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← 137 Md. App. 527 - Magee v. Dansources Technical Services, Inc.

137 Md. App. 527 - Magee v. Dansources Technical Services, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

2001

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
1
states following
July 2017
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 4 district · 20 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 24 (§ 241 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996) · 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 8 U.S.C. § 1324A (§ 274a of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1324B (§ 274b of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))

Relies on Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. · Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. · Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson · Faragher v. City of Boca Raton · Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The plurality decision in Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 , 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) ], ruled that “[t]o continue the words ‘because of as a colloquial short hand for ‘but for causation,’ ... is to misunderstand them.” Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations. When, therefore, an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was “because of’ sex and the other, legitimate considerations — even if we may say later, in the context of litigation, that the decision would have been the same if gender had not been taken into account. Id. at 241 [ 109 S.Ct. 1775 ].”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “To find that the Plaintiff was wrongfully discharged, you must find that her termination was motivated by sex discrimination. In other words, the Plaintiff was fired because she was a female. ... The Plaintiff must prove the Defendant intentionally discriminated [against] the Plaintiff. That is, but for the Plaintiffs gender, the Defendant would not have made the decision not to continue the Plaintiffs employment.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Although the employee bears the burden of persuasion that discrimination was “a motivating factor,” the employee need not prove that but for the discrimination she would not have been discharged.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.