136 Ohio App. 3d 616 - Caruso v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'actual or constructive fraud or a design to mislead or deceive another.'”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Knox v. Hetrick, 91102 (3-26-2009) · Webber v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety

2. “Here, the issue of whether [defendant] was entitled to immunity requires an examination of the motives behind the alleged assault.... [I]f the alleged assault was simply to gratify his own personal feelings of animosity and resentment, he would not be entitled to immunity. But if the alleged assault were in some, albeit, misguided way, for the purpose of facilitating the business for which the [defendant] was engaged, he would not be manifestly outside the scope of his employment. Here, other than the outburst itself, there is no evidence in the record from which the trial court could conclude that [defendant] acted to gratify personal resentment. ... As such, there was a lack of evidence in the record that [defendant] acted manifestly outside the scope of his employment or with malice. Moreover, the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that [defendant’s] conduct was reckless. As discussed above, the standard for showing reckless or wanton misconduct is high. Mere negligence is not converted into wanton misconduct unless the evidence establishes a disposition to perversity on the part of the tortfeasor. Such perversity must be under such conditions that the actor must be conscious that his conduct will, in all probability, result in injury.... The evidence was such that, although the outburst may have been intended, there was a lack of evidence that [defendant’s] conduct would, in all probability, result in injury. As such, there was a lack of evidence in the r”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 159 F. Supp. 2d 693 - Jacobs v. Village of Ottawa Hills · Chesher v. Neyer

3. “[T]he assault in question followed an attempt by the tortfeasor to reprimand one of the employees under his supervision for what he apparently regarded as an instance of unsatisfactory job performance. It began harmlessly enough with several disparaging remarks about the employee's personal life, but ended only moments later in a fit of rage when the tortfeasor grabbed the employee by her collar, threw her to the ground and kicked her in the back. Although it may be said on the state of this record that the tortfeasor had the authority to engage in limited forms of disciplinary action in accordance with the established policies of his employer, there is nothing to controvert the employer's evidence that such authority did not extend to the unprovoked use of physical violence against a fellow employee; nor is there any tenable factual basis to support a finding that the tortfeasor's actions apart from the initial reprimand were ratified by his employer. In our view, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that the tortfeasor simply lost his temper and was motivated to commit the assault solely out of feelings of personal ill will and malice harbored against his victim. * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bauman v. Bob Evans Farms, Unpublished Decision (1-16-2007)