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← 138 F.2d 655 - Pearson v. Walling

Pearson v. Walling’s Empirical Analysis

138 F.2d 655 · 1943

Citation profile

9
cited by 9 later decisions
February 1960
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently February 1960

4 federal appellate · 1 district ·

50194319501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 208 · 29 U.S.C. § 210 · 29 U.S.C. § 215 · 29 U.S.C. § 217

Relies on Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States · Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage & Hour Division of the Department of Labor · Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. · Standard Oil Co of California v. Johnson · Dohany v. Rogers

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““As appellants properly concede, if an industry has been sufficiently clearly defined by the Administrator, and notice and opportunity for hearing have appropriately been given in accordance with the requirement of the Act, the question whether a particular product should have been included in such industry or in another, or in some special classification thereunder, is primarily a matter of administrative convenience and judgment; (Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, supra), and, in any event, where there has been a sufficiently clear definition by the Administrator and notice and opportunity for hearing have been duly given, any question of unreasonableness or arbitrariness in connection with the issuance of a wage order is reachable judicially only by petition for review . . . . . this does not mean that Congress intended to compel the Administrator to enumerate in his definition every specific product which the order was designed to cover. Such an attempted enumeration . . . would certainly be a most difficult if not an impossible task. The power delegated to the Administrator to make definitions and classifications and to fix wage rates on the basis thereof manifestly was intended to assist in furthering the broad remedial purposes of the Act, ... On the basis of these principles, we believe that the Administrator, in formulating a definition for wage-order purposes, is only required to outline with reasonable clarity and certainty the general limits or extent of the indu”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.