Karst v. . Gane’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 federal appellate · 26 district · 77 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 138 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““While the act does not, in terms, require an immediate filing of a mortgage, in order to make it valid against creditors or subsequent mortgagees or purchasers, the purpose of the act can only be satisfied by prompt and diligent action on the part of the mortgagee in filing his mortgage. The filing stands as a substitute for immediate delivery, and an actual and continued change of possession, o£ the property, and avoids the conclusive presumption of fraud which would otherwise attach to the instrument under the act of 1833, in the absence of delivery and the change of possession of the mortgaged property. Some time will necessarily elapse between the execution and filing of the mortgage. Where it appears that due diligence was exercised in filing the mortgage, and there was no unnecessary delay, and no actual intervening lien has been acquired, there would seem to be no ground upon which subsequent lienholders could question the validity of the mortgage under the statute of 1833. The filing, under these circumstances, would be immediate, and make the mortgage valid as against liens subsequently acquired. But a delay of six weeks in filing the mortgage is not a compliance with the act. There were no circumstances rendering so long a delay necessary. There can be no doubt that if, during the delay in filing, a lien had been acquired by a creditor, the mortgage, as to such lien, would be void. The mortgage was, however, filed before the plaintiff’s judgments and executions wer”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Beede · In re Schmidt

2. ““A simple-contract creditor is as much within the protection of the statute as a creditor whose debt has been merged in a judgment. This was held in Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424 , in respect to the meaning of the word ‘creditors’ in the section of the Revised Statutes relating to fraudulent sales, assignments, or mortgages of goods and chattels. The same point was adjudged as to the meaning of the same word in the statute of 1833 [Laws 1833, p. 402, c. 279] in the case of Thompson v. Van Vechten [ 27 N. Y. 568 ]. There was a question in that case of priority of lien as between the Shaw mortgage, and the levy of an execution on a judgment in favor of the Westchester County Bank, recovered March 16, 1855, upon a debt which arose June 10, 1854, during the time when the omission to file the mortgage existed. Judge Denio, writing the opinion, referring to the argument that the word ‘creditors,’ in the statute of 1833, embraces only creditors who obtain judgment and execution during the default in filing the mortgage, said that if this were so the act would not in many cases accomplish any beneficial purpose. The mortgage, he observed, cannot be legally questioned until the creditor clothes himself with a judgment and execution, or with some legal process against the property, for creditors cannot interfere with the property of the debtor without process. See, also, Southard v. Benner, supra. The simple-contract creditor runs the risk of having his remedy to assail the mortgage”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Beede · In re Beede

3. ““It is undoubtedly true that one, and perhaps the most important, purpose of the act, so far as it applies to creditors, was to protect persons giving credit to the mortgagor in ignorance of the existence of a mortgage upon his property. But the legislative policy was broader than this single purpose. It is impossible to say that only creditors who became such during the existence of a mortgage may be injured by keeping the mortgage secret. It certainly is not improbable that in many eases antecedent creditors may be lulled into security, and forbear the collection of their debts at maturity, by the apparent unincumbered possession and ownership by the debtor of property covered by an undisclosed mortgage. The statute prescribes a general rule which must be observed in order to entitle a mortgagee to assert his lien as against creditors.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Mission Fixture & Mantel Co. · In re Hansen