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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1059
EILEEN CHOLLET, on behalf of C.M., a minor; DENNIS MA, on behalf of C.M.,
a minor; MERYEM GHAZAL, on behalf of P.G., a minor; RICHARD GHAZAL,
on behalf of P.G., a minor; GUADALUPE WILLIAMSON, on behalf of T.W., a
minor; TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, on behalf of T.W., a minor,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
DR. SCOTT BRABRAND, in his role as Superintendent, Fairfax County Public
Schools,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:21-cv-00987-AJT-JFA)
Argued: October 30, 2024 Decided: May 19, 2025
Before WYNN, HARRIS, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and
Judge Heytens joined.
ARGUED: George Millington Clarke, III, BAKER MCKENZIE LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellants. John F. Cafferky, BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH, PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: James M. Lucas, Dallas, Texas, Christina M. Norman, BAKER
MCKENZIE LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellants. Ian J. McElhaney, BLANKINGSHIP
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& KEITH, PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.
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PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiffs in this case are the parents of children with special needs who attend
public school in Fairfax County, Virginia. They allege that the transition to remote learning
during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an unconstitutional “taking” of what they see
as their children’s Fifth Amendment property interest in public education. The district
court rejected this argument and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. We agree and affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
Plaintiffs Eileen Chollet, Dennis Ma, Meryem Ghazal, Richard Ghazal, Guadalupe
Williamson, and Timothy Williamson are the parents of children with special needs who
attend the Fairfax County Public Schools (“FCPS”) in Virginia. Pursuant to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., FCPS provides the
plaintiffs’ children with special education services based on Individualized Education
Programs. Between March 2020 and February 2021, FCPS – like many school districts –
responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by switching to a virtual learning model. The
plaintiffs believe that FCPS’s use of remote instruction was inconsistent with their
children’s individualized needs and caused them to fall behind.
To address these concerns, the plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Dr. Scott Brabrand, in his former role as Superintendent of FCPS, alleging an
unconstitutional “taking” of their children’s purported Fifth Amendment property interest
in a public education. Virginia law, the parents alleged, establishes a fundamental right to
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a public education. And because that right is a protected property interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, they argued, it is also private property
subject to the Takings Clause.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). See Chollet v. Brabrand, No. 1:21-cv-00987-AJT-JFA (E.D. Va.
Dec. 14, 2023). 1 In a thoroughly reasoned opinion, the court explained that “[t]he
Constitution protects interests in property through various clauses.” J.A. 229. Under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a “right to a public education []
recognized and protected by state law” is a protected property interest. J.A. 228 (citing
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975)). The court recognized that Virginia law
establishes a fundamental right to public education, and agreed with the plaintiffs that this
right “likely qualifies as property for the purposes of the Due Process Clause.” Id.
But it “does not necessarily follow,” the district court concluded, that the Virginia
right to education “likewise qualifies” as private property under the Takings Clause. Id.
Instead, “federal courts have long interpreted the property interests protected by the
1
The district court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA. Chollet v. Brabrand, No. 1:21-00987-
AJT-JFA, 2021 WL 6333049, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 29, 2021). After the court’s ruling, the
Supreme Court clarified the scope of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, see Luna Perez
v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142 (2023), and we vacated and remanded for the district
court to consider that new precedent. See Chollet v. Brabrand, No. 22-1005, 2023 WL
5317961, at *1–2 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2023). In the decision now on review, the district court
concluded that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative IDEA
remedies and proceeded to reach the merits of their Takings Clause claim. The court’s
holding as to exhaustion is not challenged on appeal.
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Takings Clause as far narrower than property interests generally, including those protected
by the Due Process Clause.” J.A. 229; id. at 229–30 & n.9 (collecting cases). More
specifically, goods or services provided by the government – like public education – are
often treated as “property” or “property interests” under the Due Process Clause, but are
not typically treated as private property for purposes of the Takings Clause.
The district court then considered the nature of the right to public education in
Virginia. Unlike private property protected by the Takings Clause, the court found, the
right to public education is subject to regulation or revision by the Virginia government,
which retains significant authority to alter public education at its discretion. Further, the
right to public education in Virginia cannot be bought or sold, in contrast to other property
interests. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the right to public education, as
alleged by the plaintiffs, is not private property under the Takings Clause and dismissed
the complaint.
The plaintiffs timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
Riddick v. Barber, 109 F.4th 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2024). We agree with the district court that
the plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for compensation under the Takings Clause
and we therefore affirm its judgment.
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As the district court explained, “property interests” that trigger Due Process Clause
protections and “private property” under the Takings Clause are two different things. A
“legitimate claim[] of entitlement” to a government benefit may give rise to a “property
interest” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Goss, 419 U.S. at
573. That Clause offers procedural protections for such property interests, ensuring that
they are not withdrawn “without adherence to the [required] minimum procedures.” Id. at
574. The Takings Clause, meanwhile, applies in a narrower set of circumstances: only to
“private property,” and only when that property is “taken” by the government for “public
use.” U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”). But when it does apply, it provides a substantive remedy in the form
of just compensation, which “must generally consist of the total value of the property when
taken, plus interest from that time.” Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 190 (2019).
The plaintiffs’ argument starts with the Due Process Clause. As the district court
recognized, the right to a public education is protected in the Commonwealth of Virginia
under both the Virginia Constitution and the Code of Virginia. See J.A. 226 (citing Va.
Const. art. VIII, § 1; Va. Code §§ 22.1–214(A), 22.1–215). Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has held that “education is a fundamental right” under its state constitution. Scott
v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994). And in Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme
Court ruled that a student’s “legitimate entitlement to a public education [is] a property
interest” under the Due Process Clause. 419 U.S. at 574. Put that together, and we agree
with the district court that the plaintiffs’ children may well have the kind of entitlement to
a public education that qualifies as a Due Process Clause “property interest.” J.A. 228; see
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Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (Due Process Clause
property interests are created and defined by “an independent source such as state law”).
According to the plaintiffs, this should end the matter. In their view, because their
children’s right to public education is a protected property interest under the Due Process
Clause, it must also fall within the ambit of the Takings Clause. This is the leap in logic
that the district court rejected, and we, too, are unpersuaded.
Neither Goss nor any other case dealing with public education has suggested, let
alone held, that a student’s protected property interest in public education constitutes
“private property” for which compensation might be owed under the Takings Clause. Goss
itself established only that an interest in public education, where established by state law,
is protected by the Due Process Clause against deprivations effectuated “without adherence
to the minimum procedures required by that Clause.” 419 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), on which the plaintiffs also rely, is no different; that
case considered an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a state law denying funds for the
education of undocumented students, id. at 221–23, and is entirely silent on the meaning
of “private property” under the Takings Clause. Instead, in the case most directly on point,
the Ninth Circuit recently rejected a Takings Clause challenge aimed at a public school
district, holding that the “existence of a legally recognizable property interest” in public
education under the Due Process Clause is “not sufficient to establish that the right at issue
. . . warrants protection under the Takings Clause.” Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint Dist., # 93,
114 F.4th 1129, 1140 (9th Cir. 2024).
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This is not surprising because, as the district court observed, it is well established
that “private property” as used in the Takings Clause is defined more narrowly than the
term “property” in other contexts, “particularly compared to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 1141; see, e.g., Kizas v. Webster,
707 F.2d 524, 540 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (“[b]road due process ‘property’ concepts are [] inapposite” to Takings Clause
inquiry); Burns v. PA Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008) (“‘Property’ as
used in the Takings Clause is defined much more narrowly than in the due process clause.”
(citation omitted)); Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1104 (7th Cir. 1995)
(similar). The Supreme Court has recognized that the Takings Clause and Due Process
Clause are not coextensive, and has identified constitutionally protected property interests
that may be reduced or eliminated, in compliance with procedural requirements, without
effecting a taking. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 604–05 (1987). And our court
has done the same. Scott v. Greenville Cnty., 716 F.2d 1409, 1421–22 (4th Cir. 1983)
(“entitlement to permit issuance” was “sufficiently a ‘species of property’ to require
constitutional protection” under the Due Process Clause but was “not in the nature of
interests the deprivation of which is encompassed by the Fifth Amendment ‘takings’
doctrine”).
In short, and as the district court held, the plaintiffs’ argument, conflating “property
interests” under the Due Process Clause with “private property” covered by the Takings
Clause, is unavailing. This may well be enough to dispose of their appeal, as they have not
alleged any other ground on which they might prevail. And indeed, the right to public
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education in Virginia is not “private property” for Takings Clause purposes under any
available theory.
The Takings Clause, recall, applies not to “property” generally but only to “private
property.” In analyzing the nature of property under the Takings Clause, our court has
used a number of tools. We look to the “traditional rules of property law,” asking whether
a purported owner has “full rights of ‘possession, control and disposition,’” see Washlefske
v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 184–85 (4th Cir. 2000), or “‘free use, enjoyment and disposal’
. . . and the ‘right to exclude others,’” South Carolina State Educ. Assistance Auth. v.
Cavazos, 897 F.2d 1272, 1276 (4th Cir. 1990) (first quoting Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S.
60, 74 (1917); then quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984)).
We also have considered whether a purported property interest is certain or, instead, subject
to change by public entities, sometimes using the terms “vested” and “non-vested” to
capture the distinction. See Cavazos, 897 F.2d at 1276–77. And we have found that
property coming within the “complete[] control” of the government can thereby “lose[] its
character as ‘private property.’” Id. at 1276.
We need not determine which of these analytical paths to walk because no matter
which we choose, they all lead us to the same place: The public education guaranteed to
the plaintiffs’ children is not their “private property.” The Virginia General Assembly,
Board of Education, and local school boards retain significant authority to establish,
maintain, and alter Virginia’s education system at their discretion. Va. Const. art. VIII;
Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 141–43. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Zeyen, in holding that the
right to a free public education under Idaho law does not constitute private property, “what
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constitutes public education itself is subject to change” at government discretion, making
it “fundamentally incompatible with private ownership.” 114 F.4th at 1144. The General
Assembly governs public education through a comprehensive statutory scheme that
regulates virtually every aspect of the education system. See Va. Code tit. 22.1. These
regulations make clear that public education is not “handed to students and parents for their
use, enjoyment, disposal, or control as private property.” Zeyen, 114 F.4th at 1143. Rather,
a student’s right to the use of public education is subject to countless restrictions and
requirements. See, e.g., Va. Code §§ 22.1-79.5 (prohibiting use and distribution of
tobacco), -254 (compulsory attendance), -272 (public health requirements), -276.2
(discipline for disrupting class). And a student cannot buy, sell, or assign her right to attend
public school, and has no right to exclude others. Simply put, a person guaranteed a right
to public education in Virginia does not possess the “bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property” as understood by the Takings Clause. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at
1011 (citation omitted); Zeyen,
114 F.4th at 1142. 2
III.
For the reasons given above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
2
Because the district court held that the right to public education in Virginia does
not qualify as “private property,” it did not reach FCPS’s alternative arguments under the
Takings Clause: that there was no “taking,” in that it continued to provide education to the
plaintiffs’ children, albeit remotely; and that public education cannot be taken “for public
use.” J.A. 229 n.9. We agree with the district court, and so likewise have no need to reach
those issues.
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AFFIRMED
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