Volume 137 — North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports

<bold>Pleadings — Rule 11 sanctions — sufficiency of allegations</bold> <block_quote> Even though the trial court found plaintiff's claim for child support arrearages based on a consent order was barred by the statute of limitations, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for monetary sanctions under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>1A-1</cross_reference>, Rule 11 against plaintiff and her trial attorneys.</block_quote><page_number>Page 488</page_number>

<bold>1. Criminal Law — Joinder — sale and delivery of cocaine — transactional</bold> <bold>connection</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in consolidating for trial the two sale and delivery of cocaine offenses under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>15A-926</cross_reference>(a) because: (1) the twooffenses have a transactional connection; and (2) joinder of the offenses did not impede defendant's ability to receive a fair trial and to put on his defense.</block_quote><page_number>Page 496</page_number> <bold>2. Indictment and Information — Amendment — habitual felon — harmless</bold> <bold>error</bold> <block_quote> Although defendant contends the trial court improperly permitted the State to amend its habitual felon indictment by inserting "in North Carolina" after each listed felony when the original indictment listed that defendant's three prior felony convictions occurred in Carteret County, any perceived error was harmless because the original indictment itself was not flawed.</block_quote> <bold>3. Evidence — Prior crime or act — drug sales — intent — common plan or</bold> <bold>purpose — identity</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in a case involving two sale and delivery of cocaine offenses by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the admission of testimony from a detective that the informant had previously been arrested for buying cocaine from defendant and agreed to help the police catch defendant, because the evidence of defendant's prior drug sales was admissible under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 404(b) to prove intent, to show a common plan or purpose, and to identify defendant as the one selling the cocaine.</block_quote> <bold>4. Constitutional Law — Effective assistance of counsel — failure to</bold> <bold>request jury instruction on defendant's silence</bold> <block_quote> Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a case involving two sale and delivery of cocaine offenses by his counsel's failure to request that the jury be instructed on defendant's failure to testify at trial.</block_quote><page_number>Page 497</page_number> <bold>5. Constitutional Law — Effective assistance of counsel — sentencing</bold> <bold>hearing — failure to call witnesses</bold> <block_quote> Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a case involving two sale and delivery of cocaine offenses by his counsel's failure to call any witnesses at defendant's sentencing hearing.</block_quote> <bold>6. Constitutional Law — Effective assistance of counsel — failure to</bold> <bold>cross-examine a witness — strategic and tactical decision</bold> <block_quote> Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a case involving two sale and delivery of cocaine offenses by his counsel's failure to cross-examine a detective about a wire that was placed on an informant during one of the drug sales.</block_quote>

<bold>Constitutional Law — Right to counsel — pro se representation —</bold> <bold>inadequate inquiry</bold> <block_quote> The trial court committed plain error by allowing defendant to proceed pro se in an armed robbery and kidnapping case because: (1) the trial court did not inquire as to whether defendant comprehended the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments as required by N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>15A-1242</cross_reference>(3); and (2) neither the statutory responsibilities of standby counsel nor the actual participation of standby counsel<page_number>Page 584</page_number> is a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.</block_quote>