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← 138 F.2d 925 - Shilkret v. Helvering

Shilkret v. Helvering’s Empirical Analysis

138 F.2d 925 · 1943

Citation profile

40
cited by 40 later decisions
4
states following
August 2012
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 3 district · 17 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently August 2012 · most notably Fenner v. Fenner (1987), Commissioner v. Porter (1945)

8 federal appellate · 3 district · 17 state decisions

11019431950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Poe v. Seaborn · Gilbert v. David · Margaret Williamson v. Katherine Osenton · District of Columbia v. Murphy · Anderson v. Watt

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]o effect a change from an old and established domicile to a new one, there must be ... a fixed purpose to remain in the new location permanently or indefinitely. For domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have changed, and to show the change two things are indispensible, — “First, residence in the new locality; and, second, the intention to remain there. ... Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “In most of the cases we have examined the place in which the money is earned and the place of domicile are the same, ir, consequence of which no question of the law of domicile was involved; but where the place of acquisition and the domicile are different, certainly the majority of cases apply the common-law rule of domicile. The question is not new and was much debated especially in the preparation of the Restatement. In the early stages of the Institute discussion of the situs view was recommended, doubtless under the influence of some State statutes on the subject, but ultimately the domiciliary rule was substituted and appears now as Section 290 of the Restatement (Conflict of Raws), as follows: “Interests of one spouse in movables acquired by the other during the marriage are determined by the law of the domicile of the parties when the movables are acquired.” ******* * * * This conclusion, supported as we think it is by the weight of authority, seems to us to be manifestly the logical result. For as was said by Chancellor Kent: “It is a settled principle of international jurisprudence and one founded on a comprehensive and enlightened sense of public policy and convenience, that the disposition, succession to, and distribution of personal property, wherever situated, is governed by the law of the country of the owner’s * * * domicile * * * and not by the conflicting laws of the various places where the goods happened to be situated.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Interests of one spouse in movables acquired by the other during the marriage are determined by the law of the domicile of the parties when the movables are acquired.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.