Smith v. Thornburg’s Empirical Analysis
136 F.3d 1069 · 1998
Citation profile
32 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 104 later decisions — most recently January 2025 · most notably Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls (2005), Williams v. Bramer (1999)
32 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Relies on Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. · Illinois v. Gates · Rakas v. Illinois · Beck v. State of Ohio · Cady v. Dombrowski
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 104 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“'reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.'”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“We do not hold that every determination in a preliminary hearing should be given preclusive effect in a subsequent § 1988 action. Some preliminary hearings are little more than formalities. Also, even when an opportunity for full adversary proceedings is afforded, strategic concerns may counsel against engaging in such an exercise at the early stages of a criminal proceeding. However, where the state affords an opportunity for an accused to contest probable cause at a preliminary hearing and the accused does so, a finding of probable cause by the examining magistrate or state judge should foreclose relitigation of that finding in a subsequent § 1988 action.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“The alleged racial slurs, standing alone, state an equal protection claim based on racially motivated verbal abuse and harassment. See Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479, 482-84 (5th Cir.1989) (“To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that a state actor intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class. Johnson’s claim appears to do so. He alleges that Morel humiliated and harassed him, and that the insults and harassment were explicitly racist.”), overruled on other grounds, Harper v. Harris County, Tex., 21 F.3d 597 (5th Cir.1994).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.