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← 136 F.3d 1130 - Jackson v. Resolution GGF Oy

Jackson v. Resolution GGF Oy’s Empirical Analysis

136 F.3d 1130 · 1998

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
2
states following
June 2014
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently June 2014

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

70199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (§ 130 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1441 · 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (§ 4 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) · 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (§ 4 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) · 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (§ 4 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Warth v. Seldin · City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. · United States 77-1359 v. Kimbell Foods Inc · Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. · Verlinden B. v. v. Central Bank of Nigeria

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[There is a question what Norwest Financial Ilinois, Inc., one of the defendants, is doing in any court. Norwest has bought some of Harbor's paper but does not hold the notes signed by any of the plaintiffs, and it asked the court to dismiss it from the case on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had standing to pursue a claim against it. The district judge did not act on this motion. Like any other jurisdictional issue, this subject should have received priority consideration. Norwest's position is impeccable. Some other borrowers may have claims against it, but none of these plaintiffs does-and as the case was not certified as a class action, the only claims before the court are those of the plaintiffs personally. We need not decide whether Norwest would have been a proper defendant had a class been certified even though none of the representative plaintiffs held a legal claim against it. There is no case or controversy between Norwest and any of Named plaintiffs so Norwest must be dismissed as a party.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “It is the Department’s position that the Currie Court [sic] clearly held that the 1981 amendments to Section 4(1)(L) (Par. 6404(1)(L)) of the Statute [now § 205/4(l)(i)] provide that it is lawful to charge any rate of interest or compensation on loans secured by a mortgage on real estate. This amendment is so clearly inconsistent with the points limitation in Section 4.1a of the Statute that such limitation is necessarily repealed. Under these circumstances, the licensee [i.e., the lender] is no longer bound by the points limitation in Section 4.1a.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.