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137 Misc. 442

In re Bernard

New York Surrogate's Court

Decided June 26, 1930

New York Surrogate's Court · decided 1930-06-26

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently June 1957

1 state decisions

Relies on 3 E.H. Smith 86 - Terwilliger v. Ontario, Carbondale & Scranton Railroad

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1930-06-26

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Wingate, S.

¶1On this motion for a reargument the basic question at issue is as to the revocability of a power of attorney to *443the petitioner. This instrument authorized the attorney to recover the principal’s share in this estate, and granted broad powers in that regard. It then contained the following phraseology upon which the petitioner relies as demonstrating that the power was irrevocable. This portion of the document reads as follows:

¶2“ We hereby authorize said W. J. Trick to make contract with Attorney or Attorneys at law and agree that he may reimburse said Attorney up to 50% of the share recovered for us.”

¶3The principles of law respecting the rare exceptions to the rule that a power of attorney is revocable, are stated in Terwilliger v. Ontario, C. & S. R. R. Co. (149 N. Y. 86, at p. 92) as follows: “In a luminous statement the chief justice confined the scope of the exception to cases where, together with the power, there was vested in the donee an estate, right or interest in the subject of the power, as distinguished from an interest in the proceeds of the power when exercised.”

¶4Applying this rule to the case at bar, the power was one to collect a claim as distributee against the estate. The only interest of the donee of the power was in the proceeds of such claim when the power was exercised. The facts, therefore, do not bring it within the excepted class.

¶5The petitioner invokes the further exception to the rule that he has obligated himself by contracting with an attorney at law for the prosecution of the claim and argues that the donor of the power is, therefore, estopped to revoke it. If the attorney has so personally bound himself, he has done an unusual and unnecessary act. All that can be considered contemplated by the instrument is that the attorney in fact should employ counsel as agent for a disclosed principal which would involve him in no personal liability.

¶6The fact of the revocation cannot be disputed by reason of the duly authenticated instrument of revocation, filed in this court.

¶7The unauthenticated letter received by the attorney purporting to come from the principal could, at best, merely raise an inference that such principal did not act advisedly when he revoked the power and cannot vary the legal situation in respect thereto.

¶8The motion for rehearing must, therefore, be denied.

¶9Enter order, on notice, accordingly.

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