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138 F.4th 955

Jane Does 1-5 v. Obiano

U.S. Courts of Appeals

Decided May 29, 2025

U.S. Courts of Appeals · decided 2025-05-29

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (§ 2 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) · 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991)

Relies on Pierson v. Ray · Tenney v. Brandhove · Procunier v. Navarette

Decided 2025-05-29

Case: 24-20075        Document: 71-1       Page: 1     Date Filed: 05/29/2025




         United States Court of Appeals
              for the Fifth Circuit
                              ____________                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit


                               No. 24-20075                                FILED
                                                                       May 29, 2025
                              ____________
                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
Jane Does 1-5,                                                             Clerk

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

Willie Obiano,

                                          Defendant—Appellee.
                ______________________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Texas
                          USDC No. 4:23-CV-813
                ______________________________

Before Haynes, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
       Plaintiffs sued a former Nigerian governor under the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”), claiming he ordered military forces to
shoot and kill their husbands at rallies in Nigeria. The district court dismissed
the suit based on the common-law principle of foreign official immunity. On
appeal, the only argument plaintiffs properly present is that the TVPA
implicitly abrogates that immunity. We reject that argument and affirm.
Case: 24-20075            Document: 71-1            Page: 2       Date Filed: 05/29/2025




                                         No. 24-20075


                                               I
       The complaint alleges Nigerian military forces shot indiscriminately
at participants in two peaceful rallies in Nnewi, Anambra State, Nigeria, on
August 9, 2020, and October 23, 2020. The widows of five men killed during
the rallies (“Plaintiffs”) sued the former Governor of Anambra State, Willie
Obiano, in a Texas federal court seeking compensatory and punitive damages
under the TVPA. The TVPA provides a civil action for victims of torture or
extrajudicial killings perpetrated by persons acting under a foreign nation’s
authority. 1
       Obiano, who now lives in Texas, served as Governor of Anambra from
March 17, 2014, to March 17, 2022. The complaint alleges the “extrajudicial
killings” of Plaintiffs’ husbands occurred “under color of Nigerian law by
Nigerian military forces under [Obiano’s] command and control.”

       _____________________
       1
           Section 2 of the TVPA provides in relevant part:
       (a) Liability. An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color
           of law, of any foreign nation—
             (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
                 damages to that individual; or
             (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be
                 liable for damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any
                 person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
   Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 2(a), 
106 Stat. 73
 (Mar. 12, 1992) (codified as a note to 
28 U.S.C. § 1350
).
       Section 3 defines “extrajudicial killing” as:
       a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a
       regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
       recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not
       include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out
       under the authority of a foreign nation.
   
Id.
 § 3(a).




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                                    No. 24-20075


       Obiano moved to dismiss on various grounds, including lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based on foreign official immunity. Agreeing with the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court granted Obiano’s
motion on that basis.
       Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                                          II
       We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 
16 F.4th 456, 463
 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
                                         III
       On appeal, the parties dispute whether the district court correctly
ruled that Obiano is protected by foreign official immunity. Before addressing
that issue, we briefly provide some background on the subject.
                                          A
       The question whether foreign states and officials are suable in
American courts arose early in our history, typically in connection with suits
against foreign vessels. See William S. Dodge & Chimène I. Keitner, A
Roadmap for Foreign Official Immunity Cases in U.S. Courts, 
90 Fordham L. Rev. 677
, 683–92 (2021) [Dodge & Keitner]2; see generally The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 
11 U.S. 116
 (1812). The issue implicated not
only law but foreign policy and diplomacy. Dodge & Keitner at 683–84.

       _____________________
       2
         For other commentary on foreign official immunity, see Curtis A. Bradley &
Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity,
2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 213
, 216-229 (2010); Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of
Foreign Official Immunity, 
87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 704
 (2012); Beth Stephens, The Modern
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 
79 Fordham L. Rev. 2669
, 2673–2685
(2011).




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                                     No. 24-20075


So, the State Department began the practice of submitting “suggestions of
immunity” in such cases. 
Id.
 at 684–86.
        By the early to mid-20th century, the Supreme Court was treating
those suggestions as controlling. Id. at 685; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials, and Human
Rights Litigation, 
13 Green Bag 2d 9
, 11 (2009); see, e.g., Ex parte Republic
of Peru, 
318 U.S. 578, 589
 (1943); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 
324 U.S. 30, 36
 (1945). In the 1950s, the State Department adopted a more “restrictive”
view of immunity than previously. See Matar v. Dichter, 
563 F.3d 9, 13
 (2d
Cir. 2009) (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
461 U.S. 480
,
486–87 (1983)); see also Permanent Mission of India to the United States v. City
of New York, 
551 U.S. 193, 199
 (2007) (discussing “[t]he Tate Letter
announc[ing] the United States’ decision to join the majority of other
countries by adopting the ‘restrictive theory’ of sovereign immunity”). This
new approach distinguished a foreign sovereign’s private activities, for which
it had no immunity, from its public acts, for which it did. See Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 
541 U.S. 677, 690
 (2004); Matar, 
563 F.3d at 13
.
        In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign State Immunities Act (FSIA),
which governs the immunity of “foreign state[s]” in civil suits in state and
federal courts. See Verlinden, 
461 U.S. at 488
; see also 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330
,
1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611. FSIA generally codified the restrictive
view of immunity. See Permanent Mission, 
551 U.S. at 199
; Altmann, 541 U.S.
at 689–90. Courts divided, however, over whether FSIA also governed the
immunity of foreign officials. See Dodge & Keitner at 689–90. 3 The
Supreme Court settled that in Samantar v. Yousuf, 
560 U.S. 305
 (2010).


        _____________________
        3
          Compare Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 
912 F.2d 1095
, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990);
Belhas v. Ya’alon, 
515 F.3d 1279, 1284
 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (both ruling that FSIA governed




                                           4
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                                     No. 24-20075


        Samantar ruled that FSIA’s definition of “foreign state” did not
include natural persons and that, consequently, the statute did not govern
foreign officials’ immunity. 
Id.
 at 313–19, 325. But the Court suggested that
officials could still claim immunity “under the common law.” Id. at 325. The
Court noted the pre-FSIA “two-step procedure” for evaluating common-law immunity claims: (1) if the State Department entered a “suggestion of
immunity,” the court would recognize that immunity and dismiss the case;
and (2) absent such a suggestion, the court would decide immunity for itself,
inquiring “whether the ground of immunity is one which it is the established
policy of the [State Department] to recognize.” Id. at 311–12 (quoting
Hoffman, 
324 U.S. at 36
). The Court did not settle, however, “the precise
scope of an official’s immunity at common law.” Id. at 321. 4
        Under the common law, foreign officials may enjoy either status-based
or conduct-based immunity. See Aljabri v. bin Salman, 
106 F.4th 1157, 1163
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (citing Lewis v. Mutond, 
918 F.3d 142, 145
 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
Status-based immunity is reserved to sitting heads of state and foreign
ministers and confers absolute immunity from suit while in office, regardless
of the nature of the alleged act. 
Ibid.
 By contrast, conduct-based immunity
applies to foreign officials only for acts taken in their official capacity, and it
continues after they leave office. 
Ibid.
                                           B
        In this case, the district court followed these parameters in evaluating
Obiano’s entitlement to immunity. Because Obiano is not alleged to be a

        _____________________
foreign officials’ immunity), with Matar, 
563 F.3d at 14
 (addressing foreign official’s
immunity under common law instead of FSIA).
        4
        For instance, the Court left open whether that immunity was governed by the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 66 (1965). See Samantar, 560 at 321 n.15.




                                           5
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                                         No. 24-20075


current head of state or foreign minister, only conduct-based immunity was
at issue. The court was guided by Judge Friedrich’s opinion in Doe 1 v.
Buratai, 
318 F. Supp. 3d 218
 (D.D.C. 2018). That case involved similar
allegations of extrajudicial killings against numerous Nigerian officials,
including Obiano, albeit during times different from the ones alleged here.
See 
id.
 at 222–25. 5
        Applying the two-step procedure discussed in Samantar, the district
court concluded that Obiano was protected by conduct-based immunity. At
step one, the court noted that Obiano had requested no suggestion of
immunity from the State Department. 6 So, the court proceeded to step two
and assessed whether the State Department would recognize such immunity
under established policy.
        The district court’s step-two analysis generally followed Judge
Friedrich’s analysis in Buratai, which looked to section 66(f) of the Second
Restatement of Foreign Relations. 7 The court noted it was “undisputed”

        _____________________
        5
          Judge Friedrich ruled that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant officials and, alternatively, that the officials were entitled to conduct-based
immunity. See 
id. at 230, 236
. The D.C. Circuit affirmed based on personal jurisdiction
without reaching immunity. See Doe 1 v. Buratai, 
792 F. App’x 6
, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
        6
         By contrast, the Nigerian official defendants in Buratai requested a suggestion of
immunity from the State Department in 2017. Although the State Department reported in
2018 that it was “actively deciding what if any action to take on Nigeria’s request,” the
Department ultimately filed no suggestion of immunity. Buratai, 
318 F. Supp. 3d at 231
.
        7
           Under that section, conduct-based immunity “is available to ‘any public minister,
official, or agent of the foreign state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if
the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.’”
Buratai, 
318 F. Supp. 3d at 230
 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 66(f) (1965)) (cleaned up). Because all
parties assume § 66(f) provides the relevant standard, we do not consider whether another
one should apply. Cf., e.g., Lewis, 918 F.3d at 148–49 (Randolph, J., concurring) (doubting
that § 66(f) sets out the common-law standard for foreign official immunity).




                                                6
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                                        No. 24-20075


that, at the time of the alleged shootings, Obiano was a Nigerian official and
was acting in his official capacity by commanding Nigerian soldiers. The
court also ruled that exercising jurisdiction would “effectively enforce a rule
of law against Nigeria.” Doe 1, 
318 F. Supp. 3d at 233
. That was because, the
court explained, plaintiffs did not sue Obiano in his individual capacity and
because their complaint “repeatedly connects” Obiano’s challenged actions
to Nigeria’s “government, military, and police function[s].” 
Ibid.
        Next, the district court declined plaintiffs’ invitation to recognize a
so-called ius cogens exception to foreign official immunity. Ius cogens is an
international law concept under which officials forfeit immunity for heinous
acts such as genocide, slavery, or torture. 8 In the district court’s view, most
of the circuits to consider this issue have declined to recognize a ius cogens
exception. 9
                                              C
        Plaintiffs’ appellate brief serves up a dog’s breakfast of murky and
unsupported arguments. All but one is forfeited for inadequate briefing. See
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), (a)(8); see also United States v. Quintanilla, 
114 F.4th 453, 463
 (5th Cir. 2024) (exploring “the outer limits of the doctrine of

        _____________________
        8
          See, e.g., Belhas, 
515 F.3d at 1286
 (discussing ius cogens); see also Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States § 702 cmts. D–I,
§ 102 cmt. k (1987); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332.
        9
           See Doğan v. Barak, 
932 F.3d 888
, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2019); Matar, 
563 F.3d at 14
;
Ye v. Zemin, 
383 F.3d 620, 627
 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Buratai, 
318 F. Supp. 3d at 234
(concluding, under D.C. Circuit precedent, “ius cogens allegations do not defeat foreignofficial immunity under the common law”). But see Yousuf v. Samantar, 
699 F.3d 763, 777
(4th Cir. 2012) (concluding “under international and domestic law, officials from other
countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the
acts were performed in the defendant’s official capacity”). Because plaintiffs forfeited the
ius cogens issue, see infra, we do not decide whether the district court correctly resolved it.




                                              7
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                                        No. 24-20075


forfeiture”). The only argument we address is plaintiffs’ contention that the
TVPA implicitly waives foreign official immunity. 10 We agree with the
district court that the TVPA does no such thing.
        The TVPA covers a field governed previously by the common law,
namely, liability for actions taken under color of foreign authority.
Accordingly, “we interpret the statute with the presumption that Congress
intended to retain the substance of the common law.” Samantar, 
560 U.S. at 322
 n.13 (citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 
343 U.S. 779, 783
 (1952)).
        As noted, foreign state immunity—including the immunity of foreign
officials—was part of the common law. See Samantar, 
560 U.S. at 311
, 322–
23; Matar, 
563 F.3d at 14
; Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official
Immunity, supra, at 709 (discussing late 18th-century cases involving foreign
official immunity “as part of the general common law”). “[W]here a
common-law principle is well established, . . . the courts may take it as given
that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply

        _____________________
        10
            Accordingly, we do not address the thorny question of how ius cogens interacts
with foreign official immunity and the TVPA. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Conflicting
Approaches to the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 115 Am. J. Int’l Law
1, 8–9 (2021) [Bradley Conflicting Approaches]; Dodge & Keitner at 704;
Christopher D. Totten, The Adjudication of Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in the
United States Post-Samantar: A Circuit Split and Its Implications, 26 Duke J.
of Comp. & Int’l Law 517, 517–19 (2016). Plaintiffs do not properly raise that issue
for two reasons. First, their opening brief—to the extent it even addresses the issue—does
not develop it in any meaningful way, violating Rule 28(a)(8)(A). See, e.g., United States v.
Stalnaker, 
571 F.3d 428
, 439 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2009) (issues forfeited because brief “d[id] not
fully explain them,” “d[id] not cite the record or relevant law,” and made conclusory
“one-sentence arguments”). Second, and separately, plaintiffs’ statement of issues does
not mention the issue, in violation of Rule 28(a)(5). See Quintanilla, 
114 F.4th at 464
(“Where a party fails to list an issue presented in his or her statement of the issues, the
issue is forfeited even if he or she raises the issue in the body of the brief.”). At most, the
statement raises the implicit waiver argument (which we do address) but says nothing about
ius cogens, which the district court correctly treated as a distinct issue.




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                                       No. 24-20075


except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’” Astoria Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 
501 U.S. 104, 108
 (1991) (quoting Isbrandtsen,
343 U.S. at 783
) (other citations omitted). That is especially true with respect
to common-law immunities. As the Supreme Court has explained, a statute
must give “clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
common-law immunities.” Pierson v. Ray, 
386 U.S. 547, 554
 (1967).
        The problem for plaintiffs is that the TVPA says nothing about
immunity. It speaks about someone’s “liability” for engaging in certain acts
under the actual or apparent authority of a foreign nation. See TVPA,
§ 2(a)(1) (providing an “individual . . . shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages”). But such language does not “specifically” or “clear[ly]
indicat[e]” Congress’s design to remove existing common-law immunities.
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554–55. To rule otherwise would ignore what the
Supreme Court has long held about § 1983—namely, that its similar language
(“Every person . . . shall be liable”) does not evince an intent to eliminate
common-law immunities. 11 Accordingly, we conclude, as has the Ninth
Circuit, that the TVPA does not abrogate foreign official immunity. See
Doğan, 
932 F.3d at 896
 (“[W]e hold that the TVPA does not abrogate
foreign official immunity.”). 12

        _____________________
        11
           See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 
566 U.S. 356, 361
 (2012) (“Despite the broad terms of
§ 1983, this Court has long recognized that the statute was not meant to effect a radical
departure from ordinary tort law and the common-law immunities applicable in tort
suits.”); Procunier v. Navarette, 
434 U.S. 555, 561
 (1978) (noting § 1983 “has been
consistently construed as not intending wholesale revocation of the common-law immunity
afforded government officials”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 
341 U.S. 367, 376
 (1951) (holding
legislative immunities were not erased “by covert inclusion in [§ 1983’s] general
language”).
        12
           See also Bradley Conflicting Approaches at 16–17 (concluding the
TVPA “is best read not to displace the common law of foreign official immunity,” because
“[t]he text of the TVPA does not mention immunity, and statutes are normally assumed
not to displace the common law by implication—a proposition that the Court in Samantar




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                                      No. 24-20075


        Plaintiffs’ response is unconvincing. With no elaboration, they argue
only that the availability of foreign official immunity “means the [TVPA]
was dead on arrival.” We disagree. One could have made the same argument
with respect to § 1983 and common-law immunities, which have long been
recognized by courts without rendering that statute a dead letter.
Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, a foreign official would not
enjoy immunity if his government disavowed his conduct, something
“Congress expected foreign states would generally” do. Doğan, 
932 F.3d at 895
; see also, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 
25 F.3d 1467, 1472
 (9th Cir. 1994) (preTVPA suit against former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos allowed to
proceed because the Philippine government expressly denied that Marcos’s
conduct had been performed in an official capacity). 13
        In sum, the district court correctly ruled that the TVPA does not
implicitly waive foreign official immunity.
                                           IV
        The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.




        _____________________
itself referenced”) (citing Samantar, 
560 U.S. at 320
); but see Lewis, 
918 F.3d at 150
(Randolph, J., concurring) (suggesting common-law foreign official immunity “must give
way” to the TVPA); 
id. at 148
 (Srinivasan, J., concurring) (agreeing with Judge Randolph
that the TVPA “displaces any common-law, conduct-based immunity that might
otherwise apply”).
        13
           Plaintiffs also cite Mohammed v. Palestinian Authority, 
566 U.S. 449
 (2012), but
that decision holds only that the TVPA’s term “individual” includes only natural persons
and not organizations. 
Id.
 at 454–56, 461. It does not address immunity.




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