, in suits seeking to dispose of land formerly owned by them, and in which they still had an interest to the extent of having a right to the excess provided by Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. I have no doubt that the Legislature was in good faith in making this requirement, because it conforms to fairness, and furnishes the former owner another opportunity to save his land in this indirect way. I think the Legislature felt that mistakes or inadvertences, following an honest attempt to secure process, should not be allowed to affect the validity of any of the proceedings as to those not affected by such mistakes or inadvertences. Whether that provision meant the proceedings as to a person not served, or the proceedings as a whole, I do not know. The use of the word “inadvertence” is criticized but its meaning, as used in the Graycase, was intended to cover errors which might creep into any proceeding covering a number of individuals, and different lots and parcels of land. What*225ever we may say about the use of language, it must be apparent to everyone, that what the Legislature intended was that there should be service of process. Giving Section 12 the interpretation contended for by the State, the provision in respect to process need not have been written, and it is scarcely conceivable that the Legislature intended to go to the extent of prescribing the language of the summons, and requiring it to be served in the manner provided by law for the service in other chancery suits, and at the very end of the section provide that such failure to do so should not affect the proceeding. I think the probable intent was that the proceeding as a whole should not be affected. I am quite certain that it was not intended that the requirement of the service of process should be absolutely ignored, as was done in this case, the result of which has been to engulf the life savings of an innocent purchaser, not the former owner, upon whom the duty rested to pay his taxes. We had this question before us in State v. Gray, supra,and we there held, in effect, and it may be by way of permissible dicta in the circumstances, that it was the mandatory duty that the State have process served on former owners, if found within the jurisdiction of the court.
¶11After the decision in State v. Blevins, supra,and probably before that decision, a large number of suits were, or had been, instituted to sell lands in the various counties of the State which were forfeited or delinquent and sold in those counties. Apparently the deputy commissioners of forfeited and delinquent lands ignored, in some instances, their plain duty, and did not take the trouble to have process served on resident named defendants. When the Graycase was decided there was an immediate outcry, resulting in the Legislature, which was then in session, passing Chapter 134, Acts of 1949, in which they undertook to legislate the intention of the Legislature of 1947, in enacting Section 12 of Chapter 160, Acts of that session. The holding in the Graycase on Section 12 was given mature consideration at that time, not only because the provision of the act as to service of process *226seemed fair and advisable from every standpoint, but because it was a plain, and as I believe, a mandatory requirement. I regret that it is now deemed advisable to change the decision there reached. I see no reason why that decision should be disturbed. Ira the first instance, I think the Legislature plainly intended that process should be served when possible to do so on named defendants, and in the second place, I do not think it within the range of probabilities that any Legislature would do the futile thing of making a requirement of the service of process in one section, and end the same section by providing that the failure to do so should not affect the proceeding as to former owners residing within the jurisdiction of the court and not served with process. At the very most, it was intended to protect the proceeding as a whole, but not to lay the foundation for a decree affecting the interest of a person who was the former owner, required to be named as defendant, and required to be, but not served with process. If the failure of the deputy commissioner to carry out his plain statutory duty creates confusion with respect to land titles in the State, neither the Legislature nor this Court is to be blamed for such a situation. The State, through its Legislature, had a right to prescribe the method of procedure in a suit to sell its own property under Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution. The fact that it may not have been required to make the former owners parties defendant need not be considered. It had the power to prescribe this procedure. It had no constitutional power to change the procedure, .and make such change effective to cover suits already instituted before the change was made. The decisions of this Court will, I think, be searched in vain to find a case where procedural changes are made to apply to legislation pending at the time the change is made. Statutes of limitation and other kindred statutes, being procedural in their nature, are often changed, but they are not made to apply to pending legislation, or permitted to take effect until those who would be prejudiced thereby are given a • reasonable time in which to protect themselves. In my *227opinion the Act of 1949 was entirely beyond the constitutional power of the Legislature. What the 1947 Legislature intended must be arrived at from what that Legislature said and not by what a future Legislature, by solemn enactment, conceived that intention to be.
¶12In the brief filed by counsel for the State, it is tacitly admitted that deputy commissioners of forfeited and delinquent land throughout the State have not, in suits instituted under Chapter 160, Acts of 1947, followed the requirements of Section 12 thereof in relation to the service of process on named defendant residents within the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, and point to the confusion which will arise from sustaining the ruling of the trial court in the suit now before us, in that a great many sales would necessarily have to be set- aside, resulting in unsettled titles to numerous tracts and parcels of land. All this may be true; but, the confusion which may result from affirming the ruling of the circuit court would be trivial, as compared to that which may result from a holding that in decreeing a sale of forfeited and delinquent lands without service of process on the former owner, so far as that process can be obtained within the jurisdiction of the courts, constitutes lack of due process of law. When the Legislature of this State, considering both Sections 4 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution, enacted a statute which, as interpreted by this Court, permits the sale of such lands without personal service on the former owner, who has a property interest in the proceeds to be derived from the sale of the land formerly owned by him, then is raised the question of due process of law required by both our State and Federal Constitutions. It is a question in which the judgment of this Court is not final because of the federal question involved, and there is grave doubt whether, under the provisions of the-Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting any State from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, due process and equal protection *228of law has been afforded the former owner by the majority opinion. Of course, our own Constitution, Section 10 of Article III, provides that: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers.”
¶13Perhaps the one case which is considered as a final judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States on our forfeited and delinquent land laws is King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404. This was a case where the land had been forfeited, and in a suit instituted under what was then Chapter 105 of the Code, the lands were sold under the authority of Section 4, Article XIII of our State Constitution, and purchased by various persons. Therefore, the court had before it only the question of lands forfeited and sold, but I apprehend that the same rule would have been applied had the case been one involving the sale of land by the sheriff, purchased by the State and which had become irredeemable, and the same character of suit had been instituted to dispose of the same. The opinion, written by Justice Harlan, shows his clear understanding of the reasons for our system with respect to the collection of taxes, and the sale of land delinquent for the nonpayment of taxes or forfeiture for nonentry.. The decisions of this Court, up to that date, were discussed and applied, and the final result was reached that the methods prescribed by the statute for the sale of such land did not violate the constitutional requirement of due process of law in depriving one of life, liberty or property which means, of course, reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.
¶14But the basis of this holding was the statute as it then existed, which required process, not only on the former owner but upon all parties who were known to be interested in the land sought to be sold, so long as that process could be obtained within the jurisdiction of the courts; and where that could not be done, the publication of an order of publication. The suit in which the land was sold in that case, as in all cases of that character, was con*229sidered a regular chancery suit. I think the real basis of the decision in King v. Mullins, supra,will be found by reading the following quotation from the opinion:
“It is said that this shows that the taxpayer, after his land is forfeited to the State, is left by the statutes of West Virginia without any right or opportunity, by any form of judicial proceeding, to get it back or to prevent its sale, and, therefore, it is argued, he is absolutely divested of his lands solely by reason of his failure to place them on the proper land books.
“An answer to this view is, that what was said in McClure v. Maitland, on this point, had reference to proceedings under the act of November 18, 1873, acts 1872-73, p. 449, c. 134, which were not judicial in their nature but administrative. But as declared in Hays, Commissioner, v. Camden’s Heirs, 38 W. Va. 109, 110, the act of 1873 was so amended by the act of March 25, 1882, Acts W. Va. 1882, p. 253, c. 95, as to make the proceeding in the Circuit Court for the sale of forfeited lands, in which the owners or claimants could intervene and effect a redemption of their lands from forfeiture, a judicial proceeding. This view was reaffirmed in Wiant v. Hays, Commissioner, 38 W. Va. 681, 684, in which Judge Bran-non, delivering the unanimous judgment of the state court, observed that what was said in McClure v. Maitlandas to the landowner not being entitled of right to be made a party to the proceeding instituted for the sale of forfeited lands for the benefit of the school funds, had reference to the then existing act which was changed by the act of 1882. Answering the suggestion that the proceedings under the new law were not judicial, the court said: ‘Now, why, with parties plaintiff and defendant, process, pleading, hearing between the parties, decree, etc., it is not, if not technically a chancery suit, yet a suit, I cannot see; a suit under a special statute, it is true, but none the less a suit. So, substantially, it was regarded in Hays v. Camden’s Heirs, 38 W. Va. 109, 18 S. E. Rep. 461. Proceedings at rules take place as in ordinary and common law suits. In some places it is called a “suit.” But I know that *230it is said bjr those holding the other view that the question is not to be tested by the circumstances, such as I have alluded to, the presence of pleading, process, hearing, etc., but it must be tested by the nature of the proceeding; that is, that it is only an administrative process by the State, through an officer and court, to realize money on its own property. But to this I reply that though the State might make the proceeding such, and did in its acts up to 1882, yet by its act in 1882 it changed the proceeding from one ex parte to one inter partes, and clothed the proceeding with all the habiliments of a suit; and. still it did not proceed against the land, taking the act of forfeiture as a concession, and simply at once sell the land, but it subjected its right and title under the supposed forfeiture to question and investigation under the law through a suit, called in all interested adversely to its claim, and gave them leave to contest its right, and made its claim the subject of litigation.’
“It thus appears that under the statutes of West Virginia in force after 1882 the owner of the forfeited lands had the right to become a party to a judicial proceeding, of which he was entitled to notice, and in which the court had authority to relieve him, upon terms that were reasonable, from the forfeiture of his lands.”
¶15The case of Wiant v. Hays, supra, is mentioned in said opinion, and furnishes an illustration of what the Supreme Court of the United States had before it when it decided the case of King v. Mullins. To me great doubt exists as to whether the Supreme Court of the United States, as then constituted, had it had before it Section 12 of Chapter 160 of the Acts of 1947, with the interpretation placed thereon by the majority, would have written the opinion it handed down in that form. What would be done under the present conditions and the spirit of the times, I do not know. But, in view of the fact that service of process can and should be had as a matter of fairness to former owners, who while having no interest in the land, as such, but a property interest in the proceeds, of any sale thereof above taxes and costs, and in view of the election of the *231Legislature to require process, the paramount purpose of Section 12, aforesaid, must have been to require service of process. In my opinion, the majority of this Court, in the case at bar, take a grave risk in again permitting the question of due process of law to be raised in a suit growing out of our system of dealing with forfeited and delinquent lands. So long as we uphold the requirement of process, and other reasonable notice, we uphold the principles on which King v. Mullins, supra,was decided and our land titles, transferred under court proceedings, are secure. If we depart from those principles, grave results may follow.
¶16In this connection, the rule of law is, as I understand, that a court in construing a statute will endeavor to give it such construction as to bring it within the terms of the Constitution; and will, if possible, avoid giving to it a construction which would make it unconstitutional, and, therefore, ineffective. Construing Section 12 of Chapter 160, of the Acts of 1947, as the State asks us to do, would, in my opinion, render the section invalid as to necessary parties not served with process, as the section plainly requires, for the reason that the property interest of the former owner in the excess, given him under Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution, makes him a necessary party. As stated above, I think it was the paramount purpose of the Legislature in enacting that section to require service of process where it could be had within the jurisdiction of the courts. If the language used in the section at the very end is to be construed as nullifying that purpose, then I think the section is invalid and unconstitutional, because the effect thereof is to deprive the former owner, with an interest, not in the land as such, but in the proceeds of the sale thereof, of his right to process in a suit in which his rights are involved, and thereby denies to him of his right of due process of law, and that the same violates both the State and Federal Constitutions. On the other hand, if the paramount purpose, as I believe it to have been, was to require process, then the Act is constitutional because due process of law *232is provided for. In this connection I have not even considered Chapter 134, Acts of the Legislature, 1949, because I do not see how it can possibly be given any consideration. This is not important because, in the opinion of the majority, it was not necessary to enact Chapter 134. That construction of Section 12, as enacted in 1947, makes it unnecessary to rely on the later statute.
¶17To me there is something repellant in the idea of depriving people of rights and property through the processes of the courts of the land without personal service of process where it can be had, or the best notice that can be given where, on account of the limits of jurisdictions, all interested parties cannot be reached.
¶18It is contended by some, and apparently upheld by the majority of this Court, that because a former owner has lost his title to the land, as such, he can have no further interest in the suit authorized by Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, although in Section 5 of the same Article the property interest of the former owner is protected, and provision is made for the filing of petition in the suit by which he gets the proceeds of the sale of the land, after taxes and costs are satisfied. The two sections must be used together to complete the sale of the land and distribute the proceeds. We cannot, in my opinion, say that the former owner is without an interest in the proceeding. He has a property right which he is entitled to protect. It may not be a right to the land, as such, but it is a right growing out of the land. Former Legislatures, since 1882, have always recognized the right of former owners to be a party to the suit instituted to sell forfeited and delinquent lands, and only when officers of the State failed in their duty to carry out the will of the Legislature, as plainly expressed, did it become necessary to take the last step and say that the former owner has no rights entitled to be respected in this or any other court.
¶19I realize that some of the views expressed in this dissent are in conflict with those expressed in State v. Gray, supra,in which the opinion was written by me for the *233Court. In that case appears the following language and holding:
“We hold therefore: … (2) that under the Constitution of this State a judicial proceeding is necessary to sell said lands under the provisions of Section 4, Article XIII of our Constitution, and that in said proceeding the Legislature has the power to provide for such sale without making the former owner or other interested persons therein a party thereto; (3) that the provisions of Sections 11 and 12, Chapter 160, Acts of the Legislature, 1947, providing that former owners, and other interested persons, be made parties to such proceeding, and requiring the service of process on parties defendant, and an entry of an order of publication as to those not served, constitutes only an act of grace on the part of the State, and not an act required by Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution of this State; … »
¶20Further study of the questions has brought me to the conclusion that Sections 4 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution, read together, require that former owners be made parties to the proceeding authorized by Section 4, not because they have any interest in the land, as such, but because they have a property interest in the proceeds of any sale of any land formerly owned by them respectively, made in such proceeding, after the payment ofz taxes and costs. Furthermore, I am now of the opinion that this right to be made a party to such proceeding, and to be served with process therein, where such process may be had within the State, amounts to more than a mere act of grace. I think it is a right which grows out of the two sections of the Constitution mentioned above. In State v. Gray, supra,the parties contesting the suit were not served with process, but they made a general appearance, and lack of process was not involved. For this reason, the contention of the State is that any reference thereto in the opinion in said case was dicta, and perhaps this is true; but if one holding in respect thereto is dicta, then all such references are. This, however, is not important.
¶21*234I would affirm the ruling of the trial court first because of the inherent injustice involved in the use of the processes of the courts of the State to deprive anyone of his property.or rights without his day in court; and second because I feel that Section 12 of Chapter 160 of the Acts of the Legislature, 1947, should be construed to require service of process on Cottrell, the former owner of the lot of land involved in the case at bar, before any valid sale of said-land can be effected.